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This study centers around Nigeria-United States
relations with respect to their perspectives on political
change in Africa. It is premised on the assumption that
international politics is generally a mix of conflictual
and cooperative relationships. It is in this context that
the study examines Nigeria-United States perspectives, and
the positions taken by both countries on the issue of
political change in Africa, using Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia
and South Africa as case studies.
The study shows that, at the level of diplomatic
rhetoric, there seems to be a shared perspective on political
change between Nigeria and the United States. However,
underneath this shared perspective lie a host of disagree
ments and differences. Of critical significance are the
differences in the interpretation of political change and
the motivations behind both countries' policy in Southern
Africa.
Nigeria favors radical change, while the United
States favors gradual change. Furthermore, there is
evidence to suggest that Nigeria is motivated by its com
mitment to the cause of African emancipation, while the
United States is largely motivated by its varied economic
and strategic interests in the region. These differences,
however, have not made cooperation between both countries
in other areas impossible.
The conclusion suggests that, on the whole, Nigeria-
United States relations during the period under study have
been marked by disagreements and cooperation. Relations
between the two countries were decidedly cool at times,
cordial at other times and uneasy in the Reagan years.
NIGERIA-UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THEIR
PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICAL CHANGE IN AFRICA:
THE CASES OF ANGOLA, ZIMBABWE,
NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA
A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF ATLANTA UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
BY
AIG. SMART UHAKHEME





This dissertation is dedicated to my parents,
Mesharun and Olobi, for their love and support; to my
brothers, Omoruyi, Ibiezugbe and Ozolua for their brotherly
love and encouragement7 to Aikpabomo for her love, personal
sacrifices and encouragement and to Ohamien, (whose timely
arrival coincided with the completion of the major part of
this study) for his sweet, soothing smile.
I want to thank all the members of my dissertation
committee for their guidance and cooperation. Special
thanks to Dr. Hashim T. Gibrill for his valuable sugges
tions. Above all, my sincere appreciation goes to my dis
sertation advisor Professor Robert A. Holmes for his
assistance and helpful advice.
TABLE OF CONTENTS






II. OVERVIEW OF NIGERIA-UNITED STATES RELATIONS . . 36
Background
Overview

















1. United States Import Dependency on
Southern Africa 76
2. United States Trade with Southern
Africa 77
3. Movement's Total Forces . 96
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Africa is the centre point of Nigeria's foreign
policy. The promotion of African unity and the achievement
of "total political, economic, social and cultural libera
tion of Africa" are two of its stated foreign policy
objectives.
The attainment of the aspect of Nigeria's foreign
policy with respect to political change in Africa during
the period 1975-1981 is the focus of this research. In at
tempting to pursue its stated objectives, Nigeria realizes
that there are other important actors in the international
environment to contend with. One such actor is the United
States, and both countries have realized that the areas of
common interests that exist between them need to be empha
sized. According to National Security Council Memorandum
No. D18, part of which spells out United States global
"Foreign Policy Objectives," in The Constitution
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Lagos: Federal Ministry
of Information, Printing Division, 1979), p. 10.
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policy, the United States seeks: (1) wider cooperation with
key allies and close cooperation with such regional influ
ential nations as Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Brazil; (2) to
strengthen its presence in all regions of the world; and
(3) to enhance its cooperative effort with "moderate states
2
of Africa in the cause of African emancipation."
Nigeria-United States relations have not always
been ambiguous. In the period covered by this study, a
discernible pattern has started to emerge. Relations be
tween both countries have had their high and low points
since Nigerian independence in 1960. The United States
alleged support for Biafra during the Nigerian civil war
resulted in strained relations in 1967-70. Also there
were open differences over United States involvement in
Angola in 1975, culminating in the unwillingness of Nigeria
4
to receive the then Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.
However, relations between both countries improved immensely
during the Carter administration largely due to the skillful
National Security Council Strategy No. D18 (Wash
ington: U.S. Government Printing Press, 1978), p. 15.
Zdnek Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity
(New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1977), p. 97.
Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Records 1975-76
(New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1976), p. 25.
diplomacy of Andrew Young, United States Ambassador to the
United Nations. There were cordial exchanges and visits
between 1977 and 1980, first President Jimmy Carter and
then Vice President Walter Mondale visited Nigeria. And,
in October 1980 it was President Shehu Shagari's turn to
reciprocate with a visit to the United States. There were
those who thought that despite these visits nothing of
substance was actually accomplished.
Statement of Purpose
An Exploratory Study in Conflict
and Cooperation
Every nation state in the contemporary state system
has its own national interests that differ from the inter
ests of other nations. These differences may sometimes
lead to clashes. Occasional clashes between nation states
notwithstanding, they still engage in cooperative efforts
in other areas. As Ivo D. Duchacek puts it, nation states
"may often have profound disagreements on trade and tariff
policies while their political and military cooperation
5Africa, November 1980, p. 30.
David Ottaway, "Africa: U.S. Policy Eclipse,"
America and the World 1979 (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979),
p. 636.
flourishes."
Furthermore, it needs to be said that virtually all
relationships contain some elements of conflict. Even in
the most cooperative relationship between nation states,
some areas of disagreement are bound to occur. According to
Duchacek, "no two nations can be expected to have all their
interests in harmony with one another all the time," nor do
they "have all their interests in conflict all the time."
Even arch enemies, Duchacek added, are often able to engage
in cooperative relationship in one sector "while uncompro
mising enmity and total distrust prevail in a different
Q
sector of their relations."
The implication here is that international politics
is a mix of conflictual and cooperative relationships.
They are not mutually exclusive. That is, nation states
can be engaged in both relationships at the same time. It
is in this context that this study will attempt to analyze
Nigeria-United States relations with respect to their per
spectives on political change in Africa, using Angola,
Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa as case studies.
Ivo D. Duchacek, Nations and Men (Hindsdale, 111.:
Dryden Press, 1975), p. 532.
8Ibid.
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Areas of conflict.—At least five areas of conflict
between Nigeria and the United States can be identified:
(1) the United States' refusal to sell arms to Nigeria
during the Biafran conflict and the alleged United States
support for Biafra, (2) the United States involvement in
Angola in 1975, (3) whether or not Nigeria would use its
oil as an instrument of its foreign policy toward the United
States, (4) the rate at which Nigeria should be producing
its oil and the price at which it should be sold to the
United States, and (5) whether Nigeria should be considered
a rich country. These will be elaborated upon in the
section dealing with the review of literature.
Cooperation.—These areas of conflict have not made
cooperation between both countries in other areas impossible.
Both countries have been involved in cooperative efforts to
find a solution to the problem of colonialism in Southern
Africa. The focus of this study is on common ground in
both countries' perspectives on political change in Africa,
pointing out where conflict and/or cooperation exist.
Does the United States need Nigeria's understanding?
Is it important to the United States that Nigeria remains a
friendly nation? Is Nigeria's support for United States
diplomatic initiatives in Africa crucial to the success of
those initiatives? Conversely, has Nigeria's opposition
been an important factor in the failure of those initia
tives? How have United States diplomatic initiatives, when
successful, benefitted both countries?
A major theme in the history of the independence
struggles in Africa is total political, economic, social
and cultural liberation of Africa. Political change,
recognized then and now as a fundamental right to be sought;
its achievement has been in the forefront of Africa's mind,
and it is likely to remain there.
Today, efforts to bring about political change in
the continent are largely confined to Namibia and South
Africa. The history of such efforts in Africa is full of
examples of how Africans have sought to solve the problem
of oppression and colonialism and achieve freedom and inde
pendence by various means.
By the early 1960s the rise of numerous independent
African states helped legitimize two approaches to polit
ical independence: negotiated settlement and revolution.
The form of government that is put in place after political
independence is, to a large extent, determined by which
approach is taken. Apart from the Congo crisis, United
States interest was not reawakened until 1975 when
Portuguese domination was suddenly dismantled. Chester
A. Crocker explained: "Washington could no longer simply
enjoy its varied interests in Africa: it would have to work
actively to preempt Soviet-backed revolutionary change and
10
deter further communxst adventurism, . . .
Political change in Africa is inevitable. There is
evidence to show that political change per se is not neces
sarily inimical to United States interests. United States
policy-makers needed to come to the realization that the
United States can no longer act as the policeman of Africa,
preventing change. Instead they should have realized that
what was needed is the management of change to fit in with
United States aspirations and interests. A study by the
Center for Strategic and International Studies concluded
that what matters is not the fact of change but how change
occurs, whose interests and influence it reflects, and the
12
extent of violent or coercive solutions.
How important to Nigeria was the issue of political
9
Colin Legum, After Angola: The War Over Southern
Africa (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1976), p. 7.
Chester A. Crocker et al., The Implications of
Soviet and Cuban Activities in Africa for U.S. Policy




change in Africa? How sensitive was United States foreign
policy to this issue? How did both countries manage their
differences and find a common ground on how best to achieve
political change in Africa?
Definition of concept
Political change.—Political scientists are not
agreed on the precise meaning of political change. However,
there seems to be a concensus that it involves the reorder
ing of a given political system to permit all adult members
of the population an effective participation in the polit
ical process.
Pan-Africanists hold the view that political change
in Africa means "radical redistribution of power and
wealth." E. A. Brett, in Colonialism and Underdevelop-
ment in East Africa, explained political change as:
. . .those relating to the structure and size of
economic production, the nature of the distribution
of the social product, and the location of control
over social processes. These concerns embody a set
of related normative assumptions—that production
be maximized, distribution equalized, and control
decentralized. . .4
13Leonard Thompson and J. Butler, Change in Contem
porary South Africa (Los Angeles: U.C.L.A. Press, 1975),
p. xi.
14E. A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in
East Africa (London: Heinemann Press, 1973), p. 2.
9
Martin Kilson defines political change as "the alteration
in the ideas, values, procedures, and institutions concerned
with the role of authority, power, influence and govern
ment. . ."15
Radical Pan-Africanists take the definition a little
further by asserting that the outcome of such a restructur
ing of the political system should be a socialist order.16
Basil Davidson expressed this view when he wrote:
The basic problem for Africans is to find their
own way of revolutionizing the structures of the past,
and revolutionizing the colonial structures they have
had imposed upon them, and which they inherited, in
large part, when they have become politically inde
pendent. Africans need this dual revolution along
African lines: they need it because they have to move
on to new systems and modes of production. . .and it
seems to me very clear indeed that this revolution
will not be, cannot be, in the direction of capitalism.
It must be in the direction of socialism.17
All of these definitions are useful, but for the
purpose of this study, a suitable definition relates to the
seizure of power that leads to a major restructuring of
Martin Kilson, Political Change in a West African
State (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1966), p. 281.
For detailed discussions of radical Pan-African-
ists' view on political change, see Christopher Allen,
Radical Africana (London: Merlin Press, 1974), and Claude
Ake* Revolutionary Pressures in Africa (London: Zed Press,
1978).
Basil Davidson, "An Interview with Basil Davidson,"
Ufahamu I (March 1971): 1-32.
10
government and society, as distinguished from the mere re
placement of the former elite by a new one or coup d'etat
involving no more than a change of ruling personnel. Put
simply, political change means the wresting of state power
from colonial and neo-colonial governments, occupation
forces, settler regimes, minority regimes, and the funda
mental restructuring of the political system. The ultimate
goal is to maximize a state's political, economic, social
and cultural liberation. This can be brought about by one
or a combination of two approaches: (a) armed struggle,
and (b) negotiated settlement. The adoption of one ap
proach does not necessarily preclude the other—in other
words, they are not mutually exclusive. Nigeria publicly
embraces both approaches, while the United States publicly
adopts (b), but covertly encourages (a) in a sometimes
futile attempt to prevent change that would lead to a
fundamental restructuring of government and society.^ At
the level of diplomatic rhetoric, both countries seem to
hold similar views on political change, but does political
change mean the same thing to both nations?
18
The United States is currently involved in such




Nigeria.—During the period covered by this study,
particularly beginning with the Muhammed administration,
Nigeria adopted a radical and militant approach to issues
relating to the liberation of Southern Africa. To Nigeria,
political change had come to mean the wrestling of state
power from a colonial regime and the fundamental restruc
turing of the political system. Nigeria believed that this
could be attained by: (a) peaceful means where feasible,
and (b) armed struggle when necessary. Furthermore,
Nigeria was strongly in favor of radical change and total
liberation, as opposed to the mere changing of the ruling
personnel. An indication of Nigeria's commitment to radical
change could be seen from her extensive support for libera
tion movements in Africa.
United States.—Historically, the United States'
position could be summed up as follows: (a) a rhetorical
condemnation of colonialism, and (b) at the same time,
expressing its strong opposition to armed struggle.
Recently Chester Crocker reiterated this position when he saM
that the United States cannot endorse colonialism or oppres
sion, nor those who are "dedicated to seizing or holding
12
power through violence."19 To the United States, political
change means no more than a mere change of ruling personnel,
with little or no change in the structure of the political
system and society. It supports evolutionary change, as
opposed to radical change. It seeks negotiation, but
opposes armed struggle that would lead to radical change.
It needs to be said that although the United States is
opposed to armed struggle as an official policy, it is also
involved in covert operations in many trouble spots around
the world.
In sum, there are differences in both countries'
interpretations of political change in important respects.
While Nigeria favors fundamental change, the United States
does not. Instead, the United States favors evolutionary
change. Furthermore, Nigeria favors both peaceful means
and armed struggle to bring about change, but the United
States favors peaceful change, and only opposes armed
struggle as an official policy, but favors covert opera
tions. There is evidence to suggest that the United States:
(a) is only opposed to armed struggle that would lead to
fundamental restructuring of government and society, and
19
Crocker, et al., Implications of Soviet and Cuban
Activities, p. 16.
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(b) has actively supported armed struggle in Cuba (Bay of
Pigs), Vietnam, Angola, Nicaragua and Grenada to either
maintain a status quo or overthrow a government it considered
unfriendly.
The question that needs to be asked is why was the
United States, a country born of revolution, opposed to
radical change? Part of the answer can be gleaned from the
discussion of United States interests and motivations else
where in this study.
Literature Review
At least two time periods are discernible in the
literature on Nigeria-United States relations. There are
those who contend that prior to 1975, and for the most part
of the Nixon/Ford administration, relations between both
countries were at an all time low. Others state that begin
ning with the Carter administration, relations between both
countries significantly improved.
Prior to 1975 Nigeria was referred to as a "sleeping
giant" because of its inactive, low profile and sometimes
timid foreign policy posture. Critics say Nigeria's low
profile and timid foreign policy posture was a calculated
attempt by successive governments from 1960 to 1975 to:
14
"Stave off direct conflict with any of the major powers
except on critical issues such as the preservation of the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of
Nigeria."20
Nigeria's low profile foreign policy posture coin
cided with another important fact in the international
system—the East-West power struggle. Cold War concerns,
the war in Vietnam and Soviet activities in Cuba were of
paramount importance to Washington; therefore, the formula
tion of a credible United States Nigerian policy was a low
priority issue for United States policy makers. In his book
Nigeria's Leadership Role in Africa, Joseph Wayas noted that
"of all the areas of the world, only Antarctica is less
important to the United States," x than Nigeria or Africa.
President Lyndon B.Cfohnson's presumed indifference or igno
rance was dipicted by his quoted remarks to British Prime
Minister Harold Wilson in 1964: "I keep confusing Nigeria
22
and Algeria because both end in 'geria.'" Hezy Idowu, in
20
Olajide Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy
(Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 240.
21
Joseph Wayas, Nigeria's Leadership Role in Africa
(London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 58.
22Ibid.
15
"Nigeria's Foreign Policy: A Re-assessment," Times Inter
national , (Nigeria) presented a vivid picture of Nigeria-
United States relations during the Nixon administration:
. . .the West took Nigeria for granted. Although
Gowon (then Nigerian leader) was in power close to a
decade, the United States had no Nigerian policy and
when Gowon travelled to that country, Richard Nixon
did not consider him important enough to receive him.
In the last days of the Ford administration. Secretary of
State Henry A. Kissinger started to move away from the
policy of benign neglect. In an attempt to improve rela
tions between both countries, a more active diplomacy with
Nigeria was initiated as evidenced by a scheduled official
visit to Nigeria by Kissinger. Although the visit was
25
later cancelled, diplomatic observers were convinced that
a change in Nigeria-United States relations was imminent.
However, Kissinger's move away from the policy of benign
neglect had not gone unnoticed in Nigeria. The Nigeria
23
Hezy Idowu, "Nigeria's Foreign Policy: A Re-assess
ment," Times International, 2 August 1976, p. 3.
Yakubu Gowon was in the United States to address
the United Nations in 1973. He also visited Washington,
but Nixon did not meet with him.
24"Kissinger Can't Come Now," Daily Sketch, (Nigeria)
10 April 1976, p. 12. ■
25
Nigeria's official explanation was "inconvenient
timing" of the visit.
16
Standard attributed this shift to "the intervention of
Cuban troops in Angola and the subsequent routing of
2 fi
Western-backed forces in the former Portuguese colony."
When Murtala Muhammed came to power in 1975 in a
coup d'etat in which Yakubu Gowon was overthrown, the time
had come for the "sleeping giant" to wake up. Subsequent
foreign policy decisions taken by the Muhammed administra
tion led Africanists to characterize Nigeria's foreign
policy as a "dynamic" one. Clement Okosun, in a January
1976 article, "Nigeria's Dynamic Approach to her Foreign
Policy," explained that:
. . .within five months of its existence, the new
administration has taken steps which point to her
pursuit of a dynamic foreign policy not only towards
the already developed nations but also towards the
developing nations...
Nigeria's pursuit of a dynamic foreign policy and
of her re-discovery of her important role in the third
world and in Africa, are reflected in the decisive
stand of the new administration on the Angolan issue.
Not only did the government make its stand decidedly
clear that it recognised the MPLA as the legitimate
government of Angola, it went further to give financial
aid to the tune of about fourteen million naira to the
MPLA.27
26
"U.S. Afridan Policy Revisited," Nigeria Standard,
12 August 1976, p. 5. For further discussions on why
Kissinger switched to the activism of diplomacy, see "The
Angola Fiasco," Great Decisions 1979, p. 58.
27Clement Okosun, "Nigeria's Dynamic Approach to her
Foreign Policy," Nigeria: Bulletin on Foreign Affairs
(January 1976): 52.
17
A. Bolaji Akinyemi, in "Nigerian Foreign Policy," in
Nigerian Government and Politics, ed. 0. Oyediran, (1979)
thought that such change in Nigeria's foreign policy ap
proach was long overdue. Nigeria, he said, "Seems to have
finally arrived at the role and status which Nigerians have
28
been clamouring for since 1960. . ." The Economist, in
"Sheikhs of Black Africa," August 2, 1975, stated that this
arrival of Nigeria was precipitated by the enormous re
sources generated by the oil boom, resources which were
then being ploughed into industrial and infrastructural
bases. Jean Herskovits recognized this potential power, and
warned that if Nigeria translates its potential into actual
power, the United States would have to "rethink its policies
29
and actions in Africa."
The dynamic foreign policy of the Muhammed adminis
tration facilitated by the new wealth coincided with the
ascendancy of Jimmy Carter to the White House. When Carter
announced that he planned to visit Nigeria, observers were
quick to point out that a change in Nigeria-United States
28A Bolaji Akinyemi, "Nigerian Foreign Policy," in
Nigerian Government and Politics, ed. 0. Oyediran (London:
Macmillan, 1979), p. 167.
2 9
Jean Herskovits, "Nigeria: Africa's New Power,"
Foreign Affairs (January 1975): 314-33.
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relations had emerged. Jean Herskovits, in "Dateline
Nigeria: A Black Power," Foreign Policy, Winter 1977-78,
described the visit as a symbol of "a new spirit" in
Nigeria-United States relations. Chester A. Crocker and
William H. Lewis thought that such a change was reflected
by "top appointments and a highly energetic diplomacy."
They explained:
To offset past impressions of United States neglect,
Washington's new approach was to define and take stock
of the African view point on the continent's many
problems. This meant extending the narrow base of
past United States African diplomacy beyond traditional
friends, and building ties with Nigeria. . .where
previous relations had ranged from cool to icy. °
Oye Ogunbadejo, in "A New Turn in U.S.-Nigerian Relations,"
World Today, March 1979, stated that the Carter administra
tion marked a significant turning point in Nigeria-United
States relations. The Carter policy, he contended, provided
both countries with "an opportunity for a fresh start and a
realistic examination of issues affecting them both."
Donald B. Easum, the then United States Ambassador to
Nigeria offered a summary of the change in Nigeria-United
States relations:
30Chester A. Crocker and W. H. Lewis, "Missing
Opportunities in Africa," Foreign Policy (Winter 1977-78):
142.
19
We take Nigerian views very seriously, and not just
on African issues but on issues of global concern.
We consult and discuss together such problems as the
North-South economic relationship, or the Law of the
Sea, or Zimbabwe and Namibia, or the question of
political rights and equal opportunity within South
Africa itself. Nigerian views on these issues are an
increasingly important factor in the formulation of
United States policies.
There were those who thought that this new turn in Nigeria-
United States relations was not accidental. Two explana
tions were offered—economic and political. Herskovits
explained:
Nigeria is important to the United States. . .because
of economics, because of its growing leadership in
Africa and elsewhere in the Third World, and its re
cent election to the United Nations Security
Council. . . 2
The visits by General Obasanjo to the United States and
President Carter to Nigeria, the strengthened economic
links between both countries and Washington's firm stand on
majority rule for Namibia and South Africa were some of the
concrete examples of improved relations between both
countries referred to in the literature.33
Donald B. Easum, Interlink No. 51 (1977): 10.
32
Jean Herskovits, "Dateline Nigeria: A Black Power,"
Foreign Policy (Winter 1977-78): 167.
33
For detailed discussions of these examples, see
0. Ogunbadejo, "A New Turn in U.S.-Nigerian Relations," world
Today (March 1979): 117-126; David Coetzee, "The Blosoming
Business Relations," New African (Aug. 1978): 14.
20
Others thought that in spite of What had been done
by both countries to improve relations, nothing of substance
was actually accomplished. Stanley Macebuh saw more noise
than substance to the Carter administration's vaunted claims
of a new spirit in Nigeria-United States relations. He
stated that little more than diplomatic rhetoric could be
expected from the Carter administration because "domestic
constraints will probably not permit Carter to be as pro-
34
gressive as he would like to be in Africa."
Some observers believed that with the departure of
some of the key members of the Africanists group in the
Carter administration, such as Andrew Young and later
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, the rival group, the Global-
ists, including National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski,
seemed to have prevailed by the end of 1979 in influencing
the administration's African policy. David Ottaway, in
"Africa: United States Policy Eclipse," in America and the
World 1979, citing decisions taken by the United States else
where in Africa, contended that by the end of 1979 the
United States "did appear to be on the verge of a major
reversal back" to traditional United States policy toward
34
Stanley Macebuh, "Misreading Opportunities in
Africa," Foreign Policy (Winter 1977-78): 162.
21
Nigeria. He warned that:
The implications of such a reversal for United States
relations with Africa were likely to be far reaching.
It would certainly endanger the reservoir of goodwill
Ambassador Young and the Africanists' policy had built
up for the United States throughout black Africa
generally, and in such leading African states as
Tanzania and Nigeria specifically. ^
If the new spirit in Nigeria-United States relations
during the Carter administration, to a large extent, led to
improved relations between both countries, what was the
situation under the first year of the Reagan administration?
Initially the Reagan administration made strong efforts to
maintain good relations with Nigeria, partly for the same
reasons the Carter administration had. West Africa quoted
President Reagan as saying to the Nigerian Ambassador to
the United States:
. . .our two countries are interdependent economically,
politically and culturally. . . • This relationship of
mutual dependence has always been a close, secure one,
and we look forward to its continuing in the future on
the same basis.^
President Reagan's claim of "a relationship of mutual
dependence" was a recognition of the fact that the areas of
common interest between both countries needed to be
Ottaway, "Africa: U.S. Policy Eclipse," p. 657.
"Nigeria's Anxieties Over U.S. Policy," West Africa
(27 July 1981): 1687.
22
emphasized. However, the growing uneasiness between both
countries that became explicit and manifest during the first
year of the Reagan administration must be acknowledged.
One of the first indications of the unease was the May 1981
visit of the South African Foreign Minister to the White
House. The Atlanta Constitution described the visit as:
Officially signaling an end to almost three years of
chilly relations between Washington and Pretoria. . .
but it is certain to cause political problems for
Reagan at home and abroad. '
Leslie H. Gelb, in "A New African Policy," New York Times,
4 June 1981, explained the new approach as essentially
coaxing rather than threatening South Africa into coopera
tion. According to Gelb, this means:
. . .(1) strengthening direct ties with South Africa
through symbols like official visits and proposing
terms for a Namibian settlement closer to Pretoria's
wishes, (2) recognizing South Africa's problems with
the White minority in South West Africa. 8
Some commentators would like to have us believe that the
unease that has characterized Nigeria-United States
relations is only a symptom of some long-standing con
flicts .
"Reagan Opens His Doors to South African Official,"
Atlanta Constitution, 16 ,ay 1981, p. 6A.
38Leslie H. Gelb, "A New African Policy," New York
Times, 4 June 1981, p. 4Y.
23
Areas of conflict
As has been mentioned in the preceeding section,
United States alleged involvement in the Biafran conflict
was a source of conflict between Lagos and Washington.39
According to Harold Nelson, "the use of chartered United
States cargo planes for relief flights to Biafra," among
other things, "caused some friction on the official level
and considerable criticism in the Nigerian press."40 To
guard against clandestine arms shipments to Biafra, the
Nigerian government wanted all relief flights to first'land
in Lagos before continuing to Biafra. Occasional non-
compliance with this air blockade by the United States was
strongly condemned by Nigeria. Olajide Aluko pointed out
that on one occasion-, Nigeria had to call in the then Amer
ican Ambassador to Nigeria, Mr. Elbert Mathews, to strongly
protest "the unwarranted American interference in the
39
The United States professed to be officially
neutral in the Biafran conflict, but Mrs. Nixon's involve
ment in a Biafran fund-raising was interpreted as evidence
of tacit support for Biafra. For details, see John
Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil
War, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 289.
40Harold Nelson, Nigeria; A country Study (Washing
ton, D. C: American University Press, 1981), p. 64.
24
41
internal affairs of Nigeria." Furthermore, the professed
United States policy of "neutrality" in the Biafran con
flict and the "sustained pro-Biafran propaganda carried out
in the United States," Aluko added, were interpreted in
42
Lagos "as indirect support for the secessionist cause."
The United States involvement in Angola was also a
source of conflict between Nigeria and the United States.
The United States backing of the FNLA/UNITA faction and its
alleged collusion with South Africa in South Africa's inter
vention in Angola led to a deterioration of already strained
relations. South Africa's intervention, as John Marcum puts
it, was seen in Nigeria as a dangerous "American-South
43
African collusion."
In 1979 a small but vocal section of the Nigerian
population urged Nigeria to cut off oil supplies to the
United States to underscore its displeasure with United
States involvement in Southern Africa. Joseph Wayas
represented this view. He outlined several economic
reprisals Nigeria should take against the United States,
Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy, p. 107.
42Ibid.
43John Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," Foreign Affairs
(April 1976): 419.
25
including the cut off of oil supplies and the blacklisting
44
of United States companies seeking contracts in Nigeria.
Other areas of conflict between Nigeria and the
United States concerned: (a) the rate at which Nigeria
should be producing its oil and the price at which it
should be sold to the United States, and (b) whether
Nigeria should be considered a rich country. The United
States wanted Nigeria to raise production levels and sell
at below the OPEC minimum levels. On the other hand,
Nigeria preferred to hold down production and sell at
45
higher prices. The United States categorized Nigeria as
a rich country, thus, ineligible for concessional, as op
posed to completely reimbursable aid. Therefore, it would
have to pay full cost for all its needs from the United
States. Nigeria argued that it was not yet a rich country,
46
therefore, it should be considered eligible for aid. Aaron
Segal saw these as potentially areas of long standing
Wayas, Nigeria's Leadership Role, p. 79.
45
"Nigeria to Consider U.S. Request for Help,"
Nigeria Standard, 14 October 1977, p. 2.
. General Obasanjo, "Nigeria is not Yet a Rich
Nation," Federal Ministry of Information Release No. 1810,
11 October 1977, p. 2.
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conflicts that should be taken seriously. He predicted
that these conflicts might lead ultimately to "an unhappy"
47
relationship. Aluko was not that modest in his charac
terization of Nigeria-United States relations when he said
that these conflicts had transformed Nigeria into one of
the United States' "greatest opponents and a potential
enemy."
It is important to note that some of these con
flicts did not persist. For example, by 1981 Nigeria was
no longer talking about the use of the oil weapon, and the
issues of production levels and price range had largely
been settled by market forces.
What is apparent in the literature on Nigeria-
United States relations is that relations between both
countries seem to reflect some elements of conflict and co
operation .
Methodology
The methodological approach used in this study is
the Case Study. This method is used because it clearly
47
Aaron Segal, "Nigeria-United States: Uneasy Part
ners," Africa Report (January-February 1981): 16.
48
Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy, p. 104.
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provides an opportunity for the writer to undertake a com
prehensive description and explanation of the many components
of the subject matter. By using this approach, an attempt
will be made to collect and examine data on the political
relationship of these countries and the roles played by
Nigeria and the United States in the cause of African eman
cipation. My aim is to generate insights that will have
some applicability beyond the cases in this study. However,
I am aware that these case studies themselves can not
guarantee this.
This research focuses on four areas: (a) a general
overview of Nigeria-United States relations during the
period covered by this research 1975-1981); (b) identifica
tion of both countries' perspectives on political change;
(c) an analysis of the positions taken by both countries on
the question of political change in Africa, using Angola,
Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa as case studies; and
(d) from information generated in the above sections, con
clusions will be drawn and generalizations made about the
relations between both countries, their perspectives on




Part of this study is based on data extracted from
primary sources, including government documents and pro
nouncements . A substantial amount of valuable material is
drawn from actual government actions, independent reports,
journalistic and scholarly articles and to a lesser extent,
from published interviews and texts on the subject.
Significance of the cases
The cases examined in this study are of special
significance in that: (a) they held the inevitable prospect
of a direct military confrontation between black and white-
dominated Africa, (b) there was the possibility of great
power confrontations, and (c) at the same time, they
demonstrated that diplomatic initiatives can still be
instrumental in bringing about political change in a region
that is engulfed in revolutionary wars.
Theoretical Framework: Why Nations
Act as they do
There are three aspects of theoretical concerns
central to this study: (a) National Interests, (b) Foreign
Policy, and (c) National Capabilities.
National interests.—These are the basic objectives
29
and ultimate determinants that the decision-makers of a
state ought to follow in formulating their foreign policy.
They are typically seen as general conceptions of those es
sential elements that make up a state's most vital needs.
Invariably, these include self-preservation, independence,
territorial integrity, military security and economic well-
49
being. As Ivo D. Duchacek puts it:
Groups constituting a national community feel that
in addition to their subnational and often conflicting
interests, they also have one higher and general
interest in common; the interest in remaining a state
and in promoting its security and welfare. This col
lective interest represents a total of all individual
and group interests, and something more. It usually
stands above particular interests, and its emotional
content is high.
Ideally, national leaders are charged with the responsi
bility of equally promoting and defending all of these
interests, but sometime such a task becomes almost an im
possible one to accomplish. Hans J. Morgenthau elucidated
the link between interest and nation as follows:
. . .while the concern of politics with interest is
perennial, the connection between interest and the
national state is a product of history. The national
An
Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the
American People (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1974), pp. 1-2.
50
Duchacek, Nations and Men, p. 118.
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state itself is obviously a product of history and as
such is destined to yield in time to different modes
of political organization. As long as the world is
politically organized into nations, the national
interest is indeed the last word in international
politics.51
Although national interests may stand above particular
interests and may be the last word in international politics,
they also raise serious controversies, such as: (a) what
exactly the national interests of a nation are in any given
situation, (b) whether or not they are being seriously
threatened by external forces, and (c) how best to promote
52
and/or defend them.
Nation states in the contemporary state system
interact with one another as they promote and defend their
national interests. Differences in the national interests
of states may lead to actual conflict, but such a clash
"has never precluded conciliation or even cooperation among
nations" in other areas. According to Duchacek: "When
the interests of several nations seriously clash, it does
not mean that these nations are in mutual opposition at all
54
times and in all respects. Nation states sometime have
Hans J. Morgenthau, Dilemmas of Politics (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 67-68.
52
Duchacek, Nations and Men, p. 119.
53 54
Ibid., p. 121. Ibid.
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harmonious interests. When they do, they often work to
gether to solve mutual problems. Closely related to
national interests is foreign policy.
Foreign policy.—This is usually defined as a
planned course of action developed by decision-makers of a
state aimed at achieving specific objectives defined in
terms of national interests. Furthermore, foreign policy
involves a dynamic process of applying relatively fixed
interpretations of national interests to the various situa-
tional factors of the international scene in order to
develop a course of action and to achieve its implementa
tion by diplomatic means. Major steps in this process
include: (a) determining the state's most vital needs, (b)
translating its national interests into specific goals and
objectives, (c) determining the nature of the international
environment as it relates to the policy goals, (d) analyz
ing the states capabilities to achieve the desired
objectives, (e) formulation of a plan of action that will
best utilize the state's capabilities, (f) executing the
desired actions, and (g) undertaking a periodic review and
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New
York: Alfred Knopf Press, 1973), p. 553.
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evaluation of progress made toward the attainment of the
desired objectives.
In practice, however, this process seldom proceeds
quite as systematically as outlined above. On occasions,
some of the steps may have to be discarded and new ones
added because of the ever changing nature of the interna
tional environment. There are frustrations and failures,
enough to prompt Gunnar Myrdal's gloomy assessment that
"the foolishness of foreign policies may, on balance, be
even greater today than they were three hundred years ago,
when the Swedish Chancellor reflected, 'My son, my son, if
57
you knew with what little wisdom the world is ruled.1"
However, foreign policy has assumed a major role in inter
national relations of most states. How much efforts and
resources are devoted to the formulation and implementation
of foreign policy is sometimes contingent upon the status of
the state. In other words, the superpowers can afford and
do devote more efforts and resources to the planning and
and execution of foreign policy than the small powers.
Duchacek, Nations and Men, p. 113.
Quoted by John P. Lovell, Foreign Policy in Per
spective (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Press, 1970),
p. 225.
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Foreign policy actions are sometimes difficult to
evaluate in that: (a) their impact on other nations may be
hard to measure, and (b) most policies rarely result in
total success. More often than not they result in quali
fied success or a mixture of successes and failures.
National capabilities.—Because "not all that is
desirable is possible," national leaders are forced to
examine the power potential of their state before under
taking a course of action. This involves a systematic as
sessment of a state's military, diplomatic, political and
economic abilities to achieve its foreign policy objec-
58
tives. Furthermore, such an assessment may include all
of the major elements of national power. These elements
fall into two categories: the tangible elements and the
59
non-tangible elements. The former are measurable, but
the latter are not. The tangible elements include such
considerations as geography, population, natural resources,
economic strength, and military power. The non-tangible
elements include national character, internal cohesion,
K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework
for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977),
p. 169.
59
Duchacek, Nations and Men, p. 141.
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reputation and leadership. It needs to be said that these
elements are relative in time, and no single element is
decisive in determining a state's potential power. Accord
ing to Morgenthau:
A nation does not necessarily attain the maximum
of national power because it is very rich in natural
resources, possesses a very large population, or has
built an enormous industrial and military establish
ment .61
A nation attains national power "when it has at its dis
posal a sufficient quantity and quality, in the right
admixture, of those resources of power." Furthermore,
capabilities per se can not translate into effective
foreign policy unless these are backed by actions.
The national interests of nation states are usually
centered around their most vital needs. These include
self-preservation, peace, security, justice, freedom, ter
ritorial integrity and economic well-being. These inter
ests are the fundamental objectives and ultimate determi
nants that guide national leaders in formulating their
foreign policies. However, a state's ability to pursue
60Ibid.
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 151.
62Ibid.
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its national interests to the utmost is, to some extent,
contingent upon its capabilities. Nigeria-United States
relations during the period under study can be better
understood when placed in the context of the above-
mentioned framework.
In the following chapter, an overview of Nigeria-
United States relations (1975-1981) will be provided. The
developments that led to Nigeria-United States understand
ing will be explored and their areas of common interests
highlighted.
CHAPTER II
OVERVIEW OF NIGERIA-UNITED STATES
RELATIONS 1975-1981
The focus in this chapter is to provide: (a) brief
background information on Nigeria's foreign policy prior to
1975, and (b) an overview of Nigeria-United States rela
tions during the period under study, pointing out the low
and the high points.
Background
The hallmark of Nigeria's foreign policy from
1960-1975 was "pragmatism, restraint and caution." This
low-profile foreign policy posture has been interpreted to
mean: (a) a decidedly pro-western bent, (b) avoidance of
controversial issues, and (c) operating within the consen-
2
sus of the O.A.U. At independence in 1960 Nigeria's
Olajide Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy
(Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 24.
2
A. B. Akinyemi, Nigeria and the World (Ibadan:
Oxford University Press, 1978), p. X.
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Prime Minister Sir Abubakar T. Balewa expressed his belief
in "a flexible foreign policy and in a closer association"
with the West. Under the first civilian government of
Prime Minister Balewa (1960-1966) Nigeria was officially
nonaligned, but was infact pro-West. At the United Nations,
Nigeria supported western positions. Such a pro-western
bent, reasoned Prime Minister Balewa, would "ensure that
full attention is paid to the opinions" and views expressed
A
by Nigeria on the important political issues of the time.
According to John J. Stremlau:
Nigeria sought unabashedly to maintain close
relations with Britain and other western governments,
for this was seen as the way to maximize economic
development. . . . 'Moderate' and 'pragmatic' are the
terms that western scholars most frequently invoke to
describe the international conduct of Sir Abubakar T.
Balewa1s government.
Nigeria's financial position at independence was very weak
Festus U. Ohaegbulam, Nigeria and the U.N. Mission
to the Congo (Tampa: University Press of Florida, 1982),
p. 17.
4
Address by the Prime Minister, House of Represen
tatives Debates, 20 August 1960, and quoted by John
Stremlau in The International Politics of the Nigerian
Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977),
p. 6.
John J. Stremlau, The International Politics of
the Nigerian Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1977), p. 5.
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and she had to conduct herself in a manner acceptable to
the west whose financial assistance Nigeria needed. And
from 1960 to 1966 Nigeria received $273 million in foreign
aid from the west. Observers pointed out that this depen
dence on financial aid "imposed severe constraints on the
options open to" the Balewa regime in its foreign policy.7
In the affairs of the continent, Nigeria did not
exert herself. Essentially Nigeria adhered to the O.A.U.
principles of:
(1) non-interference in the internal affairs of states,
(2) respect for the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of each state, (3) peaceful settlement of
disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or
arbitration, and (4) absolute dedication to the total
emancipation of the African territories which are still
dependent.®
This meant that Nigeria had to wait to be part of an O.A.U.
consensus before taking any position on most issues affect
ing the continent. On Southern Africa, however, Nigeria
was more forceful. The crusade against colonialism and
6Ibid.
7
A. B. Akinyemi, "Nigerian Foreign Policy in 1975:
National Interest Redefined," in Survey of Nigerian Af
fairs ed. O. Oyediran (Ibadan: Oxford University Press,
1978), p. 109.
g
Quoted by Zdenek Cervenka, in The Unfinished Quest
for Unity: Africa and the O.A.U. (New York: Africana Pub
lishing Co., 1977), p. 14.
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oppression was one of the cornerstones of Nigeria's foreign
policy. On the 15th anniversary of the Sharpeville
Massacre, Nigeria's Commissioner for External Affairs,
Dr. 0. Arikpo reiterated Nigeria's position when he said:
It is the duty of not only the government but of
all the people of Nigeria—as indeed that of every
black man the world over—to continue to support the
diplomatic, economic and cultural isolation of South
Africa until that country abandons racial discrimina
tion; until that government treats the black man in
South Africa as a full citizen of the country of his
birth. . .9
And Nigeria has backed these pronouncements up by (a) pro
hibiting South African passport holders from entry into
Nigeria, (b) prohibiting trade with South Africa, (c)
spearheading the move that forcefully removed South Africa
from the Commonwealth, and (d) playing a key role in con
testing the credentials of the South African delegations at
many international forums. Balewa's government was over
thrown in a coup that brought General Yakubu Gowon to power'
in 1966.
Gowon1s military regime (1966-1975) at first
followed the same low-profile course in foreign affairs.
However, with the beginning of the civil war in 1967,
g
Akinyemi, "Nigerian Foreign Policy," p. 107.
10Ibid., p. 109.
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changes in Nigeria.'s foreign policy posture started to
emerge. First, there was a change in emphasis. Nigeria
placed more emphasis on acting independently of the west
in foreign affairs. Second, there was a conscious attempt
by Nigeria to curb the pro-western bent by encouraging
relations with the Soviet Union. While the Balewa regime
maintained economic and military ties almost exclusively
with the West, the Gowon administration broke with tradi
tion in August 1967 by entering into cultural, economic and
military aid agreements with the Soviet Union. On August
11, 1967 the first shipment of Soviet MIG-17s and 122mm
artillery batteries arrived in Nigeria with Soviet military
12
personnel. Trade with the Soviet bloc countries also rose
from 2.4 percent of Nigeria's total trade in 1966 to 4.6 per
cent in 1968. Nigeria's attempt at strengthening its rela
tions with the Soviet Union notwithstanding, its cultural,
economic and trade links remained securely with the West.
Gowon was ousted in another coup in 1975. Observers
contend that what emerged at the end of the Gowon adminis
tration was a "transformation of Nigeria's foreign policy
Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy, p. 124.
12
Stremlau, Nigerian Civil War, p. 358.
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into one of rigorous nonalignment." This transformation
was precipitated by the unwillingness of Britain and the
United States to supply arms to Nigeria during the civil
war, and the alleged United States support for Biafra.
In sum, Nigerian foreign policy under Prime Minister
Balewa (1960-1966) was officially nonaligned, with a strong
commitment to the principles of O.A.U. charter and a pro-
western bent. The course of the civil war and western re
actions and involvement precipitated a new stance in Nigeria's
foreign policy during Gowon administration (1966-1975).
Gowon's rigorous nonalignment policy meant curbing Nigeria's
pro-western bent and reaching out to the Soviet bloc nations.
Gowon's successor, Murtala Muhammed, changed all that.
Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo became Chief of Staff,
Supreme Headquarters and Colonel Garba became Commissioner
for External Affairs. These were critical appointments in
that: (a) Muhammed and Obasanjo were vocal members of the
Nigerian foreign affairs elite, with critical views of
Nigeria's foreign policy under Gowon before assuming their
positions, which meant, (b) among other things, that the
Harold D. Nelson, Nigeria; A Country Study (Wash
ington, D.C.: American University Press, 1982), p. 225.
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views of the professional staff and the Nigerian academi
cians would no longer be disregarded as seemed to be the
case under Gowon. As expected, the new administration set
up a high powered committee to review Nigeria's foreign
14
policy and make recommendations. Consequently, rather
than maintain continuity with his predecessors, Muhammed
adopted a "radical and militant" approach, not hesitating
to engage in confrontation with any of the major powers,
especially on issues relating to the liberation of Southern
Africa.
Muhammed's approach, facilitated by the new oil
wealth, did not fail to arouse United States attention.
Thus, after about eight-year reign over United States
policy of benign neglect, Henry Kissinger attempted to
visit Nigeria in 1976.
Overview; (1975-1981)
The years 1975 to 1976 can be characterized as the
low point in Nigeria-United States relations, while 1977 to
1980 represented the high point. Relations between Lagos
and Washington were decidedly cool, if not icy, during the
The Adedeji Report on Foreign Policy of 1976 recom
mended, among other things, that Nigeria adopt a militant
foreign policy posture with some emphasis on the promotion
and defense of the rights and interests of all black people.
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Nixon-Ford administrations. One of the manifestations of
this was the unwillingness of Lagos to receive then
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. Critics contend
that during this period "the United States had no Nigerian
policy." According to Aluko, the main sources of dis
agreement between the two countries, among others, were:
(1) the tough and uncompromising style of the Nixon-Ford
administrations in dealing with African countries, (a)
American importation of strategic minerals from Rhodesia
(Zimbabwe) until the repeal of the Byrd Amendment, and
(3) the United States involvement in Angola in 1975, and
16
the Ford letter to the Nigerian leader on the eve of the
extraordinary summit meeting of the Organization of African
Unity in Addis Ababa in January 1977.
Between 1977 and 1980 Nigeria-United States rela
tions took a dramatic turn around from the open differences
mentioned above to cordial exchanges which culminated in
Hezy Idowu, "Nigeria's Foreign Policy: A Re-assess
ment," Times International, 2 August 1976, p. 3; also see
New Nigerian, 7 February 1976, p. 16.
Ford urged the Nigerian leader not to recognize the
O.A.U. meeting on the Angolan crisis. The letter provoked a
bitter official verbal attack on the U.S. by Nigeria, which
described the letter as an insult to Africa.
Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy, p. 249.
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state visits by the leaders of both countries. Both visits
were hailed in Lagos and Washington as a success. There
were those who contended that this heightened United States
interest in Nigeria could be traced to three distinct
causes.
Strategic.—Soviet-Cuban activities in Africa had
caused United States policy-makers to recognize the need to
cultivate the friendship of Nigeria. Such friendship with
Nigeria and other key African countries, United States
policy-makers envisaged, would be instrumental in the suc
cess of further United States diplomatic initiatives de
signed to curtail Soviet-Cuban activities in Africa.
Political.—The influence of about 25 million Amer
icans of African ancestry who want to see justice done for
the black majorities in Southern Africa denied effective
political participation.
Economic.—The value of United States investments
in Nigeria had been considerable. The main sectors of
United States investments were in the oil industry,
liquefied gas, agriculture, construction, banking and
18"Black Africa: More Weight in U.S. Policy Scales?,"
Great Decisions 1979, p. 54.
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insurance and manufacturing industries. In 1980 United
States trade and investments with Nigeria stood at $1.49
19
and $3.5 billion, respectively.
Great Decisions 1979 summed up the new understanding
between Nigeria and the United States in three principles:
(1) the key to success in black Africa is to establish
the United States as a friend of African nationalism;
(2) stronger pressures must be brought to bear against
white minority rule in Southern Africa; and (3) to ac
complish the above, the United States must de-emphasize
East-West confrontation in Africa.20
Some of the important reasons for the new understanding can
be gleaned from National Security Council Memorandum No.
D18, part of which sought to foster closer cooperation with
Nigeria which was regarded as one of the influential states
likely to sway the fate of the rest of Africa; and to en
hance United States cooperative effort with the "moderate
21
states of Africa in the cause of African emancipation."
It is apparent from the second reason that there
was a convergence of interests between the two countries.
The "cause of African emancipation," for which the United
20Ibid., p. 58.
21
National Security Council Strategy No. D18 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1978),
p. 15.
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States was willing to join forces with moderate African
states to achieve, was also the main desire of Nigeria.
Aluko explained that:
Although all American governments since 1960 have
maintained that they were committed to African inde
pendence and liberation from racial and other social,
political and economic oppression, the Carter adminis
tration has been the first to declare that its ultimate
aim in South Africa is the establishment of the prin
ciple of "one man, one vote,' which is what Nigeria
wants.
Because of this convergence of interests, Nigeria supported
United States diplomatic initiatives in Africa.
In September 1977 Nigeria came out strongly in
favor of the Anglo-American settlement proposals in
Zimbabwe. According to Joseph Garba, then Nigeria's Com
missioner for External Affairs, General Obasanjo's trip in
September 1977 to the front line states was undertaken for
the sole purpose of persuading the leaders of these
23
countries to accept the proposals. Explaining the
government's position on the Anglo-American proposal, Garba
stated that: ". . .the document truly contained a number of
the African demands in Southern Africa. Our demands like
22
Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy, p. 250.
23
"Nigeria Supports Anglo-American Peace Proposal,"
Nigeria: Bulletin of Foreign Affairs VII (October 1977):
8.
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one man, one vote in those territories are contained in
24
the proposals." In addition to one man, one vote, the
document provided for a cease-fire; United Nations obser
vers to monitor elections and activities of the police; a
neutral transition administration with powers over defense,
law and order and electoral arrangements in the hands of an
impartial administrator; integration of existing armed
forces into one army that would be loyal to the elected
government; and a democratic constitution with guarantees
25
of individual rights for both black and white Zimbabweans.
Obasanjo's trip to the front line states to drum up
support for the Anglo-American proposals was one indication
that the United States needed Nigeria's goodwill and support
if its diplomatic initiatives in Africa were to succeed.
Nigeria, on the other hand, needed United States coopera
tion in bringing pressures to bear against white minority
rule in Southern Africa. Nigerian leaders realized that,
not only was it almost impossible to go it alone, but
political independence in Southern Africa could not b©
achieved through armed struggle alone.
24Ibid.
25Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Records, 1977-78
(New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1978), p. C59.
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The issue of political independence in Africa was
of paramount importance to Nigeria. This stated foreign
policy objective was consistently pursued under successive
governments from Muhammed to Shagari. On December 2, 1975,
the then Nigerian leader Brigadier Murtala Muhammed in an
address to the Angolan people, said:
We in Nigeria are committed to the total libera
tion of the whole of Africa and we will not fold our
hands to see our brothers and sisters in Angola sub
jugated, exploited and recolonized by the racists and
imperialists in South Africa and their supporters.
. . .your struggle is therefore our struggle and we
will support you both morally and materially until
absolute victory is gained in Angola.2^
Muhammed was assassinated in 1976, and his successor,
0. Obasanjo made it clear that there would be no change in
foreign policy objectives. In a speech marking Nigeria's
17th independence anniversary Obasanjo declared:
. . .until all Africa is free, we remain unfree. . .
Nigeria will continue to support liberation movements
in Africa until success is achieved. Any political
process based on partial or total exclusion of large
sections of the adult population, whatever the ration
ale, must crumble. When. . .Namibia becomes free, when
apartheid ceases to exist in South Africa, all Nigerians
can hold their heads high. . .'
"Address by His Excellency Brigadier Murtala Mu
hammed to the People of Angola," Nigeria: Bulletin on For
eign Affairs vol 5, n 3 & 4, Aug.-Dec, 1975, p. 89.
27
We Must Sacrifice to Liberate Africa," New
Nigeria, 4 October 1977, p. 9.
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Nigeria's then Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Joseph
Garba told the United Nations Security Council:
Mr. Smith is steeped in African blood and his
allies in South Africa and the West share responsi
bility for the present situation. Nigerian armed
forces have been alerted to the unfolding situation
in Southern Africa and Nigeria can not remain un-
involved if a racial conflagration engulfs the
region.
In an earlier address to the Nation on June 29, 1976, the
Nigerian leader reiterated that:
. . .the centre-piece of our foreign policy is Africa.
We are committed to the total liberation of all op
pressed black people in Africa. . . . Whether or not
the racists and their collaborators like it. Southern
Africa must be free. Nigeria will contribute her full
quota to the liberation struggle. . .2^
Nigeria's full quota, according to 0. Aluko, had been very
substantial. In addition to the aid Nigeria has given to
the freedom fighters through the Organization of African
Unity, Nigeria also provided other direct bilateral mili
tary and economic aid to the tune of about $5 million a
year during 1975-1980 to liberation movements in Southern
Africa. Included in this aid package were small arms,
J. Garba, Address to the U.N. Security Council
Meeting: On Mozambique's Complaint about Rhodesian Aggres
sion, 29 June 1977.
0. Obasanjo, "Address to the Nation," Ministry of
Information Release No. 780, 29 June 1976.
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ammunitions and the services of C.130 Hercules military
transport planes. Some aspects of Nigeria's contribution
to liberation movements in Africa are still classified in
formation, but enough has been made public as extensively
documented by Z. Cervenka. One example of the highly
publicized aid was the N13.5 grant given to the MPLA govern-
32
ment of Angola by Nigeria on December 20, 1975. On July
5, 1976 at the meeting of O.A.U. heads of state in
Mauritania, Nigeria donated a quarter of a million dollars
to the liberation committee to be used for the struggle in
Zimbabwe. In 1977 there was widespread discussion in
government circles and the press in Nigeria about how far
Nigeria could go on the issue of political change in Africa.
The immediate cause of this discussion was the announcement
by the Chief of Army Staff, Lt. General T. Y. Danjuma in
June 1977 that Nigeria was ready to send troops to assist
Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy, p. 251.
Zdnek Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity:
Africa and the OAU (New York: Africana Publishing Co.,
1977) .
32
"N13.5 Million Gift to Angola," Nigeria: Bulletin
on Foreign Affairs vol 5, n 3 & 4, Aug.-Dec, 1975, p. 3.
"Nigeria Donates to Liberation Committee," Daily
Times, 6 July 1976, p. 9.
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the liberation movements in Southern Africa. At best,
Dajuma may have made propaganda mileage out of the an
nouncement, for there was no evidence to suggest that such
action was being given any serious consideration by the
Nigerian government. Although the military option was not
given any serious consideration, Nigeria has featured pro
minently in the discussion considered by some observers "to
be the inevitable prospect of a direct military confronta
tion between black and white-dominated Africa." For such a
confrontation to be successful, observers contended, "it
would require the backing, especially at sea and in the air,
of a super-power and even such a power would be committed to
the risks of an operation 6,000 miles from home."36 Nigeria's
reluctance to consider the military option seriously might
also have been due to the belief that: "it is likely that,
if the future of Southern Africa is to be determined mili
tarily, it will be as a result of prolonged guerrilla war
34Sundav Sketch, (Ibadan, Nigeria) 19 June 1977, p. 1.
35"The Military Equation: Black Africa Lags Behind,"
Africa n 82 (June 1978): 14.
36William Gutteridge, "The Military Equation: Black
Africa Lags Behind," Africa n 82 (June 1978): 20.
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rather than through a direct military confrontation." Geo
graphical, logistic and political factors seemed to have
ruled out the military option, however, there was evidence
to suggest that Nigeria has a military force to be reckoned
with in the event of a confrontation between black and white-
dominated Africa. A study by the International Institute
for Strategic Studies concluded that Nigeria had "by far
the largest and one of the best equipped forces in black
Africa." Furthermore, the study showed that in 1978 Nigeria
had an estimated total of 232,500 men, and spent $2.4 billion
on defense. On the other hand, the study indicated that the
strength of South Africa's defense force was such that "she
would be a match for any force which black African countries
38
could assemble against her." °
There is no doubt that the issue of political inde
pendence in Africa was very important to Nigeria. How
sensitive was United States foreign policy to this issue?
National Security Council Memorandum No. D18 was based on
37Ibid.
Military Balance 1977-78, International Insti
tute for Strategic Studies, (London, 1978), p. 25. South
Africa's armed forces were estimated to be 55,000, with an
additional 90,000 in paramilitary units and spent an esti
mated $1.9 billion on defense.
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the premise that Nigeria would remain a friendly country if
United States foreign policy were sensitive to issues of
great importance to Nigeria, particularly, the issue of
"African emancipation."39 The United States had attempted
to carry out its pledge of cooperation with Nigeria in the
cause of political independence in Africa by two means:
economic/military assistance and diplomacy- The assumption
here was that resources supporting a policy were key to its
effectiveness.
Historically, United States official aid to Africa
had been very small. From 1960 to 1976 Africa's share of
United States aid averaged around 9 percent. By contrast,
United States aid to Latin America was more than 20 per-
40
cent. However, under the Carter administration more
assistance was given than in the past. For example, United
States aid budget for fiscal year 1978 included $460 million
for Africa. This represented a 48 percent increase over
41
1977. In 1979 the Carter administration asked Congress
for $294 million for the African Development Fund and
39
N.S.C. Strategy No. D18, p. 15.
40Africa Report, March-April 1979, p. 12.
41
Great Decisions 1979, p. 61.
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$45 million for military assistance. Nigeria was one of
the several African countries which were beneficiaries of
United States aid programs, having borrowed a total of $2
43
billion from the World Bank and American banks in 1978.
In the Horn and in Southern Africa the United States made
some efforts to help resulve disputes peacefully. In the
Ogaden conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia, the United
States urged all of the parties concerned to make efforts
toward a peaceful settlement. During the Carter adminis
tration Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Richard
Moose visited Somalia. State Department reports on the
trip indicated that discussions with President Siad Barre
were centered on: (a) obtaining assurances from President
Barre that he "would respect the internationally recog
nized borders of his neighbors," and (b) informing the
Somali leader that further United States aid to Somalia
would be restricted in scope and "confined to defensive
items only." The implications here were that: (a)
Somalia's respect for the internationally recognized
42Cyrus Vance, "Issues Facing the U.S. in Africa,"
Department of State Bulletin (July 1978): 29.
43Legum, Africa Contemporary Records, p. B.753.
44Vance, "Issues Facing the U.S. in Africa," p. 30.
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borders of his neighbors would remove the causes of the
Ogaden conflict, and (b) since the United States was the
major arms suppliers to Somalia, a limited supply would
have had a halting effect on Somalia's ability to continue
the conflict.
In Southern Africa the United States had been an
45
active member of the Contact Group, formed in April 1977
to find a peaceful solution to the Namibian question.
United States chief negotiators, especially Donald F.
McHenry during the Carter administration, at different
points of the negotiation, came close to achieving a break
through. The United States was instrumental in working out
what became known as "the Contact Group proposal" for a
Namibian settlement which included a call for "cease-fire,
elections and independence for Namibia." South Africa
had long rejected this plan reportedly because it is thought
to have favored SWAPO's electoral chances. Kurt Waldheim
warned in his report to the General Assembly in 1979 that
such delay in freeing Namibia was "bound to lead to an
45
The other members were Britain, Prance, Canada and
W. Germany.
^Legum, Africa Contemporary Records, p. C. 211. See
details in Chapter 4.
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escalation of violence and bring bloodshed and ruin to the
region."47
For decades, United States policy toward South
Africa had been an ambivalent mixture: rhetorical condemna
tion of apartheid, sorrowful slaps on the wrist, and wish
ful thinking that contact and business would lead to
evolutionary change, and revolution averted. Although Henry
Kissinger had made a belated start in his Lusaka speech in
1976, the first real indication that a change was imminent
surfaced during the 1976 presidential election campaign
when the Democratic Party charged that eight years of
Republican administrations' indifference, "accompanied by
increasing cooperation with the racist regime, have left
our influence and prestige in Africa at an historical low."
In its place, the Democrats promised to "adopt policies
that recognized the intrinsic importance of Africa, and the
inevitability of majority rule" in South Africa. Further
more, they promised to:
(1) Work aggressively to involve black Americans in
foreign policy positions. . .and in decisions affect
ing African interests; (2) support majority rule in
47
United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General
on the work of the Organization," United Nations Document
A/34/1, p. 25.
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Southern Africa, recognizing that our true interests
lie in peaceful progress towards a free South Africa
for all South Africans, black and white; (3) lend
support to African nations in denying recognition to
1 Homelands' given pseudo-independence .by the South
African government under its current policy of
'separate development1; (4) end relaxation of arms
embargo against South Africa. ^
The Carter administration attempted to fulfill some
of these campaign promises by: (a) appointing Andrew Young
as United States Ambassador to the United Nations; (b)
having Vice President Walter Mondale handle the South
African negotiations; and (c) by personally taking.a direct
interest in developing day-to-day policies towards Southern
49
Africa. Furthermore, the administration took a number of
actions to underscore United States' opposition to apartheid
and racial discrimination in South Africa. One such action
was to arrange a top-level meeting with the Vice President
and South Africa's Prime Minister in Vienna in May 1977.
The purpose of the meeting was to inform Mr. Vorster that a
new era had begun in United States-South Africa relations,
and to warn him that, in President Carter's own words,
.S. African Policy: The National Democratic Party
Platform (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1976) , p. 5.
^President Jimmy Carter, "Interview," Africa Re
port (July-August 1980): 8.
50Department of State Bulletin, 20 June 1977,
pp. 659-666.
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"unless there is movement away from racial discrimination
and separate development and toward full political partic
ipation for all South Africans, relations between our two
countries can not improve." The United States supported
the 1977 United Nations arms embargo against South Africa,
and in 1978 imposed a ban on export of goods and technology
52
to the South African regime.
There were some groups who thought that the United
States could do better, but that it lacked the political
will and unwavering commitment to bring about change in
South Africa. They called for stronger measures, includ
ing disinvestment and a trade boycott. Beyond diplomatic
rhetoric, the case can be made that the United States may
not have done enough in concrete terms, but it should be
remembered that nation states rarely pursue foreign policies
that are not in their own interests. United States inter
ests in South Africa go beyond the rhetoric of African
freedom. What these interests are, Nigeria-United States
^Carter, "Interview," p. 10.
52Ibid.
They included university students and black organi
zations across the United States.
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perspectives on political change, and the common grounds
that existed between both countries will be explained in
the next chapter.
CHAPTER III
POLITICAL CHANGE IN AFRICA
Nigeria and the United States agreed that political
change in Africa was inevitable, but as has been explained
earlier, both countries had not always agreed on: (a) what
political change meant, and (b) how best to achieve it.
However, the emphasis here is on the convergence of inter
ests that existed between both countries on the issue of
political change in Africa and their respective motivations.
Nigeria's Perspective
Successive governments from Muhammed to Shagari
have seen it, in the words of Chief Abdul Yesufu Eke, the
Nigerian Ambassador to Washington, as "a duty to ensure
that the wind of change blowing over the continent con
tinues." During the period covered by this study
Nigeria's perspective on political change in Africa
"Nigeria's Anxieties Over U.S. Policy," West Africa
27 July 1981, p. 1688.
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remained fairly consistent. Some of the elements of
Nigeria's perspective useful for our examination of the
issue of political change in Africa include:
1. Negotiated settlement—As evidenced by the
country's support for United States initiatives
in Africa, including the Anglo-American proposal,
Nigeria supported change by peaceful means where
feasible.
2. Armed struggle—Where negotiated settlement had
failed, Nigeria expressed strong support for
armed struggle as evidenced by her extensive
support for liberation movements in Africa.
In a policy statement made by General Muhammed in
2
1975, these two elements were implicitly echoed when he
said "if persuasion failed, other methods would be employed."
Obasanjo was more forceful in his approach. Speaking at a
White House dinner on October 11, 1977 he reiterated these
two elements of Nigeria's perspective on political change
when he expressed, on the one hand, "support for all efforts
aimed at finding a just and peaceful solutions" to the
issue of political change in Africa, and on the other hand
2Federal Ministry of Information Release No. 1466,
November 29, 1975, p. 3.
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talked about "his belief in the armed liberation struggle."
What is evident here is that the fact of change was
perhaps more important to Nigeria than how change occurred.
The same can not be said about the United States. On oc
casions, the United States had expressed concern about how
change occurs and whose interests and influence it reflected.
When it did, critics were quick to accuse the United States
of being the policeman of Africa, dedicated to preventing
4
change. it should be pointed out that while Nigeria
publicly embraced negotiated settlement and armed struggle,
the United States publicly advocated only negotiated settle
ment. Although the United States had been known to be
involved in several covert operations around the world that
amounted to supporting armed struggle, it had fallen short
of publicly adopting armed struggle as an official policy.
There was a major disagreement over means. It did not pre
clude cooperation between both countries, it only led to
minor irritations, with no major strain in relations. How
ever, there is evidence to show that the United States was
3Ibid., No. 1809, 11 October 1977, p. 5.
4Radical Pan-Africanists, including Claude Ake,
Peter Enahoro and Ralf Uwechue hold this view. For an over
view, see New African, August 1978, p. 14.
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not necessarily against change per se, provided such change
was not inimical to United States interests.
United States Perspective
In a speech on July 1, 1977 Secretary of State
Cyrus Vance described United States perspective as "affir
mative" and added that:
A negative, reactive American policy that seeks
only to oppose Soviet or Cuban involvement in Africa
would be both dangerous and futile. Our best course
is to help resolve the problems which create oppor
tunities for external intervention.-*
According to Vance, some of the elements of this perspective
included:
. . .(1) A strong United States commitment to social
justice and economic development in Africa; (2) efforts
to help resolve African disputes peacefully; (3) re
spect for African nationalism; and (4) helping to
foster respect for human rights which strengthens the
political fabric of African nations.6
The United States had the erroneous notion that countries
experiencing political change in Africa brought about
through armed struggle, aided by the Soviet Union, would as
a matter of course, become Soviet satellites. By
5Cyrus Vance, "The United States and Africa: Build
ing Positive Relations," Address made before the annual
convention of the NAACP at St. Louis, Missouri, July 1,
1977, p. 5.
6Vance, "Issues Facing the U.S. in Africa," p. 11.
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interpreting events in Africa as a by-product of a global
East-West conflict, the United States either ignored the
nationalist dynamic of the African situation or was
thoroughly ignorant of it. Thus, the United States on oc-
caion, spoke out forcefully against armed struggle. And
when tough talking failed, the United States had invariably
resorted to covert operations by secretly backing the op
posing factions. For example, in 1975 after United States
arm-twisting attempt to prevent O.A.U.'s recognition of the
M.P.L.A. failed, it resorted to covert operation by secretly
arming and funding the UNITA faction in Angola.
Common Objective
It was obvious from both countries' perspectives
that a common objective existed between them. That common
objective was that Africa become free. This point was
further highlighted by Obasanjo in a White House dinner
speech when he reiterated that: "A close affinity already
exists between our two countries. . . . This affinity. . .
derives from our common attachment to freedom and indepen
dence." Beginning with the Carter administration this
Federal Ministry of Information Release No. 1466,
November 29, 1977, p. 2.
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common objective was recognized by United States policy
makers. In a policy statement on June 7, 1978 President
Carter stressed United States commitment to: "Africa that
is free. . .free of the dominance of outside powers, free
g
of the bitterness of racial injustice, free of conflict..."
However, at the beginning of the Reagan administra
tion observers wondered if African concerns, such as the
issue of political change in Africa, would be regarded as
"high priority issues as they were in the Carter administra-
tion." Diplomatic rhetoric notwithstanding, the Reagan
administration did not regard African concerns as high
priority issues. To maintain the level of rhetoric, Reagan
acknowledged the importance of the common objective existing
between both countries when he said in his reply to
Ambassador Eke's speech, that:
The constructive leadership role Nigeria plays
among African nations and in international form is an
important contribution to peace and mutual understand
ing. The United States has greatly appreciated the
support of your government in many issues and crises
facing the world community. Our many bilateral
8lIPrincipal Elements of U.S. Policy," State Depart
ment Bulletin, July 1978, p. 16.
9For further discussions on Reagan's African Per
spective, see Richard Deutsch, "Reagan and Africa," Africa
Report (January-February 1981): 4.
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consultations on various of these topics have served
to bring us even closer together. We share the same
goals and objectives, . . .resolving differences
through peaceful negotiations, eliminating oppression
and the repression of people. . A®
Nigeria may have played a constructive leadership role in
Africa, and may have cooperated with the United States in
efforts to resolve some of the conflicts in Africa, but it
is hard to say both were involved in these interactions for
the same reasons. Officially, the United States had ex
pressed its preference for peaceful change, as opposed to
armed liberation and its repercussions. According to Cyrus
Vance, the United States preferred:
Working for peaceful change. Violence. . .bears
many costs—in human terms, in a legacy of political
polarization, in damage to economic interests, . . .
and in the excuse it presents for outside inter
ference. I
The idea of a peaceful change had sometimes been
difficult to pursue because of (1) the intransigence of the
colonizers, (2) the successes of armed liberation struggle,
(3) the continued flow of arms from the Soviet Union and
10
President Reagan gave this reply to the speech
made by A. Y. Eke, the Nigerian Ambassador to Washington at
the White House on June 10, 1981, and was reported in West
Africa, 27 July 1981, p. 1689.
C. Vance, "U.S. Relations with Africa," State
Department Bulletin, August 1978, p. 11.
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Eastern bloc nations and (4) the presence of Cuban troops.
The successes of armed liberation struggle were, to some
extent, dependent on the level of arms flow from the Eastern
bloc nations and the presence of Cuban troops. In Ethiopia
alone, the Soviet Union had flown in an estimated $2 billion
worth of military hardware, 3,000 Russian military advisers
12
and about 20,000 Cuban combat troops. Similar efforts
were being duplicated in other African trouble spots, hence
the concern expressed by the United States about Soviet and
Cuban activities in Africa. There are those who argue that
the Cuban troops and Soviet weapons were not the problem.
The problem, they said, was the existence of colonialism
and oppression; white, minority-ruled governments pursuing
discriminatory policies.
This has become a source of disagreement between
the two countries, with the United States linking the issue
of Cuban troops with the question of independence; and
Nigeria insisting the problem was not the Cuban troops,
12Colin Legum, "The Stakes in Africa," Atlas World
Press Review (July 1978): 16.
13Shagari, Kaunda, Nyerere and other leaders of the
Frontline States held this view. For a discussion of the
merits of this argument, see T. J. LeMelle, "Wither U.S.
African Policy," Africa Today (April-June 1978): 5-6.
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but colonialism and oppression. In the words of Shagari,
"linking the so-called issue of Cuban troops with the
question of independence is as unjust as it is incompre
hensible."14
The fact that both countries were not agreed on
what the problem was in Southern Africa is a further testi
mony that the stakes for both countries in the liberation
of Southern Africa were not the same. However, as has been
indicated in our framework, disagreement in one area does
not necessarily preclude cooperation among nations in other
areas. Indeed both countries had been engaged in some co
operative efforts in many of Africa's minor and major
trouble spots. Joseph Garba's attempt to mediate the Shaba
problem between Zaire and Angola in the summer of 1977,
the continuing peace efforts in Chad and Obasanjo's trip to
the Frontline States were some of the positive indicators
of these cooperative efforts between both nations to find
solutions to some of Africa's pressing problems. Mention
President Shagari, "Policy Toward Southern Africa,"
An Address Presented at the Commonwealth Heads of Govern
ment Conference, Melbourne, Australia, October 1981, p. 5.
15Africa Contemporary Records; 1976-1977 (New York:
Africana Publishing Co., 1977), p. B 678.
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has been made of Obasanjo's trip in the preceding chapter.
Garba's mediation effort grew out of an understanding
between him and Vance. According to Donald B. Easum's
testimony, the trade-off was that "the United States would
not overreact to the reported role of the Cubans" in the
conflict. 6 Garba's trip was the first major step toward a
peaceful settlement. It produced two meetings between the
two countries in Brazzaville in July 1978. At these
meetings both countries agreed to: (1) bring relations back
to normal; (2) free the refugees in both countries, and
(3) reopen the connecting railway line. This normalization
was further consolidated by visits by both Heads of state.
First, President Neto paid an official three-day visit at
the invitation of President Mobutu on August 19, 1978.
Second, the invitation for President Mobutu to visit Angola
18
was contained in a joint Communique issued at the end of
President Neto's visit to Zaire. In the communique both
countries reaffirmed: (1) their respect for the aims and
16
"Nigerian-American Business Relations," Testimony
delivered by Donald B. Easum before a Hearing of the House
of Representatives Sub-Committee on Africa in Detroit, Mich
igan, April 29, 1981, U.S. Govt. Press, Washington, D.C.
17The Times,(London) 21 August 1978, p. 9.
18
The Guardian, (London) 22 August 1978, p. 10.
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principles of the O.A.U. and the United Nations; (2) their
pledge to establish a joint commission to increase security
along their common border; and (3) their commitment to the
development of close cooperation and the establishment of
diplomatic relations.
Nigeria and the United States were actively in
volved in efforts to find a peaceful solution to the civil
war in Chad. First, there was the initial peace effort
spearheaded by Obasanjo and Shagari administrations that
culminated in the well-acclaimed Lagos Accords. Second,
the collaborative effort between Nigeria and the United
States on the Chadian crisis was first mentioned at the
Cancun conference in Mexico where both leaders discussed
the formation of a peace-keeping force to replace the
20
Libyan forces in Chad. The inter-African peace-keeping
force that was finally assembled from six African countries,
including Nigeria, consisted of 5,000 troops, some 2,000 of
them and the commanding general, General G. 0. Ejiga, were
19
In 1979 Nigeria brought all the warring factors in
Chad to the conference table in an attempt to work out a
peaceful solution acceptable to all. The resultant proposal
that came to be known as the Lagos Accords was signed in
Lagos on August 18, 1979.
20
"Shagari Meets Reagan," West Africa, 2 November
1981, p. 2554.
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from Nigeria. A substantial part of the cost for the
Nigerian contigent was covered by the United States, having
provided some logistical help and financial assistance to
21 10
the tune of $12 million. The functions of the peace
keeping force were to: (1) maintain law and order;
(2) supervise elections, and (3) help in the integration
of the Chadian army.
The idea of a peace-keeping force in Chad raised
optimistic hopes when it was initiated. New African,
echoing this optimistic view, saw the move "as an encourag
ing sign of some order coming out of the Chadian disorder."2"*
Furthermore, it was in the interest of Nigeria and the
United States to find a political solution to the Chadian
crisis. Success in Chad would enhance Nigeria's credibility
as regional power, and for the United States it would de
prive Libya of a conflict to exploit. Thus, the similarity
in both countries' position, and their cooperative efforts
to reconcile the warring factions and work out a time-table
21
"U.S.A.: Africa Policy Reflections," Africa Con
fidential, 6 January 1982, p. 4.
22
Alex Rondos, "O.A.U. Still Discussing Chad," West
Africa, 23 November 1981, p. 2757.
Alem Mezgebe, "Chad: The War Game," New African,
January 1982, p. 10.
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for a ceasefire and elections were essentially in keeping
with some of the elements of both countries' notions of
their national interests. While there were similarities in
both countries' perspectives on political change, the
question remains: were both countries motivated by the same
interests?
Motivation
As Richard Cottam puts it, motivation is a "com
pound of factors that predispose a government and people to
move in a decisional direction in foreign affairs."24 What
was at stake for Nigeria and the United States in the
liberation of Southern Africa? My contention is that both
were not motivated by the same interests.
Nigeria
Two important factors can be identified: moral ob
ligation and commitment to black solidarity. There was
evidence to suggest that Nigeria was motivated by its
sincere commitment to the unfinished task of the total
decolonization of Southern Africa. Nigeria saw this task
24
Richard W. Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation: A
General Theory and Case Study (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1977), p. 31.
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as a moral obligation to assist fellow Africans who were
still under colonialism. Successive administrations since
1960 had consistently stressed the point that until all of
Africa was free, Nigeria remained unfree. This expressed
commitment to decolonization had also been backed by
financial and logistical support for liberation movements
in Southern Africa. The idea of black solidarity, as it
related to black people in the continent, was promoted by
the Gowon administration in a rather low-keyed fashion.
However, under the Muhammed-Obasanjo administrations, black
solidarity was raised to the front political burner. Ac
cording to Aluko:
It was raised to an important aspect of policy.
Indeed, the Adedeji Report on foreign policy in 1976
declared that one of the objectives of the country's
external policy should be the defense and promotion of
the rights and interests of all black people within
and outside Africa.26
The Shagari administration had publicly emphasized this
aspect of Nigeria's foreign policy on several occasions.
"The destiny of Nigeria," said Shagari, "is inextricably
linked with the fortunes of all the countries of Africa and
25
This has become part of the rallying cry for all
Nigerian leaders since 1960.
Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy, p. 133.
74
27
all the peoples of African descent abroad."
Nigeria saw her role as Africa's spokesman, with a
moral obligation to help fellow Africans still under
colonial rule to win their independence. As Africa's most
populous nation, with its relative wealth, it is understand
able that Nigeria should have spearheaded the cause of black
people in Africa, particularly Southern Africa.
United States
Critics assert that there was a need to transcend
the political rhetoric of the United States in its so-
called commitment to the cause of African emancipation;
pointing out that there was more to the stated United States'
28
position than was readily discernible. United States in
terests, they contended, were not just Africa that was free
per se, but free for the maintenance and or pursuance of
United States' strategic and economic interests. Another
factor was the fear of the probable cut off of Nigerian oil.
Strategic interests have generally included access to the
27President Shagari, Address to the U.N. General
Assembly 6 October 1980, p. 5.
op
Pan-Africanists, including black organizations
such as the Congressional Black Caucus and university stu
dents across the U.S. held this view.
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region's mineral resources, security of Western oil flows
around the Cape and containing the spread of Soviet and
29
Cuban influence and military activities in Africa.
Specifically, United States' military and strategic stake
in Southern Africa was centered around the possibility of
Soviet access to naval bases in the region. Since the bulk
of Western Europe's oil supplies and a fifth of United
States' pass through the Cape of Good Hope, a prolonged
cut off of these supplies by the Soviet Union could wreck
havoc on Western economies. Therefore, access to basing
rights in Southern Africa was viewed by United States policy
makers as giving the Soviet Union the military means to do
so. David Rees summed up the strategic importance of the
Cape route when he wrote:
For nearly two hundred years the critical strategic
importance of the Cape to the Western trading system
has been generally recognized. ... In the age of the
Cape Oil Route, the strategic significance of the best
intermediary position between Europe and India is even
further enhanced. . . . Consolidation of Soviet
influence in South Africa would almost certainly be
The Report of the Study Commission on U.S. Policy
Toward Southern Africa (Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1981), p. 310.
30Ibid., p. 318.
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the penultimate stage in the economic strangulation
of the West.31
Economic.—The United States was heavily dependent
on mineral imports from Southern Africa. These minerals
were considered to be crucial to the production process of
United States1 industries. Four essential minerals:
chromium, manganese, vanadium and platinum gave the South
ern African countries, particularly South Africa, their
significance for the United States. Chromium and vanadium
are vital to the production of anti-corrosive steels, and
platinum is a major element in anti-polution technology.
Table 1 shows the degree of United States import dependence.
TABLE 1
U. S. IMPORT DEPENDENCY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA
Major Southern
% of Needs Africa Supplier
Mineral Imported (% of U.S. Imports)
Chromium 90 South Africa (35)
Chromium 90 Zimbabwe (38)
Vanadium 36 Zimbabwe (20)
David Rees, "Soviet Penetration in Africa,"
Conflict 77 (November 1976): 1.

























Source: U. S. Congress, Senate, Sub-Committee on African
Affairs, "Imports of Minerals from Southern Africa
by the United States and the OECD Countries,"
September 1980.
Other aspects of United States economic interests are in
vestments and trade. In 1980 United States investments in
Southern Africa were estimated to be about $3 billion, with
TABLE 2
U.S. TRADE WITH SOUTHERN AFRICA, 1978-1980


































































































Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, 1980.
$2 billion in South Africa. South Africa appears to have
dominated United States trade with Southern Africa. The
breakdown is shown in Table 2. These figures partly
explain why Southern Africa remained a major strategic and
economic interest to the United States. It is conceivable
that so long as there are no other overriding national
interests, the United States would simply continue its in
volvement in the region, irrespective of the political
arrangement there. Furthermore, it can be said that the
United States had downplayed the strategic and economic
79
aspects of its interests, while at the same time highlight
ing its stated commitment to the cause of African emancipa
tion.
The threat of oil weapon.—United States dependence
on foreign oil had significant implications for its foreign
policy. In 1979 Nigeria provided 18.8 percent of United
States oil imports, second only to purchases from Saudi
Arabia. And it was estimated that United States invest
ments in Nigeria in 1980 amounted to over $3.5 billion.33
The bulk of these investments were in the oil industry,
followed by investments in agriculture. The United States-
Nigerian Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee was
charged with the responsibility of supervising these
34
investments in agriculture. The implication here was
that Nigeria could use its oil as a lever to pressure
United States action on Southern Africa. The threat that .
Nigeria might cut off oil supply to the United States or
nationalize United States investments to underscore its
displeasure with United States policy in Southern Africa
may or may not have been credible, but United States
33Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy, p. 138.
34Ibid.
80
policy-makers would rather not face that prospect. Washing
ton would like to have thought that Lagos was bluffing about
the use of the oil weapon, but after a similar action was
taken by Nigeria against Britain in 197935 it was hard not
to think that the threat was a credible one. Credibility
could have been established in many ways.36 One method was
through a declaratory statement of intentions. A second
method was through consistent action. Nigeria's policy
statement in 1979 that United States' recognition of the
Internal Settlement regime in (Rhodesia) Zimbabwe will be
met with "appropriate response" was interpreted to mean
Nigeria would cut off United States' supplies of oil if the
Muzorewa regime was recognized by the United States.
Credibility was greatly enhanced if the threat were not out
of proportion with the provocation,37 and there was evidence
Following Mrs. Thatcher's statement of her inten
tion to recognize the Muzorewa regime in (Rhodesia) Zimbabwe,
Nigeria nationalized BP and disqualified British companies
seeking contracts and licenses in Nigeria.
For further details see J. David Singer, Deterrence,
Arms Control and Disarmament, and Thomas Schelling, Arms and
Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966) .
37According to Kenneth Boulding, beyond a particular
point, the higher the level of a threat, the lower the
probability that it will be believed. See Kenneth Boulding,
Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper
and Row, 1962), p. 255.
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in the threatening nation's history to indicate that the
threat may have actually been carried out. It would appear
that the oil cut off to United States was certainly not out
of proportion to United States' non-support for Nigeria's
Southern African policy, and Nigeria's action against
Britain in 1979 seemed to have added to the credibility of
the threat.
Gulf Oil got 60 percent of its oil from Nigeria,
and when the United States Congress was debating whether
or not to lift sanctions against the Internal Settlement
regime in (Rhodesia) Zimbabwe in 1979, a Gulf Oil represen
tative told a congressional hearing that "we would not like
to see our imports jeopardized by precipitous congressional
38
action." It was evident that the Nigerian card was on
the table, and Congress took note of it when it decided not
to lift the sanctions if President Carter considered their
retention to be "in the national interest." Their reten
tion was, indeed, deemed by the President to have been in
the national interest of the United States.
38
Quoted by Richard Deutsch, "African Oil and U.S.
Foreign Policy," Africa Report (September-October, 1979): 47-51.
39
Public Papers of the Presidents of the U.S., Bk II
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1979), p. 1434.
82
Could Nigeria have actually cut off the supply of
oil to the United States? Nigerians felt very strongly
about the situation in Southern Africa. Successive admin
istrations, particularly from 1975, have regarded the
liberation of Southern Africa as a matter of high principle
for which they were willing to pay whatever economic price.
Therefore, under certain market conditions, Nigeria might
have been tempted to take such action. At the height of
the oil boom in 1979 Nigeria was being urged by a small but
vocal sector of the Nigerian population to: (a) move from
verbal protest to concrete action by organizing concerted
economic reprisals against the West, particularly the
United States, (b) cut off oil supplies to the United
States, and (c) increase aid to frontline states and the
liberation movements.40 One important point to remember,
however, is that oil sales represented about 80 percent of
Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings. Thomas Schelling
explained this paradox succinctly: "In threatening to hurt
somebody if he misbehaves, it need not make a critical
difference how much it would hurt you too—if you can make
40
Joseph Wayas, Nigeria's Leadership Role in Africa
(London: Macmillan Press, 1979), p. 79.
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him believe that threat." Thus, the implication here is
that it does not really matter whether or not Nigeria loses
revenue in the process, but that the United States is made
to believe the threat. The point was to establish the
credibility of the oil threat, which Nigeria may have
managed to do. Nigeria did not actually have to carry out
the threat to obtain United States support for the cause of
African emancipation, it only had to make the United States
believe it. That also Nigeria may have managed to do.
In sum, the United States and Nigeria were not in
terested in the cause of African emancipation for the same
reasons. While Nigeria was motivated by moral principles
and its commitment to black solidarity, the United States
was motivated by its strategic and econimic interests, and,
to some extent, the fear of the oil threat.
Shared perspectives had not really meant shared
interests between both countries, but the real test of their
perspectives on political change in Africa was in the prob
lem areas of Southern Africa. In the following chapter, an
attempt will be made to find out, on the basis of detailed
Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1966), p. 36.
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empirical data, the actual positions taken by both countries
on the issue of political change in Africa, using Angola,
Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa as case studies.
CHAPTER IV
CASE STUDIES
The remarkable similarity in the political history of
Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa is that they all
suffered from some form of colonialism, oppression and the
attendant effects of substantial white settlement. White
settlement in these countries varied widely, however, from
the long established white settlement in Angola dating back
to 1575 and South Africa in 1652, to the much later coloni
zation of Zimbabwe during the 1890s and Namibia in the early
1900s. Various theories have been espoused by whites at
different periods to justify their dominance: in Angola,
the Portuguese fiction of assimilation and overseas pro
vinces; in Zimbabwe, the white settlers' notion of "partner
ship"; in Namibia, the sacred trust; and in South Africa,
the concept of apartheid. In Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and
South Africa, however, the major problem was essentially
the same—that of protecting entrenched white minority inter
ests while at the same time attempting to meet the
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aspirations of the African majority.
The first two have managed to shake the yoke of
colonialism, but not its ramifications; while the last two
are still continuing the struggle for independence. At one
time or another the most important issue on the minds of
Africans in these countries was the issue of political
change. This chapter will examine how Angola and Zimbabwe
settled this issue, and how Namibia and South Africa are
wrestling with it, with particular emphasis on the positions
taken by Nigeria and the United States on the issue of
political change in these countries.
Angola
What was the political situation in Angola prior
to the Portuguese collapse in 1975? How was the issue of
political change settled, and what were the actual positions
taken by Nigeria and the United States on this issue? A
brief mention of Angola's colonial history is in order here.
Portugal's colonial exploits in Africa dates back to the
fifteenth century; and in the process, Portugal colonized
a number of African countries including Angola, Guinea,
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Bissau and Mozambique. Historians assert that Portuguese
explorers, led by Diogo Cao, first landed in Angola in 1482,
and Portugal effectively conquered Angola between 1575 and
2
1675. After 500 years as a Portuguese Colony, Angola be
came independent on November 11, 1975.3 According to Basil
Davidson, "Europe's concert of imperial powers traced
Angola's colonial frontiers as they are today." Put
simply, Angola was recognized as a colony of Portugal at the
Berlin Conference of 1884-85. By 1925 Angola was effec
tively colonized by Portugal. Observers contend that this
was accomplished in various phases. Davidson's categoriza
tion seems to be the most useful. According to him, this
task was accomplished in three phases: The first was up to
Guinea Bissau and Mozambique won independence in
1973 and 1975, respectively. In both cases independence was
won largely through armed struggle led by PAIGC in Guinea
Bissau and PRELIMO in Mozambique.
2
Douglas Wheeler and R. Pelissier, Angola (New York:
Praeger, 1971), p. 32.
Africa, n 52 (December 1975): 88.
4
Basil Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm (New York:
Doubleday, 1972), p. 97.
For further discussion, see Wheeler and Pelissier,
Angola, p. 51.
6
Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm, p. 98.
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about 1900, characterized by military invasion and the es
tablishment of an effective presence by Portugal. The
second, was during the early 1920s, and was characterized
by pacification campaigns, which repressed African resis
tance. The third, beginning in the late 1920s until the
1950s, was concerned with the consolidation of Portuguese
domination. Davidson declared that during Portuguese rule
Angola's people were the "most deprived of any people any
where" :
Angola's case is certainly extreme in its depri
vation These people. . .lived in acute material
distress and hunger. During the 1960s about 98 per
cent of all Angolans were completely illiterate, were
denied any effective control over their own lives, and
were unable to participate in any legal action to
improve their lot.7
While the majority of Angolan people were economically
deprived, Portugal was busy exploiting the Angolan natural
resources for large profits for the metropolitan treasury.
In defense of Portuguese colonialism in Africa, its statesmen
have used arguments similar to those that their predecessors
had used for more than a century—"civilizing mission."




than material virtues of Portuguese colonialism.
Africans were subjected to forced labor, and their
lands expropriated. They were generally regarded as sub
human, people who would benefit from "white subjugation be
cause of the opportunity it gave them for contact with a
9
higher civilization." The Portuguese forced labor system
in Angola was widespread. According to the Report on
Native Problems in the Portuguese Colonies, it included
"independent self-employed workers, women, children, the
sick and the old." "Only the dead," the Report added, were
"really exempt from forced labor." In 1942 African
workers in Angola were paid $1.50 per month. And six years
after the 1961 revolt, salaries of African workers had only
risen to $3.00 per month.
Legislation enacted by the Portuguese to systemat
ically disposses Africans of their land started in 1907 and
8
For a detailed discussion of the ideology used to
explain and justify the Portuguese presence in Africa, see
G. J. Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese (Los Angeles:
UCLA Press, 1978).
9
This thinking is credited to the Portuguese admin
istration in Angola by G. J. Bender in Ibid.
Henrique Galvao, Report on Native Problems in the
Portuguese Colonies (Lisbon, 1970), pp. 57-71.
1:LIbid.
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continued through the early 1970s. About 90 percent of the
Africans in Angola lost their land property rights as a
result of the notorious decree No. 58470 of 1901 which was
12
renewed in 1919.
The alleged justification for Portuguese presence
in Angola was to bring civilization to Africans. Yet more
than 400 years later, the Portuguese were still treating the
Africans as subhuman whose only value was as a resource of
unpaid labor. By the time of the coup in 1974 Portugal had
put in place a colonial policy that sought to protect en
trenched Portuguese interests while at the same time per
petuating the inherent social and political inequality of
the system by dividing the population into two separate
classifications: (a) indigena—uncivilized, unassimilated
or natives. This category included nearly all Africans;
(b) Nao-indigena—civilized. This included all whites and
a small percentage of blacks considered civilized.
This extreme deprivation and exploitation was
12
Mario de Souza Clington, Angola Libre? (Paris:
Gallimard, 1975), p. 133. This decree: (a) gave high pri
ority to the settlement of Portuguese in Angola, (b) de
clared most of the land as the property of the state, and
(c) forced 90 percent of the Africans off the land to make
room for the settlement of thousands of Portuguese in rural
Angola.
Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese, p. 149.
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compounded by the lack of opportunity for political self-
expression. Under these circumstances it was little wonder
that a few hundred men, women and children decided to do
something about it. They took to arms, and by the 1960s,
independence movements that sprang up in Angola numbered
well over a dozen. Prominent among these was the
Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA: People's
Movement for the Liberation of Angola) which launched
armed struggle against colonial rule in February 1961,15 in
what has become known as the 1961 revolt. That year was,
in the words of Irving Kaplan, "by any standard a watershed
in Angolan history." The revolt awakened the Portuguese
out of their complacency and proved to Africans that they
could turn their potential power into actual power.
Portuguese attempt to suppress the liberation movements by
force of arms led to widespread concern around the world,
culminating in the detailed United Nations consideration of
the situation in 1962. In January 1962 the United Nations
14
For a partial list of liberation movements in
Angola, see John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution vol 2
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978), p. 318.
Irving Kaplan, Angola; A Country Study (Washington,
D.C.: American University Press, 1979), p. 45.
16Ibid.
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General Assembly, after a debate, warned Portugal to cease
repressive measures against the Angolan people. And on
December 18, 1962 it voted 57-14 to condemn Portugal's
colonial war against Angola. An estimated 70,000 to
100,000 Portugese troops were used in the savage military
18
repression.
The liberation movements suffered a great deal from
the reprisals of Portugal, but they were not completely
destroyed. Despite the considerable amount of military
support received by Portugal from NATO; by the late 1960s
it was apparent to Portugal that a military solution to the
issue of political change in Angola would not be in its
favor. The alternative was predictable—the transfer of
some power to some black elites which was regarded as
puppets by the majority of the African population. The
election of some of these "puppets" to advisory legisla-
19
tures in 1973 was a case in point, in that "real power"
still remained in Portuguese hands. This cosmetic approach
to political change did not address the real problems of
17United Nations Resolution 1819 (XVII) U.N. General
Assembly Official Records vol 1, Seventeenth Session, 1962.
18
Kaplan, Angola; A Country Study, p. 50.
19Ibid., p. 53.
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Angola. Critics charged that the half-hearted reforms
initiated by Portugal were deception schemes, an attempt by
Portugal to minimize the gains of the liberation movements.
G. Giovanni viewed the reforms in the same way Prantz Fanon,
in The Wretched of the Earth, saw concessions granted by
colonial powers—as an effective means of arousing a re
sponse of loyalty from the African people, consequently
20
sabotaging the efforts of the liberation movements.
There were a few half-hearted attempts at reforms
geared toward equalizing the races before the law and
legally discouraging racism. However, by the mid 1970s, the
long history of Portuguese abuses against the African people,
had turned into a military problem. Many in the military
and in the civil service were convinced that the system was
21
ripe for radical transformation. Thus, on April 25, 1974
a group of young military officers took over the government
22
in a bloodless coup. Observers contended that the coup
was caused by the increasing military, economic and polit
ical pressures brought about by the high cost of Portugal's
20
G. Giovanni, "Can Colonialism Make It?" Atlas
vol 9, n 6 (June 1965): 353-359.
Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese, p. xxvii.
22
Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, p. 241.
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African wars. John Marcum gave a breakdown of the drain
in Portugal's resources:
Emigration soared to 170,000 in 1971, including a
major outflow of draft-age men. . . . 100,000 draft
resisters left the country; there were fewer than one
hundred cadets attending Portugal's four-hundred place
military academy; and during the last call-up before
the coup, some 50 percent refused to report. The toll
in Portuguese military casualties. . .reached 11,000
dead and 30,000 wounded or disabled. Roughly 1.5
million Portuguese sought livelihoods abroad, leaving
behind an internal workforce of just 3.5 million and
a total population reduced to 8.6 million. The coun
try ran a $400 million a year deficit, suffering
Europe's highest rate of inflation (23 percent), and
confronted mounting sabotage by anti-war underground
movements unprecedentedly disciplined and effective.23
The coup speeded up the decolonization process which
culminated in the Alvor Accord of January 15, 1975.24 This
was the independence agreement the Portuguese government
signed with the three Angolan liberation movements. All
the parties to the conflict pledged to work together in a
coalition transitional government to govern Angola during
the interim period to independence day which was scheduled
for November 11, 1975. Observers saw this as a gamble from
23Ibid.
24
Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Records: 1975-76
(New York: Africana Publishing, 1976), p. B 797.
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25
the outset. Predictably, it failed, and independence saw
Angola engulfed in a civil war between the rival factions
with MPLA eventually overcoming its rivals. At the time of
the coup there were three major guerrilla movements and a
few minor ones. The major ones were: The popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), led by Agostino Neto;
The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), led
by Holden Roberto; and The National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA), headed by Jonas Savimbi. Of
the minor ones, the most important was the separatist-
inspired Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda
26
(FLEC). It appeared that the relative effective fighting
strength, the extent of popular support, the primary objec
tive of the movement and the chance of winning the elections
were major factors in explaining why Nigeria and the United
States supported a particular faction. But aside from
these factors, there were several unspoken but critically
important interests at stake for both countries in Angola.
These will be explained later in this section.
According to Charles Ebinger, of the three major
25
. After Angola: The War Over Southern
Africa (New York: Africana Publishing, 1976), p. 47.
26
Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, p. 241.
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guerrilla movements, the FNLA was the major fighting force
confronting the Portuguese at the time of the coup. Ebinger,
quoting official Portuguese estimates, put FNLA forces at
about 2,000 "operating in the Dembos Mountains and an addi
tional 10-12,000 guerrillas headquartered" on the Zairian
side of the border, with additional scattered units else
where in northern Angola.27 A breakdown of the movements'






















Source: Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, p. 257
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Charles K. Ebinger, "External Intervention in
Internal War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Angolan
Civil Sar," Orbis. Fall 1976, p. 671.
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In 1974 the MPLA's military prospects were very
bleak, partly because: (a) it suffered from intense internal
crisis; (b) it lacked operational base; and (c) it was
never able to develop the military potential of its forces .28
Finally, UNITA's prospects were also not impressive.
Two major weaknesses were apparent: it was undermanned, and
it lacked adequate supplies. ^
It was obvious that at the time of the coup none of
the contending forces was strong enough to win without out
side assistance. Since attempts by African governments and
the Organization of African Unity failed to find a solution
to the Angolan problem non-African involvement became in
evitable. The introduction of the external factor into the
Angolan crisis changed the military equation. Many observers
believed the MPLA eventually won "because of Cuban troops
backed by massive Soviet help in weapons and material."
The issue of political change in Angola was settled,
not only by the liberation movements themselves, but with
Kaplan, Angola: A Country Study, p. 125.
29
Ebinger, "External Intervention in Internal War,"
p. 673.
For example, see Kaplan, p. 125. Nigeria also gave
substantial political and material support for the MPLA
later in the struggle.
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considerable help from forces outside Angola. These external
forces and the roles they played in the Angolan crisis
received considerable attention in the literature on for
eign intervention in Africa.31 Let me now turn to an ex
amination of the positions taken by Nigeria and the United
States in the Angolan crisis and analyze the motivations
behind both countries' involvement in Angola.
Nigeria's position
The Angolan crisis provided Nigeria with its first
serious test in foreign policy during the period under
study. The new government of Muhammed continued the
Angolan policy of the previous administration which accord
ing to Akinyemi, was waiting to be part of an OAU consensus
before stating Nigeria's position, while "putting pressure
on the three movements to form a National Government."
It is important to note that until South Africa's interven
tion, the OAU maintained a broad consensus on its policy on
Angola expressed as follows: (a) support for a Government
For an overview, see Colin Legum, After Angola; The
War Over Southern Africa (New York: Africana Publishing,
1976).
32
A. B. Akinyemi, "Nigerian Foreign Policy in 1975:
National Interest Redefined," in Survey of Nigerian Affairs,
0. Oyediran, ed. (Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1978),
p. 111.
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of National Unity; (b) acceptance of MPLA, FNLA and UNITA
as legitimate nationalist movements entitled to participate
in such a government; (c) the maintenance of territorial
integrity; and (d) opposition to all forms of foreign inter
vention. When the prospect for a national government by
the three movements failed, Nigeria threw its weight behind
UNITA. In the middle of 1975 Nigeria declared its support
for UNITA and promised military assistance to Savimbi.
According to Legum, Nigeria's first stand "was to favour
support for UNITA and the OAU line in favour of reconcilia
tion and national unity in Angola." However, a few
months later, Nigeria completely reversed this position at
the OAU emergency summit in Addis Ababa in January 1976.
Analysts have explained this "volte face" as stemming from
the emergence of "the new factor: the open and direct
military assistance which the South African regime was
giving to the FNLA-UNITA alliance." South Africa's in
vasion of Angola on October 23, 1975 was cited as evidence
Report of the OAU Conciliation Commission's Recom
mendations on Angola, adopted at the OAU Summit in Kampala,
October 24, 1975.
Legum, After Angola, p. 35
35Africa Contemporary Records; 1975-76, p. B. 798.
Akinyemi, "Nigerian Foreign Policy," p. 111.
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of South.Africa's involvement, which in Nigeria's view,
"had put a different complexion on the situation."37 In a
communique issued on February 3, 1977 by the South African
Defense Headquarters in Pretoria, South Africa admitted
having given military assistance to the FNLA-UNITA coali
tion in September 1975, but insisted that the assistance
OQ
was given on a "limited scale" only. Whatever "limited
scale" meant, there was no question about South Africa's
involvement. Nigeria was convinced that:
There is now abundant evidence of racist South
Africa's troops in the conflict. The factions fight
ing against MPLA are backed not only by South Africa
but by other interests which are clearly against
Angolan independence and freedom in Africa.39
In a statement recognizing the MPLA as the legitimate govern
ment of Angola, the Nigerian leader, Brigadier Muhammed, ap
pealed to all Angolans to rally behind the MPLA. He pledged
Nigeria's moral and material support until "absolute victory
40
is gained." But why did Nigeria back UNITA in the first
place? Analysts contend that "UNITA was generally credited
37 Ibid.
38
The Nature.and Extent of the South African Defense
Forces" Involvement in the Angolan Conflict, Defense Head
quarters Communique, Pretoria, February 3, 1977.
39"Nigeria and Angola, " Africa 53 (January 1976) : 11.
40Ibid.
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with the best prospect for emerging successfully should the
October elections take place."41 Another rationale for
Nigeria's support can be found in the report of a ten-
member Commission of Enquiry42 set up by the OAU which
stated that "UNITA had the largest popular support" in
Angola, followed by ENLA, and MPLA was a distant third.
It should be pointed out that Nigeria seemed to
have adhered to its stated perspective on political change
by: (a) working towards a negotiated settlement as demon
strated in its effort to pressure the three liberation
movements to cease hostilities and form a National Govern
ment; and (b) in a pragmatic move, showing support for
UNITA because: (1) UNITA played the role of a mediator in
order to bring about conditions conducive to holding elec
tions, and (2) indications were that UNITA had a better
chance of winning the election as a result of its strong
popular support in Angola. Nigeria used the Angolan crisis
to demonstrate its two-pronged perspective on political
change: negotiated settlement where feasible; armed strug
gle when necessary. Nigeria saw UNITA as a means to apply
Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, vol. 11,. p. 260.
42




The Portuguese coup of 1974 made the strategy con
tained in National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39)43
grossly irrelevant; and the subsequent power struggle in
Angola and its outcome exposed a basic flaw in NSSM 39.
Through faulty intelligence, and a classic demonstration
of how out of touch with the realities of the Angolan situa
tion policy-makers were, NSSM 39 concluded that African
liberation movements were ineffectual, not "realistic or
supportable" alternatives to continued colonial rule. The
"depth and permanence of black resolve" was questionable.
As it turned out, the most inaccurate part of the conclusion
of NSSM 39 was that "black victory at any stage" was com
pletely ruled out.
The study recommended some policy options for the
United States in the region, including: (a) closer ties with
white-minority regimes in the region, and (b) selective
relaxation of United States' opposition toward the white-
minority regime, and economic aid to the neighboring
^National Security Council Inter-Dept. Group for
Africa, Study in Response to NSSM 39; Southern Africa,
AF-NSE-1969. August 15, 1969.
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states. As it turned out, United States official policy
became: (a) fostering closer ties with white-minority
regimes, (b) adoption of a "lower profile" at the U.N.,
which meant softening criticisms of Portuguese colonial
policy, and (c) $5 million in economic assistance for the
44
neighboring states. This study and the resultant policy
ignored African interests and concerns in Angola. United
States perception of the Angolan crisis as a test of big
power rivalry with the Soviet Union, coupled with its
strategic interests in Angola, seemed to have been the
basic determinants of U.S. policy in Angola.
However, when the three liberation movements were
attempting to settle the second phase of the issue of polit
ical change in Angola in 1975, the questions of "black re
solve" and "black victory" were not the issues for U.S.
policy-makers; rather, it was one of coming seriously to
grips with what position to take and which faction to sup
port. At a White House dinner for President Kenneth Kaunda
of Zambia on April 19, 1975 President Ford declared the
United States' position:
Ibid. See also Henry F. Jackson, From the Congo
to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960
(New York: W. Morrow & Co., 1982), Chapter 2.
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We have been following developments iri Southern
Africa with great, great interest. For many years
the United States has supported self-determination
for peoples of that area, and we continue to do so
today. We view the coming independence of Angola. . .
with great satisfaction. . .America stands ready to
help. . .and to provide what assistance we *^
Indeed, for many years the United States had supported self-
determination as it defines it, which invariably means sup
port for factions it considers to be "moderate" or pro-
Western in orientation. In mid-July 1975 Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger took the first major step towards
actively involving the United States in Angola by request
ing Congress "to vote a $79 million emergency aid program"
supposedly for Zaire, but actually intended to provide arms
for the FNLA-UNITA forces.46
The United States had hoped that the Alvor Agree
ment would survive, leading to the emergence of a coalition
government of national unity in Angola. According to
Kissinger, in his testimony to the Senate's Africa sub
committee on January 29, 1976, the United States "have con
sistently advocated. . .a government representing all three
45Department of State Bulletin, August 11, 1975,
p. 212.
Legum, Africa Contemporary Records; 1974-75,
pp. A. 97-99.
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factions in Angola." 7 Once this hope was dashed, the
United States' immediate reaction was to support the FNLA-
UNITA coalition. This support was given mainly through
covert action. Press reports to this effect started to sur
face in early 1975 when "the National Security Council's
40 Committee authorized a covert American grant of $300,000
48
to the FNLA-UNITA factions." According to John Stockwell
the 40 Committee had outlined four options for the United
States in Angola:
1. limited financial support for political activity;
2. substantial financial support and covert action, ...
costing $6 million;
3. larger amounts of money ($14 million) and material
to give Savimbi and Roberto (FNLA-UNITA) superiority
over Neto (MPLA);...and
4. sufficient support to sustain Roberto and Savimbi's
(FNLA-UNITA) armies for a year, costing $40
million. 9
By July 1975 the administration had stepped up its covert
program to beef up the FNLA-UNITA forces. Reports in con
gressional Quarterly indicate that between $25 to $50 million
47
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, Implications
of Angola for Future U.S. Foreign Policy, Testimony made
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on January
29, 1976, Washington, D. C.
48
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in military hardware was given to FNLA-UNITA by the end of
1975. This turned out to be a conservative estimate, as
the C.I.A.'s own estimate put the figure around a hundred
million. Edward A. Hawley, et al, lamenting this in
creased military aid to FNLA-UNITA, wrote:
We are especially distressed at the rising level of
United States involvement through. . -massively in
creased aid to FNLA-UNITA. . . . Such outside support
can only prolong and intensify the fighting, strength
ening those Angolans prepared to accept a neo-colonial
pattern of independence and weakening those whose
goals are true independence and self-determination.^
There were serious differences of opinion within
the administration over the Angolan issue. At least, two
view-points were discernible: (a) those who favored halting
support for FNLA-UNITA; and (b) those who favored an in
crease in aid to FNLA-UNITA. Some top level officials in
the State Department, including the then Head of the African
Bureau, Nathaniel Davies, and both Houses of Congress were
strongly opposed to continued United States support for
FNLA-UNITA. Observers contended that opponents were
Congressional Quarterly, December 20, 1975, p. 2832.
Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, p. 54.
52
Edward A. Hawley et al., "Angolan Independence:
Agony and Hope," Africa Today (October 1975): 7.
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afraid of another Vietnam-type situation in Angola and
stressed that claims that United States involvement would be
limited was reminiscent of similar statements in the early
stages of the Vietnam intervention. When the issue came
to a head in December 1975, Congressional opposition was
unmistakably made clear in a Senate vote of 54-22 to ban
any further covert assistance to Angola. The ban was
sponsored by John V. Tunney (Democrat, California) as an
amendment to the fiscal 1976 defense appropriations bill
(HR 9861). And on January 27, 1976, the House of Represen
tatives followed suit by voting 323 to 99 not to provide any
further covert assistance to FNLA-UNITA forces.
Prominent among those who favored increased aid to
the FNLA-UNITA forces were the Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger, United Nations envoy, Daniel P. Moynihan, and
President Ford. Citing the issue of the Cuban presence and
its policy implications for the United States, Kissinger
argued his case before the Senate on January 29, 1976 with
out tangible results. The outcome in Angola, Kissinger
54
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55; , 27 December 1975, p. 2854.
, 31 January 1976, p. 208.
108
warned, "will have repercussions throughout Africa." United
States credibility in the region, he said, will be under
mined if "the Soviet Union and Cuba are unopposed in their
attempt to impose a regime of their own choice in Angola."
Kissinger not only argued his case for continued assistance
for FNLA-UNITA, but defended his covert policy on the fol
lowing grounds:
(1) We chose covert means because we wanted to keep our
visibility to a minimum (2) we wanted the greatest
possible opportunity for an African solution; (3) we
felt that overt assistance would elaborate a formal
doctrine justifying Great Power intervention—aside
from the technical issues such as in what budgetary
category this aid should be given; and how it could
be reconciled with legislative restrictions against the
transfer of U.S. arms by recipients; (4) the Angolan
situation is of a type in which diplomacy without
leverage is impotent, yet direct military confrontation
would involve unnecessary risks; (5) thus it is pre
cisely one of those grey areas where covert methods are
crucial if we are to have any prospect of influencing
certain events of potentially global importance."
President Ford's letter to the House of Representatives on
January 27, 1976 warning about the long term effect of the
situation in Angola did not change too many minds either.
The imposition of a military solution in Angola, the Presi
dent warned, "will have the most profound long-range sig
nificance for the United States." Furthermore, the
Kissinger, Implications of Angola, p. 5.
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President declared that:
The United States can not accept as a principle of
international conduct that Cuban troops and Soviet arms
can be used for a blatant intervention in local con
flicts, in areas thousands of miles from Cuba and the
Soviet Union, and where neither can claim an historic
national interest. If we do so we will send a message
of irresolution not only to the leaders of African
nations but to United States allies and friends through
out the world.58
It is estimated that United States military aid to FNLA-
UNITA up to the time of MPLA victory was about $31 mil-
59
lion, but the Select Committee of Intelligence of the
United States House of Representatives subsequently declared
that the amount was much higher than that because of the
covert nature of the operation and the use of secret CIA
funds. Stockwell's $100 million estimate seemed to have
been a more realistic figure than any of the other quoted
figures here.
Nigeria-United States relations during Nixon-Ford
administrations were decidedly cool. As a result, United
States initiatives in Africa, particularly during the
Angolan crisis, did not receive much support. Despite the
58
"President Ford Reiterates U.S. Objective in
Angola," Department of State Bulletin, 16 February 1976,
pp. 182-183.
59
Legum, After Angola, p. 27.
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lack of collaboration between both countries during the
Angolan crisis, both supported political change in Angola
and efforts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. For
a while, Nigeria and the United States threw their support
behind the same faction in the Angolan crisis, but for dif
ferent reasons.
South Africa's intervention, which turned out to be,
as Ebinger puts it, "a serious diplomatic and military mis
calculation, " changed all that.60 This intervention, ob
servers contend, destroyed the possibility of a collabora
tive effort between Nigeria and the United States and "all
remaining hope of a unified African stance in opposition to
outside intervention." Furthermore, South Africa's inter
vention was seen as a dangerous "American-South African
collusion" which prompted African states such as Nigeria
Tanzania "previously critical of Soviet intervention," to
rally "to the cause of the MPLA."61 Kissinger has since
denied this charge, saying: "Some charge that we have acted
in collusion with South Africa. This is untrue. We have
no knowledge of South Africa's intentions and in no way
60Ebinger, "External Intervention," p. 691.
Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," p. 419.
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cooperated with it militarily.62 Kissinger's disclaimer
notwithstanding, United States collusion with South Africa
was documented by the Senate Intelligence Committee in its
1978 report. The general conclusion was that "South Africa
entered Angola with the knowledge and approval of the
63
United States." Why were Nigeria and the United States
involved in Angola in the first place? What were the in
terests at stake for both countries?
Nigeria's Real Interests in Angola
Nigeria was involved in Angola to enhance its posi
tion as Africa's spokesman, dedicated to the liberation of
Southern Africa. When peaceful negotiations failed, Nigeria
shifted to a policy of active support for the MPLA and
launched a vigorous campaign urging OAU member states to
recognize the MPLA at the OAU summit meeting in Addis Ababa
in 1976. Angola provided Nigeria with the first opportunity
to demonstrate its stated commitment to black solidarity as
it related to black people on the continent. It is import
ant to note that Nigeria's stand was directly opposed to
that of the United States which had urged the members of
62
Kissinger, Implications of Angola, p. 7.
Also see Jackson, From Congo to Soweto, pp. 53-77.
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the OAU, including Nigeria, to oppose the MPLA and prevent
its recognition at the OAU summit meeting in 1976. Further
more, it can be said that Nigeria's stand on Angola ef
fectively puts to rest the notion that resistance to Soviet
and Cuban activities in Angola was a matter of common con
cern to Nigeria and the United States.
U.S. Real interests in Angola
Even when it was evident the MPLA was winning in
Angola, the United States adamantly stuck with the FNLA-
UNITA faction. Thus, it would appear that the United States
was involved in Angola, not to promote the cause of African
emancipation per se, but to attempt to put in place a govern
ment that would protect its ideological and varied economic
and strategic interests. Specifically, what were those
interests? First, a word about United States method of
intervention in general. Put simply, the standard method
of United States intervention in third world countries was:
(a) to identify in a troubled nation a local leader or
faction considered moderate or pro-Western in orientation,
and (b) supply this faction with military and material sup
port to facilitate its victory over the opposing faction.
In Angola, the faction that fitted United States perception
113
of a moderate, with pro-Western orientation was the FNLA-
UNITA faction. As noted earlier on pages 104 and 105 in
this study, the United States funded and armed the FNLA-
UNITA faction, not only during the war, but long after
MPLA's victory in Angola.
Strategic Interests
United States strategic interests in Angola included
the Azores Islands air and sea bases, the Lajes air base on
Terceira and "its backup field on Santa Maria Island."64 In
1971 these bases took on added significance when the United
States signed an agreement with Portugal to extend United
States "base rights through 1973" in return for a substan
tial aid package of over $400 million that included:
(1) $30 million in agricultural development assistance,
(2) $5 million in drawing rights on U.S. Defense De
partment stocks of non-military equipment, and (3) eli
gibility for up to $400 million in Export-Import Bank
financing for a variety of other development projects.65
These bases were crucial in redeployment of United States
troops in Europe, particularly as "NATO-related staging, re
fueling, and submarine tracking" bases.66 In 1973 these
64Ibid., p. 59.
Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, p. 235.
66Ibid., p. 236.
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bases were used by the United States to rearm Israel in the
Yom Kippur war.
Economic interests
United States economic interests in Angola were
centered around Angola's oil, diamonds, coffee and phos
phates. United States companies acquired a significant
control of the oil production in Cabinda province in 1966,
and by 1975 Gulf Oil Corporation had invested more than
$300 million in oil production and was pumping 150,000 bar-
68
rels a day. The Angolan port of Lobito was critical for
imports from Angola and neighboring Zaire and Zambia. These
imports included diamonds, copper, cobalt, coffee and phos
phates destined for western markets.69
Other Interests
Furthermore, Angola shared a common border with
Namibia. This raised frequent concern in Washington that
an MPLA government in Angola would serve as a springboard
for the spread of communism to Namibia and elsewhere in the
67Ibid.
68




Making Angola safe for the pursuance and maintenance
of these interests, was the primary reason the United States
was involved in Angola. That the United States had managed
to cloak this in the political rhetoric of African freedom
is perhaps an indication of the level of misinformation
that exists in the foreign policies of the big powers.
After the independence of Angola, the focus of the Southern
African liberation struggle shifted to Zimbabwe.
Zimbabwe
Since the late 1800s Zimbabwe has had a troubled
and violent political history. Political scientists have
generally examined the political history of Zimbabwe under
four headings: (1) White Settlement; (2) Responsible
Government; (3) The 1961 Constitution; and (4) The Uni
lateral Declaration of Independence (UDI).
1. White Settlement: Political scientists and
historians have put the date of the arrival of the earliest
For a detailed discussion of the political history
of Zimbabwe, see Philip Mason, The Birth of a Dilemma (New
York: Preager, 1958).
The most useful is given by Patrick O'Meara, in
Rhodesia: Racial Conflict or Coexistence? (New York:
Cornell University Press, 1975).
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white settlers in Zimbabwe at September, 1890.72 These
white settlers, who were known as Pioneer Column, numbered
200, and they were carefully recruited by Cecil Rhodes.
After 1891 the anniversary of the arrival of the Pioneer
Column has been celebrated as Occupation Day. In 1961 it
was changed to Pioneer Day.73 Resistance from indigenous
Africans to this occupation was met with ruthless force.
2. Responsible Government: The government that
emerged from this illegal occupation collected the taxes,
administered the country, and took on the full responsibility
of government. In effect, Britain did not assume any real
authority. In theory, it became a self-governing British
colony after a referendum in 1923 in which the majority
(59.4 percent) voted in favor of self-government.74 In
practice, however, it enjoyed almost complete autonomy from
1890.
3. The 1961 Constitution: This constitution was a
further attempt by the settler regime to make it impossible
for Africans to effectively participate in the political
system or achieve majority rule. The constitution created
72B. Vulindlela Mtshali, Rhodesia: Background to
Conflict (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1967), p. 38.
73Ibid., p. 44. 74Ibid., p. 116.
117
two-voters' rolls, an A and a B roll, with voting quali
fications based on financial and educational standards that
were out of the reach of most Africans. The implications
of the new condition of franchise were that very few
Africans could vote; and as a result, African demand for
full political equality based on the principle of "one man,
one vote" was effectively rejected, while ensuring permanent
white minority control.
4. The Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) :
The country's white minority government strongly resisted
majority rule, and in order to ward off British half
hearted political pressure to bring about eventual democra
tic majority rule in Zimbabwe, the colonial government under
Prime Minister Ian Smith issued on November 11, 1965 a uni
lateral declaration of independence (UDI) which purported
to make the country an independent state, free of external
control. Britain declared the country to be in a state of
rebellion and invoked financial and economic sanctions, but
refused to use military force against the Smith regime.
75Ibid., p. 121.
Robert C. Good, U.D.I. The International Politics
of the Rhodesian Rebellion (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1973), p. 15.
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From then until the Lancaster House Conference of 1979 the
country was in an embattled state. The conference ulti
mately led to the independence of Zimbabwe in April 1980.
This section attempts to: (a) isolate the problem in Zimbabwe;
(b) show how the issue of political change was settled; (c)
examine the roles played by Nigeria and the United States in
settling the problem, and (d) highlight the real motivations
behind both countries1 position in Zimbabwe.
The Problem
An estimated 7,396,000 people lived in Simbabwe in
1979. Of these, there were about 7,164,000 Africans; 11,000
Asians; 21,000 Coloreds; and 200,000 European settlers.77
Beginning in 1890 the small body of European settlers, never
totaling more than 5 percent of the total population, ruled
Zimbabwe for 90 years. During this period the country was
polarized between a dominant white minority and an oppressed,
exploited African majority which was systematically excluded
from effective political participation. How did this small
white settlement dominate the African majority for 90 years?
What was the response of the Africans?
Irving Kaplan, Rhodesia; A Country Study (Washing
ton, D.C.: American University Press, 1979), p. xii.
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Through a complex web of discriminatory legislation,
economic exploitation and the use of brutal force, the
white minority managed to remain in power against the will
of the majority. To understand the nature of the oppres
sion and exploitation of the African majority, one should
look at the conditions in which they lived. The objective
material conditions of Africans in Zimbabwe under white
settler regimes and the intransigence of these regimes made
violent confrontation inevitable. Under the provisions of
the Land Tennure Act of 1969, 50 percent of the land was
reserved for the whites. According to Leonard T. Kapungu,
whites took "those parts of the country having better soil
and rainfall, and Africans were forcefully removed from
their traditional fertile lands," driving them to settle in
the hot, unproductive, and at times, unhealthy parts of the
78
country. The average wage of the African in Zimbabwe was
$190.60 a year while that of the white was $2,894. On edu
cation the government spent about $28 per African child in
school per year as against $300 per white child.79 Accord
ing to J. Rogaly, five years of education was:
78
Leonard T. Kapungu, Rhodesia; The Struggle for Free
dom (New York: Orbis Books, 1974), p. 14.
79Ibid., p. 19.
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. . .the best that most African school children could
expect. This means learning to read and write in
African languages; very simple English reading and
writing; elementary arithmetic; nature study; and
local history and geography.^°
Racism was legalized in a number of laws passed be
tween the late 1920s and the early 1930s, "making race the
determining factor for access to economic, political, and
81
social privileges." The country turned out to be one of
privilege and ease for the whites, while for the Africans
it was one of subservience and frustration. African insti
tutions were systematically destroyed, and their develop
ment aborted. What emerged out of this was a colonial sys
tem in which Africans were exploited as cheap labor,
"separated from the white farms and urban centers either in
82
reserves or segregated townships."
The task of removing the political domination
through which these conditions were being perpetuated gave
80
J. Rogaly, quoted in Kapungu, Rhodesia, p. 19.
Harold D. Nelson et al., Area Hand Book for South
ern Rhodesia (Washington, D.C.: American University Press,
1975), p. 83.
82
Patrick O'meara, "Rhodesia-Zimbabwe: Guerrilla War
fare or Political Settlement?" in Southern Africa: The Con
tinuing Crisis, Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, eds.
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), p. 19.
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rise to the emergence of guerrilla movements in the 1950s.83
For Britain, and, to some extent, the international commun
ity, the problem was how to resolve the vexing contradic
tion of protecting entrenched white interests on the one
hand, and providing equal opportunities for effective
African political participation on the other hand. Until
1976 successive British governments, particularly since
1965, had failed to seriously address this problem. Pre
dictably the country was headed for a "bloody confrontation
between the white settlers, who exclusively enjoyed polit
ical and economic power, and the African" who had been
systematically excluded from any effective political
participation.OH>
By making evolutionary change impossible, the
settler regime made revolutionary change inevitable.
Patrick O'Meara explained this point further when he wrote:
Not only was the white power structure unwilling
to permit increased African participation, but it also
limited channels of protest and opportunities for
political mobilization. Ultimately, therefore, the
83
Most liberation movements, including the ANG, were
formed and operated from inside Zimbabwe until they were
banned in 1960.
84
Kapungu, Rhodesia, p. 1.
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nationalists moved outside of what they saw as a
restricted political system.
Moving outside the system meant waging a guerrilla war
against the white settler government, and when the war
intensified in the 1970s several factions were vying for
political power in Zimbabwe.00 The development of the
guerrilla movement was very fluid, but four"' notable fac
tions were involved in the fight against the Smith regime:
(1) Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). ZAPU was
formed in 1961, and led by Joshua Nkomo; (2) Zimbabwe
African National Union (ZANU), led by N. Sithole and R.
Mugabe was founded in 1963; (3) Front for the Liberation
of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI), led by James Chikerema was formed in
1971; and (4) Zimbabwe Reformed African National Council
(ZRANC), led by Thompson Tirivavi was founded in 1976.
Intra-movement conflicts had sometimes been intense, but
their fundamental objectives remained the same: (a) the
wrestling of the state power from the Smith regime; (b) the
restructuring of the political system to permit the
85O'Meara, "Rhodesia-Zimbabwe," p. 24.
least twelve factions, including the African
National Council (ANC) were in contention for national power,
87
ZAPU and ZANU merged on October 10, 1976 to form
the Patriotic Front.
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effective political participation of all Zimbabweans; and
88
(c) the redistributing of the nation's wealth equitably.
Wrestling the state power from the Smith regime required a
prolonged guerrilla war that appeared unwinnable from
Smith's standpoint, and its effect had taken its toll on
the Smith regime.
Solution
The cost of the war in economic and human terms
steadily rose, reaching a very high peak in 1978. Virtually
all male Zimbabweans age 18-38 were conscripted. In Febru
ary 1977 conscription was extended from age 38 to 50, and
89
men over 50 were also encouraged to volunteer. In econom
ic terms the war cost the government over $1 million a day
in direct outlay and several more millions in lost produc
tion. Morale was generally low as emigration reached a
record level in 1978. In December of 1978 alone, 2,771 emi
grated, and it was estimated that a total of 18,069 whites
left in 1978. According to David Martin and Phyllis
Johnson, 14,149 left in the first nine months of 1979, and
88'Africa Contemporary Records 1976-77, p. A. 19,
89Ibid., pp. B. 911-12.
90,The Daily Telegraph, 26 January 1979, p. 5.
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tourism, an important generator of foreign currency, dropped
91
by 74 percent.
In human terms it is estimated that more than 8,000
people, mostly civilians, had died and several thousand
were wounded. A 10 percent income tax was imposed in
92
1975. Under these circumstances the Smith regime had no
alternative but to make peace.
The Anglo-American Proposals.—Several attempts
were made beginning in 1965 to find a peaceful solution to
the Zimbabwean crisis. All these attempts made by succes
sive British governments, Labor and Conservative alike,
were doomed primarily because independence was to be granted
under white minority rule, with only token African political
participation. Only after a United States initiative,
spearheaded by Henry Kissinger, which was designed to bring
about majority rule in Zimbabwe surfaced in March 1976, did
the British government concede for the first time that
majority rule was indeed its objective. Thus, for the first
time since 1965 the British objective appeared to converge
with that of Nigeria and the United States on the issue of
91
David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, The Struggle for
Zimbabwe (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981), p. 280.
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Africa Contemporary Records 1976-77, pp. B. 911-12.
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political change in Zimbabwe.
The Roles Played by Nigeria and the
United States
What were the essential elements of the Anglo-
American Proposal? How instrumental was it in bringing
about political change in Zimbabwe? What were the actual
positions taken by Nigeria and the United States on the
issue of political change in Zimbabwe? It is important to
note that the Kissinger initiative, the Anglo-American Pro
posals and the Lancaster House Agreement were belated re
sponses to the call made by the Organization of African
Unity in the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969.93 In this document,
the OAU: (a) warned of the threat to international peace
and security brought about by misunderstandings and conflict
of interest among nations; (b) appealed to the international
community for cooperation in achieving peaceful change in
white minority ruled territories; (c) stated its objectives
in these areas; and (d) declared its preference for negoti-
94
ated settlement. In its opening statement the document
93
Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa; Joint State
ment by the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government





When the purposes and the basis of states' inter
national policies are misunderstood, there is intro
duced into the world a new and unnecessary disharmony.
Disagreements, conflicts of interest or different as
sessments of human priorities already provoke an excess
of tension in the world and disastrously divide man
kind at a time when united action is necessary.95
In its appeal to the West for cooperation, it urged them to
support African objectives and aspirations explained as
follows:
Our objectives in Southern African stem from our
commitment to the principle of human equality. We are
not hostile to the Administrations of these states be
cause they are manned and controlled by white people.
We are hostile to them because they are systems of
minority control which exist as a result of, and in
the pursuance of, doctrines of human inequality. What
we are working for is the right of self-determination
for a rule in those countries which is based on the
will of all the people and an acceptance of the equality
of every citizen.9^
The Lusaka signatories, while asserting their preference
for peaceful change or negotiated settlement, also indicated
that they would not hesitate to support armed liberation
struggle if necessary. They summed up their position as
follows:
We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy,
to talk rather than to kill. We do not advocate
violence; we advocate an end to the violence against
95 Ibid., p. 5. 96Ibid., p. 10.
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human dignity which is now being perpetrated by the
oppressors of Africa. If peaceful progress to emanci
pation were possible, or if changed circumstances were
to make it possible in the future, we would urge our
brothers m the resistance movements to use peaceful
methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise
on the timing of change. But while peaceful methods of
struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the
tuning of change. But while peaceful progress is
blocked by actions of those at present in power in the
states of Southern Africa, we have no choice but to
give to the peoples of those territories all the sup
port of which we are capable in their struggle against
their oppressors.97
Kissinger's response to the Lusaka Manifesto was
contained in his own Lusaka Declaration of April 25, 1976
in which he accepted the OAU proposals and reaffirmed:
• . .the unequivocal commitment of the United States to
human rights, as expressed in the principles of the
United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. We support self-determination, majority
rule, equal rights and human dignity for all the peoples
of Southern Africa—in the name of moral principle,
international law and world peace.98
Several developments in Southern Africa forced the United
States to rethink its policy. One of them was the success
of armed struggle in Guinea Bissau (1973), Mozambique (1975)
and Angola in 1975. Another significant development was the
presence of Cuban and Soviet forces in Angola. MPLA victory




Department of State Bulletin. 31 May 1976, p. 672.
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credibility as a global power. The United States had to
salvage its credibility by playing a constructive role in
the process of political change in Africa. It was against
this background that Kissinger made a belated response to
the Lusaka Manifesto seven years later.
However, it opened the way for some major diplomatic
initiatives in 1977 by the Western powers: (a) The Anglo-
American Proposals in Zimbabwe; (b) the mediation effort in
Namibia by the Western powers (Contact Group); and (c) a
renewed focus on the South African problem. The last two
initiatives are discussed elsewhere in this study. Before
a coherent policy could be developed out of these initia
tives, a new administration came into office in the United
States, and Dr. Owen was appointed as the new Foreign
Secretary in Britain. Following up on the Kissinger initia
tive, the new administration of Jimmy Carter launched a
joint peace initiative in March 1977. New proposals for a
settlement were published in a British white paper on
99
September 1, 1977. This document, known as the Anglo-
American Proposals contained some essential elements for a
peaceful and irreversible transfer of power to black
99
New Proposals for a Settlement; British Government
White Paper (London: 1 September 1977) .
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majority rule in Zimbabwe. These essential elements included:
(1) the abdication of the Smith regime; (2) a British resi
dent commissioner to preside over the transition? (3) a new
constitution guaranteeing majority rule and minority rights;
(4) internationally supervised elections based on one man,
one vote; (5) integration of existing armed forces into one
army that would be loyal to the elected government; and
(6) an internationally financed aid program for an indepen
dent Zimbabwe.
To minimize objections to this plan, close consulta
tions were held with Nigeria and the Front Line States
(Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana and Angola) in its
planning and implementation. In September 1977 General
Obasanjo came out very strongly in support of the Anglo-
American Proposals. In his tour of the front line states in
September 1977 to drum up support for the proposals,
Obasanjo declared in Lusaka, Zambia that the document "is a
positive step towards majority rule in the territory," in
sisting that "it should be given a chance." in Zaire,
This document formed the basis for the Lancaster
House Agreement of 1979.
"Sligeria; Bulletin on Foreign Affairs, vol 7, n 9
(September 1977): 4.
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Obasanjo confirmed that "Britain and the United States had
jointly given Nigeria and other African countries concerned
the assurance of their determination to work with African
countries to achieve majority rule in Zimbabwe."102
The four months between September 1977 when the
Anglo-American Proposals were published and January 1978
turned out to be crucial in three respects: (a) during this
period the Patriotic Front was struggling with its own deep
internal divisions and was unable to reach agreement on
some of the key aspects of the plan; (b) while Britain,
Nigeria and the United States were busy attempting to sell
the plan to the front line states and the international com
munity, the Smith regime saw an opportunity to devise an
alternative plan; and (c) on February 15, 1978 the Smith
regime announced the successful conclusion of the "Internal
Settlement" negotiations.
The internal settlement.—On March 3, 1978 the
Smith regime signed an agreement with moderate African
factions led by Bishop Muzorewa. Under the new constitu
tion the 212,000 whites still maintained their special
Ibid.
Economist, 4 March 1978, p. 63.
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status. Although they constituted only about four percent
of the population, they were guaranteed 28 of the 100 seats
in parliament. Furthermore, for ten years they would have
controlled through a complex veto provision the judiciary,
the civil service and the security forces.^4
The Patriotic Front rejected the internal settlement
on the grounds that it preserved the existing structure of
the state in that: (a) black leaders were simply taking
over some of the apparatus; (b) real power still remained
in the hands of the white minority; and (c) no redistribu
tion of the nations wealth was undertaken. In his assess
ment of the internal settlement Robert Mugabe said:
All that has happened is a change of heads—a
black head being substituted for a white but with the
body still the same—the same armed forces, the same
civil service, the same judiciary, the same economic
structure. . .a head acting as a megaphone.1°^
For example, the specially-entrenched provisions
of the constitution could be amended only with the affirma
tive votes of 78 members of the House of Assembly. This
requirement of more than three-quarter votes effectively
gave whites a veto power over any proposed amendment. For
further details see Documents Section, Africa Contemporary
Records, 1977-78, p. C. 5. Martin and Johnson, The
Struggle for Zimbabwe, p. 293.
105Economist, 18 March 1978, p. 60.
106Patriotic Front's Leader R. Mugabe, quoted by








































first black Prime Minister on May 29, 1979 after winning the
April elections.
While the internal settlement and the new government
of Prime Minister Muzorewa were generally rejected and
ignored by those who sought a credible black majority rule
in Zimbabwe, observers noted that the internal settlement
was perhaps the beginning of a significant change. A sharp
decline of white power was envisaged. According to Colin
Legum, such a decline was reflected in the views of Ian
Smith, the architect of white supremacist rule, in that he
"was compelled to concede that the basic reason for the
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on November 11,
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1965 was no longer tenable." Furthermore, Smith was
quoted as saying in Time magazine that:
Whether we like it or not minority governments are
unacceptable to the rest of the world. I had always
hoped we could avoid black majority rule in my life
time. But you have to change your tactics in this
game, and we came to the conclusion that if we did not
change, we couldn't survive.
^■Reports by observers indicate the elections were
neither free nor fair. For full details of reports, see
Claire Palley, The Rhodesian Election (London: Catholic
Institute for International Relations, April 1979), (mimeo
graphed) .
112Africa Contemporary Records, 1978-79, p. B. 975.
113Time. 30 April 1979, p. 36.
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Several months after the institution of the Muzorewa
regime, the three major questions facing the country were
still unsettled: (a) ending the war; (b) removing economic
sanctions; and (c) gaining international recognition. The
Patriotic Front saw nothing to be gained from talks with
the Muzorewa regime. Instead, it intensified the war ef
forts by successfully establishing larger numbers of guer
rilla forces inside Zimbabwe. The turning point of the war
came perhaps in September 1978 when a Viscount aircraft of
Air Rhodesia was shot down by guerrilla forces. A Zimbab
wean military communique described what happened after the
crash:
Five of the 18 initial survivors went to seek help
from local tribesmen in the nearest village. Terror
ists then opened fire with communist-made kalashnikov
assault rifles and 10 of the passengers died in the
hail of bullets.114
By mid 1979 the weaknesses of the transition government pro
duced fears and frustrations in the country. Several major
indidents in the guerrilla war, such as the second Air
Rhodesia Viscount aircraft that was shot down on February
114
The Guardian, 5 September 1978, p. 15. From this
point on, the effect of the war was felt directly by whites
who lived in the cities as more and more raids were carried
out in the major cities.
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12, 1979 and all the 59 people on board were killed,
heightened the fears and frustrations of the white popula
tion of Zimbabwe.115
At this point in the conflict the thrust of the
Anglo-American initiative was bring all the factions in the
internal settlement and the external movement to an all
party conference. However, before any progress could be
made in this direction, two events occurred which had a
negative impact: First, the conservative party had won the
April elections in Britain, and Margaret Thatcher had
pledged in her campaign to recognize the Muzorewa regime
and lift sanctions. Signalling her intentions, Mrs. Thatcher
said at a press conference in Canberra, Australia on July
1st, 1979 that she would not try to get Parliament to re-
impose sanctions and that recognition "might take a little
longer." a few days later. Lord Carrington, British
Foreign Minister, was reported to have told Moraji Desai,
then the Indian Prime Minister, that the British government
would "formally recognize the Muzorewa regime" soon after
the Commonwealth Conference.117 Second, the United States
115The Herald (Salisbury), 14 February 1979, p. 1.
116Economist. 7 July 1979, p. 78.
117The Daily Times. 5 July 1979, p. 2.
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Senate, in one of its several attempts to undermine White
House policy on Zimbabwe, voted 75 to 19 on May 15, 1979 to
118
recommend the lifting of sanctions.
As the Commonwealth Conference in August 1979 ap
proached, there were increased speculations that the
British government would announce its recognition of the
Muzorewa government soon after the summit. The attempt by
Prime Minister Thatcher and some Republican Congressmen
headed by Senator Jesse Helms to recognize the Muzorewa
regime and lift sanctions was blocked by pressures from
Nigeria and the Carter administration, especially the Afri-
canist Group in the Carter administration. The Nigerian
government, in one of its many messages to the Thatcher
government, on June 5, 1979 insisted that any attempt to
recognize the Muzorewa regime would amount to "provocation
and a calculated and deliberate spite, constituting a
wanton disregard for African opinion and well-being and
119
deserving of an appropriate response." Also the Carter
administration expressed deep concern that Britain's inten
tion to lift sanctions would be counterproductive.
118"Carter Rhodesia Policy Suffer a Set Back in
Senate," Congressional Quarterly (19 May 1979): 957.
119New Nigerian, 6 June 1979, p. 3.
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Ambassador Donald McHenry argued that Britain was "on a
very wrong course by not referring the issue of sanctions
to the Security Council."
As the delegates from 39 Commonwealth Countries
were preparing to gather in Lusaka from August 1-7, 1979,
the British press supported Britain's position and recog
nition of the Muzorewa regime. The Economist, in its edi
torial of May 26, 1979 called on Mrs. Thatcher to recognize
the Muzorewa regime; and predicted that Nigeria would "only
121
bark and not bite." *x The Daily Telegraph, on June 14,
1979 also urged the British government to recognize the
Muzorewa regime and present the Commonwealth Conference with
122
a fait accompli. It was against this background that
Nigeria responded on the opening day of the conference that
it was confiscating the assets of British Petroleum (BP) in
Nigeria. The implications of this action included a loss
of BP's entitlement to about 300,000 barrels a day of
Nigerian oil and its 40 percent interest in the Port Har-
o. -1 ,= • 123court oil refinery.
120Washing"ton Post, 12 December 1979, p. A. 5.
121Economist, 26 May 1979, p. 13.
122The pally Telegraph, 14 June 1979, p. 10.
123West Africa, 6 August 1979, p. 1399.
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Britain drew the proper lesson from this action and
Mrs. Thatcher departed significantly from her Canberra
statement when she said at the conference that her adminis
tration "is wholly committed to genuine black majority rule
in Zimbabwe," and added that the aim of her administration
"is to bring Zimbabwe to legal independence on a basis which
the Commonwealth and the international community as a whole
will find acceptable."124
Several issues were discussed at the conference,125
but the resolution of the Zimbabwean problem attracted con
siderable attention. On this issue there was a meeting of
minds—that what was needed was a peace plan acceptable to
all parties to the conflict. This consensus was reflected
in the final Communique126 of the conference in which the
Heads of Government agreed, inter alia, on the following
objectives: (a) genuine black majority rule; (b) the effec
tive participation of "all parties to the conflict" in the
124
Quoted by Martyn Gregory, in "Rhodesia: From Lusaka
to Lancaster House," The World Today (January 1980): 13.
125
Other trouble spots, including Namibia and South
Africa itself, and the growing African refugee problem were
discussed.
126Final Communique of the Meeting of Commonwealth
Heads of Government, held in Lusaka, Zambia, 1-7 August
1979 (Commonwealth Secretariat, London).
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peace process; (c) a democratic constitution including "ap
propriate safeguards for minorities"; (d) a free and fair
election supervised under British government authority; and
(e) the presence of a commonwealth observers team to monitor
the election.
127
There were mixed reactions to the outcome of the
meeting, but as it turned out, a giant step toward the re
solution of the Zimbabwean conflict had been taken. The
Lusaka Agreement laid the basis for what finally emerged
from the Lancaster House Conference.
The Lancaster House Conference.—One of the remark
able things about the Lancaster House Conference was that
the rival sides to the conflict were brought to the same
negotiating table, which was one of the objectives of the
original Anglo-American initiative. When the conference
opened on September 10, 1979, several key issues were
addressed: (a) an internationally acceptable constitution,
(b) conditions for a ceasefire, (c) the supervision of the
elections, (d) the land issue, and (e) the status of the
Patriotic Front's guerrilla forces during the transition
127While Kenneth Kaunda, Chairman of the conference,
was jubilant, the Muzorewa regime was angry because Thatcher




period. Early in the negotiations, Muzorewa agreed to
the need for a fresh elections, which effectively meant
relinguishing his office for a truly independent Zimbabwe.
On the other hand, the Patriotic Front had initially in
sisted on United Nations-supervised elections, as opposed
to British-supervised elections, but dropped its opposition
after President Nyerere's personal intervention. Thus, the
major point became the function and composition of the
Commonwealth monitoring force. With some persuasion from
Nigeria and the front line states, Britain agreed to a plan
that called for: (a) a civilian group to observe the elec
tions; and (b) the formation of a Commonwealth force to
129
monitor but not enforce ceasefire. Land redistribution
was already agreed upon, but several questions were raised
such as (a) who would provide the money for compensation to
be paid to farmers, and (b) who would be affected by redis
tribution? A timely intervention by the United States
saved the talks. President Carter promised a substantial
contribution toward a land compensation fund, thus,
128Gregory, "Rhodesia: From Lusaka," p. 17.
12 9T, , A
130By the end of 1980 the U.S. had made a $50M dona
tion to that fund.
141
initiating a multi-donor program that later attracted dona
tions from other countries including Britain and Nigeria.
On the status of the guerrilla forces during the transition
period, the plan recognized the Patriotic Front's guerrillas
on an equal basis with that of the Muzorewa regime. With
these key issues resolved, the conference closed on a rather
positive note on December 15, 1979. The final agreement,
known as the Lancaster House Agreement, was signed by both
parties to the internal settlement and the external move
ments on December 21, 1979. In essence both parties agreed
to: (a) observe a ceasefire, monitored by Commonwealth
Forces; (b) accept the outcome of a British-supervised and
internationally observed elections to be held after a two-
month transition period.131 In the meantime, Britain as
sumed control over its "rebel" colony Rhodesia on December
12, lifted sanctions and installed Lord Soames as the
132
British governor. Thus, the end had come to Ian Smith's
illegal regime, and the results of the elections that fol
lowed confirmed even Smith's own belated admission that
131Martyn Gregory, "The 1980 Rhodesian Elections: A
First Hand Account and Analysis," The World Today (May
1980): 180.
132
"Britain Rules Rhodesia After Truce," Africa
Report (January-February 1980): 23.
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minority regimes "are unacceptable" to Zimbabweans.
Robert Mugabe's faction of the desolved Patriotic
Front won the elections of February 1980 in a landslide
and went on to form a coalition government with Joshua
Nkomo's faction in March 1980; thus, finally settling the
issue of political change in Zimbabwe. Nigeria and the
United States were given part of the credit for this desir
able outcome. However, perhaps the critical factor was the
success of the liberation movements on the battle field.
Nigeria-United States relations during this period
witnessed a dramatic turn around from the open differences
over the Angolan crisis and Nigeria's subsequent refusal to
admit Kissinger into the country, to cordial exchanges and
cooperation which culminated in state visits by the leaders
of both countries.134 This positive, turn in relations has
been attributed to a number of factors including: (a) Presi
dent Carter's stated commitment to the cause of African
emancipation, based partly on his emphasis on human rights,
(b) economic: Nigeria's oil export to the United States and
133ZANU won 63 percent of the popular vote and 57 of
80 black Assembly seats.
134It is perhaps of some historical significance to
note that President Carter's visit in April 1978 was the
only state visit to a sub-Saharan African country ever made
by a U.S. president.
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and U.S. investment in Nigeria, and (c) U.S. willingness to
de-emphasize East-West confrontation in Africa.
Nigeria supported the Anglo-American proposals, and
Obasanjo undertook a trip to the Front Line states to drum
up support for them. Andrew Young should be given part of
the credit for this because as Harold D. Nelson puts it,
"his influence on American policy in Africa and the close
consultations initiated with Nigeria" over Southern African
issues.
And when it was clear that the Thatcher government
and the conservative elements in U.S. Congress were leaning
toward recognizing the Muzorewa regime, the Obasanjo and
Carter administrations resisted Britain and congress,
respectively. Both countries were active participants in
the Lancaster House Conference. They both played construc
tive roles at critical points of the talks by helping to
avoid a breakdown over the land issue and questions concern
ing the monitoring force. All of this occurred at a time
the Patriotic Front was clearly winning the war. What were
the motivating factors behind both countries' involvement in
Zimbabwe? Were there some areas of common interest in
135Harold D. Nelson, ed. Nigeria: A Country Study
(Washington, D.C.: American University Press, 1982), p. 231.
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Zimbabwe?
Nigeria.—Two factors can be identified: (a) Suc
cess in Angola, and (b) the oil wealth. Success in Angola
seemed to have elevated Nigeria's Southern African crusade
to new heights. The crusade was intensified on many fronts:
(a) economic reprisals were taken against Britain, (b) in
creased moral and material support was given to liberation
movements, and (c) Nigeria took a more active role in the
negotiation process. A friendly administration in Washing
ton, coupled with the new oil wealth, meant that Nigeria
was now prepared to consolidate its position as Africa's
spokesman, committed to the liberation of Southern Africa.
United States interests.—Although the United
States had other interests in Zimbabwe, African concerns
and interests also played a role in its involvement in
Zimbabwe. It needs to be said that the Carter administra
tion's approach to the situation in Zimbabwe represented a
significant departure from the approach of the Nixon-Ford
era in that African concerns and interests were regarded as
high priority issues. This approach rested on sound
premises that included, among others: (a) fundamental change
in Southern Africa was not necessarily inimical to United
States interests, and (b) the best way to protect and
145
promote United States interests was for the United States to
identify itself as a friend of Africa, sympathetic to the
aspirations of the African people.
Other interests.—(1) Credibility: The United
States was involved in Zimbabwe partly to salvage what was
left of its already shaken credibility as a global power.
MPLA's victory in Angola has been interpreted by policy
makers in the United States as a serious blow to U.S. credi
bility as a global power. Kissinger warned in 1976 that
the lack of a direct U.S. response to the Soviet Union in
Angola would translate into a substantial loss of credi
bility for the U.S. in the region. Thus, to preempt further
Soviet influence and activities in the region, the U.S. be
came actively involved in efforts to find a solution to the
situation in Zimbabwe. It was in this context that the U.S.
not only claimed credit for the outcome in Zimbabwe, but
concluded that the outcome in Zimbabwe enhanced U.S. credi
bility as a global power, and at the same time, it deprived
the Soviet Union of a conflict to exploit.
(2) Strategic minerals: Some of the major minerals
that make Southern Africa vital to the United States are
found in Zimbabwe. Two of these minerals are chromium and
vanadium. They are vital to the production of anti-corrosive
146
steels. Other minerals found in Zimbabwe include abestos,
magnesium, phosphates and uranium. Union Carbide has a
profitable investment in chrome mining and smelting in
Zimbabwe. It was estimated that the United States had the
third highest foreign investment in Zimbabwe, about 20 per
cent of the total foreign investment, with South Africa and
137
Britain first and second, respectively. United States
importation of chromium had jumped from 10.2 percent in
138
1974 to 38 percent by 1980, despite a United Nations
embargo.
It would appear that U. S. policy-makers had cor
rectly interpreted events in Zimbabwe and concluded that an
African victory was inevitable. Therefore, in order to:
(a) enhance its credibility as a global power, and (b) pro
tect its varied economic interests in the long run, the U.S.
had to play a constructive role in finding a solution to
the problem in Zimbabwe.
136U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa, (ed)
ACAS (Boston: South End Press, 1978), p. 25.
137Harold Nelson, Zimbabwe: A Country Study (Washing
ton, D.C.: American University Press, 1982), p. 231.
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p. 213. Also see Table 1, p. 76.
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Namibia
Namibia's relatively short recorded political his
tory can roughly be examined in three parts: (1) the German
Era, (2) the Mandate Era, and (3) the Post Mandate Era.
The German Era
At the Berlin Conference of 1884-5 Africa was
partitioned among the imperialists. Germany took Namibia,
known then as (South West Africa) and forced most of the
tribes in the territory to sign treaties effectively giving
up their sovereignty. With Germany's imperial control es
tablished, a systematic looting of the resources followed.
By the end of the century Germany had "seized by legal
trickery, guile or force much of the best land and cattle"
139
in Namibia. African resistance was met by an extermina
tion order issued by General Von Trotha. A Blue Book pub
lished in 1918 documented some of the atrocities committed
140
by Germany during this period. During World War I,
colonialism in Namibia changed hands.
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Elizabeth Landis, "Namibia: Impending Independence?"
in Southern Africa in Crisis, G. Carter and P. O'Meara, ed.
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), p. 165.
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For a review, see Christopher Hitchens, "Namibia—
Rhodesia Again?" Nation, 30 December 1978, p. 725.
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The Mandate Era
South Africa invaded the territory in 1915, and
would have taken over Namibia as its fifth province at the
141
end of the war if President Wilson had allowed it. In
stead, under Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant
Namibia became a Class "C" mandated territory administered
by South Africa on behalf of the League of Nations. In
President Wilson's terms, the territory was entrusted to
South Africa as "a sacred trust of civilization," to "pro
mote to the utmost the material and moral welfare and the
142
social progress" of the Namibian people. South African
atrocities in Namibia were on a larger scale than those of
the Germans. Africans were used as cheap labor, and "rele-
143
gated to inadequate, poor-quality native reserves."
African resistance was met by bombings of "their women and
children." According to O'Meara, "the Africans learned
that they had exchanged an overseas tyrant for one from next
door."144
141President Wilson is credited as being the main
champion of the planning and writing processes of the
League of Nations.
142"What is Namibia? Some Highlights of Territory's
History/" United Nations Chronicle XVIII, n 6 (June 1981): 13.
143O'Meara, "Rhodesia-Zimbabwe," p. 167.
144Ibid.
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Upon the formal dissolution of the League of
Nations in April 1946, all former mandates not granted inde
pendence were placed under United Nations trusteeship. But
South Africa refused to either grant Namibia independence
or place it under the United Nations trusteeship system.
Instead, South Africa sought permission to annex the terri-
145
tory. Furthermore, South Africa discontinued its annual
reports on Namibia and refused to send petitions from the
Namibian people to the United Nations. Since then indepen
dent African states, with lukewarm support from the United
Nations, have been attempting to settle two crucial prob
lems: (a) the status of Namibia, and (b) political change in
the territory. The rulings of the International Court of
Justice did little to resolve these problems. In July 1950
the Court rendered an opinion on the international status
of Namibia. It advised, inter alia, that: (1) South Africa's
obligations under the original mandate continued. . .; and
(2) that it was not mandatory that South Africa should place
Namibia under the United Nations trusteeship system.146 In
an attempt to lay the groundwork for eventual independence
145
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for Namibia, Ethiopia and Liberia went to-the Court once
again in 1960. They charged, inter alia, that South Africa
had: (1) extended apartheid to Namibia, and (2) violated
the human rights of the Namibian people and prevented pro
gress toward independence.147 After six years of arguments
and one interim decision in which the Court ruled that
Ethiopia and Liberia, both former members of the League,
had the right to file the charges, the Court in July 1966
reversed itself and concluded that the two complainants had
148
no status to bring the proceedings. Thus, by ruling on
the procedural and not the substantive aspect of the case,
the Court hindered the efforts of those who were seeking to
achieve independence for Namibia and strengthened South
Africa's intransigence.
Post-Mandate Era
The Court's ruling was greeted with anger and dis
may by concerned African states in particular, and the
General Assembly in general. Thus, on October 27, 1966 the
General Assembly voted 114 to 2 to adopt resolution 2145
147
United Nations General Assembly Official Records,
Sixteenth Session, 1960-61, p. 158.
148
South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment: I.C.J.
Reports, 1966, p. 6.
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which revoked South Africa's mandate, formally removing
Namibia from South African control. Furthermore, the
resolution made South Africa's presence in the territory an
illegal occupation. Under this resolution Namibia was to
become the direct responsibility of the international com
munity charged with the task of bringing the territory to
independence. Successive South African governments had
defied the United Nations before revocation of the mandate,
and insisted that with the demise of the League, all their
international obligations regarding the mandate lapsed.
The need to remove this illegal occupation that had
lasted for over 51 years in utter defiance of the wishes of
the Namibian people and the United Nations gave rise to the
emergence of several liberation movements in Namibia.
The most important movement was South West African Peoples
Organization of Namibia (SWAPO) led by Sam Nujoma. SWAPO
was recognized by the United Nations and most of the world
as the legitimate representative of the Namibian people.
149United Nations Resolution 2145 (XXI), U.N.Resolu
tions Series 1, vol XI, 1966-68, p. 118.
those in contention for power are the South
West African National United Front (SWANUF) the South West
African National Union (SWANU) and the South West African
Peoples Organization (SWAPO).
15^-SWAPO is also recognized as such by the Organiza
tion of African Unity.
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Since its formal inception in 1960 SWAPO has spearheaded
the liberation struggle against South Africa's illegal oc
cupation. Sam Nujoma urged "all Namibian patriots to main
tain unity, vigilance and intensify at all fronts in the
struggle for the national liberation of Namibia."152
Nujoma's call notwithstanding, South Africa's illegal
regime was enforced and perpetuated by "all the massive ap
paratus of apartheid law, military occupation, judicial
rulings, a nationwide and ruthless police establishment,"
and total economic exploitation of the African population.153
With Zimbabwe's independence in April 1980, the
focus of the international community centered on Namibia.
Namibia was thought to be next. But such optimism was re
placed by cautious speculation. However, one thing seemed
certain: political change in Namibia was inevitable. Would
political change in Namibia be achieved through negotiated
settlement or armed struggle or both? We shall examine the
ongoing efforts of the international community, with partic
ular emphasis on the positions taken by Nigeria and the
152
Declaration of the Central Committee of the SWAPO.
by Sam Nujoma in Lusaka, Zambia, 2 August 1976.
William Johnson, "Namibia: Forces and Factions,"
Africa Today (August 1979): 23.
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United States, to resolve the Namibian dispute.
Kissinger's Lusaka Declaration of 1976 marked the
beginning of current attempts to resolve the Namibian dis
pute. Part of that speech dealt with the Namibian question
in which Kissinger outlined the United States position as
follows:
First, we reiterate our call upon the South African
government to permit all the people and groups of
Namibia to express their views freely, under United
Nations supervision, on the political future and con
stitutional structure of the country. Second, we urge
the South African government to announce a definite
timetable acceptable to the world community for the
achievement of self-determination. Third, the United
States is prepared to work with the international com
munity, and especially with African leaders, to
determine what further steps would improve prospects
for a rapid and acceptable transition to Namibian inde
pendence. We are convinced that the need for progress
is urgent. Fourth, once concrete movement toward self-
determination is underway, the United States will ease
its restrictions on trade and investments in Namibia.
We stand ready to provide economic and technical
assistance to help Namibia take its rightful place
among the independent nations of the world.^^
This policy outline, coupled with Carter's commitment to
human rights, opened the way for subsequent mediation ef
forts by the Western nations in 1977. The mediation efforts,
spearheaded by the United States, were launched in April
of State Henry Kissinger, U.S. Policy on
Southern Africa, an Address made on April 25, 1976 at
Lusaka, Zambia. Also see Department of State Bulletin
31 May 1976, pp. 672-684.
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1977 to obtain a settlement of the Namibian dispute along
the lines set out in previous United Nations resolutions
on Namibia, especially Security Council resolution 385 of
1976 which demanded, inter alia, that:
. . . (a) South Africa accept elections under United
Nations supervision and control before independence;
(b) release of all political prisoners; (c) abolish
all forms of racial discrimination; (d) permit all
exiles to return without fear of arrest; and (e) with
draw its illegal administration. "
The Western nations further agreed that every stage and
planning of this mediation effort would involve close con
sultation with the front line states and Nigeria. Since
one of the objectives was a solution acceptable to all
parties to the dispute, SWAPO was brought directly into the
negotiating process. This was the beginning of the Contact
Group, which included Canada, France, United Kingdom,
United States and West Germany, and was headed by U.S.
Ambassador Don McHenry.
Prompted by events in Angola in 1975 and pressures
from the international community, South Africa realized
that independence for Namibia was inevitable. However,
South Africa's position as to what form it would take
United Nations Chronicle, XII, n 2 (February
1976): 18.
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differed significantly from that of United Nations and SWAPO.
Although South Africa did not wish to be seen as the one to
break off negotiations with the Contact Group, it was un
willing to accept any solution that would jeopardize what it
considered "to be vital political, strategic and economic
interests in the territory." From South Africa's point
of view, the ideal solution was a friendly and dependent
government in Namibia that would allow Namibia to remain a
buffer state and permit continued South African access to
the mineral wealth of the territory. And since the solution
proposed by the Contact Group was perceived by South Africa
as not likely to lead to a puppet government in Namibia that
would allow South Africa to retain control of the terri
tory's uranium and diamonds, South Africa has presented its
own alternative—The Turnhalle Constitutional Talks. The
talks, launched in September 1975 with representatives of
the major ethnic groups, excluded SWAPO. In 1977 the con
ference produced a set of proposals for the establishment of
an interim assembly that would lead to Namibian independence
Michael Spicer, "Namibia: Elusive Independence,"
World Today, October 1980, p. 407.
157Richard Sklar, "In Namibia, They have Counted
Votes, but the Verdict is Undecided," Los Angeles Times,
17 December 1978, V. 2.
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by December 1978. J° The delegates from this conference,
under South Africa's urgings, formed a multi-racial alli
ance party known as the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) ,
led by Dirk Mudge, a prosperous farmer of German extrac
tion, who was reported to have a long history as a leader
of a white supremacist party. 59 South African-sponsored
elections that excluded SWAPO and other opposition parties
was held on December 4-8, 1978 with predictable results.
The DTA won in a landslide160 amidst worldwide condemna
tion of the entire exercise. The Contact Group branded
the election outcome "null and void." SWAPO's secretary
for foreign affairs Pestus Naholo called "on all our
brothers in Africa and the whole international community
to condemn" the exercise.
Observers saw the move as another unilateral de
claration of independence and likened the December elec
tion in Namibia to Ian Smith's internal settlement.
Xtopher Hitchens declared that:
158
Spicer, "Namibia: Elusive Independence," p. 409.
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160Sklar, "In Namibia," p. 2.
161Washington Post. 20 August 1976, p. A. 7.
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What we are seeing in Namibia is another Unilateral
Declaration of Independence, only this time backed
even more strongly by Pretoria because those involved
S^th AfriCan rath th ii ^ fbeca ' Sr an Br t sh' ^because the economic stake is more direct.162
With the lessons of Zimbabwe fresh in the minds of policy
makers in South Africa, it seemed conceivable that South
Africa's strategy was to: (a) eventually agree to an inter
nationally-supervised election, (b) attempt to use the time
gained by its delaying tactics to build up internal and
external support for the DTA or (internal settlement), and
(c) weaken SWAPO politically and militarily, thus, reduce
its chances of winning the election when eventually held.
South Africa's attempt to side-track the interna
tional initiative may have slowed down the initial momentum
gained when it appeared all parties to the conflict were
willing to give the western plan a chance, but the plan had
not been discarded. The United Nations council for Namibia
held a series of extraordinary plenary meetings in Lusaka,
Zambia in 1978. On March 23, 1978 it adopted a Declaration
of Lusaka (A/S-9/2-S/12631) in which the Council said it
considered the "illegal occupation of Namibia by South
Africa to be a threat to international security." The
Hitchens, "Namibia: Rhodesia Again," p. 726.
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Council recommended, among other things, that the General
Assembly:
. . .(a) urge the Security Council to take the neces
sary measures to end forthwith South Africa's illegal
occupation of the territory; (b) ensure complete and
unconditional withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia;
and (c) urgently to consider the imposition of manda
tory and comprehensive economic sanctions.l6^
On July 27, 1978 the Security Council endorsed the western
initiative and adopted two Resolutions—431, on the appoint
ment of a United Nations Commissioner for Namibia by a vote
of 13 to 0; and 432, concerning Walvis Bay, by a unanimous
vote. South Africa had attempted to separate Walvis Bay
from the rest of Namibia for possible annexation.
Nigeria and the United States supported the plan.
In Security Council Resolution 435, co-sponsored by Nigeria,
the United States and others, the Council reiterated its
major objective—the withdrawal of South Africa's illegal
occupation of Namibia and the "transfer of power to the
people of Namibia." Furthermore, the resolution:
. . .(a) called for the establishment of the United
Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to super
vise the Namibian election; (b) called on South Africa
forthwith to cooperate with the Secretary General in
163
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the implementation of its resolution, and with the
UNTAG in carrying out its function; and (c) declared
that all unilateral measures taken by the illegal
administration in Namibia in relation to the electoral
process, including unilateral registration of voters
or transfer of power, in contravention of Council
resolutions 385, 431, and 435 were null and void.1^
The resolution was adopted by a vote of 12 to 0, with two
abstentions. The United Nations appointed Martti Ahtisaari
as United Nations Commissioner for Namibia to head a
negotiating team to work out the details of the cease fire
and elections as stipulated by resolution 435.
Nigeria not only endorsed the western initiative in
Namibia, but threw its weight fully behind their efforts in
1977. Nigeria had consistently made its position on the
Namibian question clear in both United Nations sessions and
policy statements. In a speech delivered at the United
Nations in 1977, Obasanjo reiterated Nigeria's commitment
"to the cause of freedom and justice" in Namibia and added
that:
We salute SWAPO leaders and pay warm tributes to
the devotion and determination of that organization




'The Daily Times. 8 September 1977, p. 2.
160
Nigeria will not relent in our efforts to see Namibia
free.167
Nigeria's foreign affairs commissioner, Joe Garba, in a
policy statement on October 21, 1977, not only reaffirmed
Nigeria's position on Namibia, but deplored the "hypocriti
cal attitude on the part of some world powers in handling
the Namibian question," and stated that "no sacrifice is too
great, no measure too strong" for Nigeria to take to ac
celerate the process of decolonization and bring about
genuine political change in Namibia.
The Shagari administration continued the activist
foreign policy started by the Muhammed-Obasanjo regime.
Shagari repeatedly reaffirmed Nigeria's commitment to the
liberation of Namibia. Addressing the Lagos Diplomatic
Corps, shortly after his inauguration , in 1979 Shagari
said:
My administration will relentlessly work with all
countries willing to apply civilized standards to
bring about the early eradication of colonialism,
racism and other forms of discrimination in Africa
167
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On Namibia, Shagari reaffirmed "Nigeria's support for SWAPO
as the sole and authentic representative of the people of
Namibia." Declaring Nigeria's support for the Western ini
tiative, Shagari urged the United Nations Secretary General
to: "Persist in his commendable efforts to implement the
Security Council resolutions on Namibia. South Africa must
withdraw unconditionally from that territory."170 During
his visit to the United States in 1980, Shagari predicted
victory for Namibia in a year and called for mandatory
sanctions against South Africa.
Efforts to find an internationally acceptable solu
tion to the Namibian question continued during 1980, Presi
dent Carter's last year in office. While the United Nations
played a central role, it also received some assistance
from Nigeria and the United States in keeping the issue
alive.
During the Carter administration. South Africa
moved grudgingly from intransigence to ambivalence to
rather doubtful cooperation. By December 1980 South Africa
was ready to come to the conference table.171 in one of a
Ibid., p. 56
71Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim told the Security
Council on November 24, 1980 that South Africa and SWAPO had
agreed to attend the proposed U.N.-sponsored conference in
January.
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series of attempts to resolve the Namibian dispute the
United Nations sponsored a Pre-Implementation Conference
(PIM) in Geneva in January 1981. Delegates to the meet
ing included the South African government and SWAPO,
Nigeria, the frontline states, the OAU and the Contract
Group attended as observers. Specifically, this conference
was called by United Nations Secretary General, Kurt
Waldheim, for the purpose of:
. . .setting the dates for: (c) a ceasefire; and
(b) the start of the implementation of the Settlement
Proposal leading to independence for the Territory
in 1981.173
The conference, opened by the Secretary General on January
7, ended on January 14 without agreement being reached on
any of the two key points. Predictably, South Africa found
another snag—this time expressing extreme concern "regard
ing the impartiality of the United Nations." In effect,
South Africa was demanding the withdrawal of United Nations
recognition of SWAPO as "the sole and authentic representa-
174
tive of the Namibian people."
^■72"U.N. Sets Multi-Party Namibia Talks in January to
End Impasse," Africa Report (January-February 1981): 23.
Namibia Conference Ends after Failing to Agree on




United Nations Under Secretary General for Special
Political Affairs Brian E. Urquhart expressed regret at
the failure of the conference, pointing out that by this
failure "a great opportunity had been missed." Kurt Wald-
heim, in his report to the Security Council on the result
of the conference (S/14333) dated January 19, 1981 stated
that the outcome of the meeting "must give rise to the most
serious international concern," and appealed to South Africa
to reconsider its position.1'5 At a United Nations press
briefing on January 21, 1981, SWAPO's Permanent Observer to
the United Nations, Theo-Ben Gurirab accused South Africa
of wrecking the talks, and thus, "forced the Namibian people
on a war path." The General Assembly condemned "South
Africa's manoeuvres at the Geneva conference," and deplored
the failure of the conference, which in the opinion of the
Assembly, was attributable "to South Africa's continued
intransigence." Furthermore, the Assembly expressed the
view that, with the failure of the Geneva talks, "the
people of Namibia had no option other than to escalate
their armed struggle."
175Ibid. 176Ibid., p. 6.
177"Assembly, In Resumed Session, Calls for Total Sanc
tions Against South Africa," United Nations Chronicle XVIII,
n 5 (May 1981): 5-7.
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While South Africa continued to question the good
faith of the United Nations in an apparent attempt to stall
for time, it also stepped up building local support for its
internal settlement, and actively pursued military action
against SWAPO.178
Observers contended that while the success of
Mugabe in Zimbabwe served as a warning to South Africa over
the future of Namibia, Ronald Reagan's election as United
States President raised South Africa's hopes of a possible
reversal of American support for an internationally accept
able settlement in Namibia along the lines stipulated in
Resolution 435. "The South African government," wrote the
Economist, appears:
. . .to be stalling yet again on the Namibia settlement
plan. This time, it seems, Mr. Piet Botha's government
wants another delay because it hopes it will be able to
bargain for a better deal once the Reagan administra
tion is in office in Washington. South Africa has long
been banking on a Reagan administration coming to power
and, it hoped, being both more sympathetic to its
standpoint and more ready to veto a sanctions move.179
A reversal of American policy had not yet emerged, but
178
°South Africa has carried out military raids on
suspected SWAPO bases in neighboring countries, particularly
Angola. One such raid was mounted on May 4th 1978 on
Cassinga, 156 miles inside Angola.
179,,
1980, pp. 41-42.
Waiting for Reagan," The Economist. 22 November
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there had been a decided shift in perspective. This shift
was anticipated by African observers when it became clear
Reagan would be in the White House in 1981. Ali A. Mazrui,
anticipating this shift, predicted that the Reagan adminis
tration was:
. . .likely to have an African policy that, to some
extent, is almost a mirror reflection of China's
policy—a tendency to look at African issues neither
on their merits nor from the perspective of direct
U.S.-African relations, but from the perspective of
U.S.-Soviet relations.180
Richard Deutsch predicted that: (a) African concerns, such
as the issue of political change in Africa, are not expected
to be high priority issues in the Reagan administration,
but added that pragmatism will lead the administration to
accommodate "Nigeria's commitment to the achievement of
majority rule" in Southern Africa; and (b) the administra
tion is expected to back off from applying pressure on
South Africa; instead, it will engage the South African
181
government in "frank talk" or "private persuasion." Some
of these predictions were right. Reagan's new approach was
180Ali A. Mazrui, "Africa Between Republican and
Democratic Administrations," Africa Report (January-
February 1981): 46.
181Richard Deutsch, "Reagan and Africa," Africa Report
(January-February 1981): 4-6.
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essentially coaxing rather than threatening South Africa
into cooperation. The administration named this approach
"constructive engagement." The corollary to this is the
so-called "linkage"—which is a formula designed by this
administration to make Namibia's independence contingent
upon the withdrawal of Cuban troops in Angola.182 Critics
charge that such a policy has hindered negotiations rather
than helped them, pointing out that South Africa's refusal
to withdraw from Namibia "for security reasons until
19,000 Cuban troops" are withdrawn from Angola, falls in
line with Reagan's policy of linkage. In Kenneth Kaunda's
own words, "we cannot accept that. We do not see why there
should be any connection between the withdrawal of the
Cubans and independence for Namibia."183 United States
negotiators, headed by Assistant Secretary of State, Chester
Crocker, have been explaining the administration's position
at home and abroad. He toured Africa in 1981 to explain
United States policy on Africa, particularly in regard to
Namibia. In a speech to United States Council on Foreign
182
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183
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Relations in New York on October 5, 1981, Crocker branded
the so-called United States tilt to South Africa as "mis
information, " and added:
We are determined to press for an internationally
acceptable settlement for the independence of Namibia.
That settlement must be one which meets the vital
security needs of Namibia's neighbors as well as per
mits the exercise of self-determination by Namibia's
people. We believe we have made progress toward that
objective.184
Addressing the issue of linkage Crocker denied the existence
of such a policy when he said: "We have not made Cuban
troops withdrawal a pre-condition of the Namibian settlement.
The Namibian negotiations are proceeding on their own
track.185 However, Crocker echoed the administration's con
cern over the presence of Cuban troops which he saw as:
. . .(a) a major impediment to progress on Namibia, and
(b) a situation which allows the Soviet Union and Cuba
to forment disorder, to keep the pot boiling, to con
tinue a dependence on Soviet arms.186
Crocker's denials and explanations notwithstanding,
Reagan made the independence of Namibia contingent upon the
withdrawal of Cuban troops. Nigeria publicly rejected this,
calling it "unjust" and "incomprehensible."
184Assistant Secretary, Chester Crocker, "U.S. Inter
ests in Africa," Council on Foreign Relations, New York
(Current Policy No. 330), 5 October 1981, p. 3.
185Ibid., p. 5. 186Ibid., p. 7..
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By the end of 1981 negotiations were at a standstill
and announced deadlines passed with no solution in sight.
Even the unity of the Contact Group seemed to have unraveled,
with France, West Germany and Canada conceding that the only
obstacle to an agreement was the Cuban issue, and informing
Washington that "linkage is unacceptable."187
The question in Namibia was not political change
per se, but what form it would take. Indications were that
South Africa wants to impose a neo-colonial form of govern
ment on Namibia in a desperate attempt to protect what it
considered to be vital political, strategic and economic
interests in the territory, and the Reagan administration
seemed to be unwilling to discourage this. It is perhaps
noteworthy that all the attendant problems that confronted
Ian Smith's Internal Settlement were also present in the
Namibian situation in that: (a) the war continued, (b) it
attracted worldwide condemnation, and (c) South Africa's
illegal occupation had not received international recogni
tion. And it was not unrealistic to expect that what
happened to Ian Smith's Internal Settlement would also
occur in Namibia.
Newsweek, Africa: The Namibian Conundrum," p. 71.
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South Africa's delay tactics notwithstanding,
colonial history might repeat itself in Namibia. As Faye
Carroll pointed out:
What ultimately will transpire in Namibia is pre
dictable. Eventually, South African exploitation of
the territory will end. Ultimately, apartheid will
fail. The process may be long and costly, but
colonialism and white supremacy are dying.188
The Reagan administration made meaningful cooperation be
tween Nigeria and the United States on the Namibian ques
tion practically impossible because of its major policy
shift.
Motivations behind both countries' stance in
Namibia.—First, both countries were not agreed on what the
issue was in Namibia. Second, the Reagan administration
intensified U.S. concern over Soviet and Cuban involvement
in Southern Africa, and U.S. access to strategic minerals
and protection of its economic interests were the top
priority issues for U.S. policy-makers, not African concerns
and interests.
Nigeria.—Nigeria was motivated by the need to push
the decolonization process one step further. As Africa's
spokesman, with considerable involvement in the Southern
188
F. Carroll, South West Africa and the U.N. (Lexing
ton: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), p. 113.
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African decolonization process, this had become a natural
issue over which all Nigerian administrations were agreed.
Furthermore, it had become an article of faith for all
administrations in Nigeria to not only actively support the
liberation of Southern Africa, but to regard it as a
priority issue in its foreign policy.
United States.—While Nigeria saw colonialism as
the problem in Namibia, the United States sees the Soviet
and the Cubans as the problem. Thus, for the Reagan admin
istration, Namibia's independence took second place to the
East-West confrontation. A SWAPO government in Namibia was
seen by the Reagan administration as: (a) a victory for the
Soviet Union and Cuba, (b) a blow to U.S. security, and
(c) a loss of important strategic minerals.
Strategic Minerals.—Namibia possesses extensive
deposits of minerals including, uranium, diamonds, copper,
1QQ
lead and zinc. oz> In 1977 Namibia was the seventeenth
leading mining nation in the world, "with diamonds account
ing for 66 percent of total mineral exports."190
189
Siedman, Multinational CorporationsT p. 163.
190
Roger Murray, "No Easy Path to Independence,"
Africa Digest (May-June 1977): 19, and cited by Allan
Cooper in "U.S.Economic Power and Political Influence in
Namibia" (Ph.D. dissertation, Atlanta University 1981), p. 145
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Lithium and vanadium are produced extensively in
Namibia and exported to the United States. Lithium is used
in the manufacture of lubricants and ceramics, and vanadium
is vital to the production of anti-corrosive steels.191
Furthermore, in 1977 Namibia was reported to be the second
largest producer of lead in Africa, and "the third largest
producer of Zinc."x^ It is also rich in arsenic, silver,
sillimanite, salt, sodalite, gold, manganese, tin and
193
slate. In 1975 United States direct investment in
Namibia was over $50 million.194
United States-owned Tsumeb Corporation and the
Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa, a member
of the Anglo American Group produced "over 90 percent of
all mineral production in Namibia."195 It is estimated that
Tsumeb"s share of profit alone in 1978 amounted to $60
U.S. Study Commission, p. 310.
192
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million.
East-West confrontation and the protection of these
varied economic and strategic interests took precedence
over Namibian independence. In the next section, the fo
cus will be South Africa itself. Efforts made by Nigeria
and the United States to bring about political change in
that country will be examined, and the motivations behind
both countries' involvement will be highlighted.
South Africa
South Africa's apartheid system is unique, and of
great concern to those committed to racial justice and
human dignity. The question of how to transform South
Africa's apartheid system has bothered the rest of Africa
for years. The concern the rest of Africa has shown for
the achievement of this objective has fluctuated throughout
history. It was very intense immediately after periods of
relative success of a liberation struggle or negotiated
settlement in other parts of the continent.197
Nigeria and the United States have persistently
17.
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expressed their opposition to South Africa's apartheid sys
tem. Both countries have also made some efforts to bring
about peaceful change in the apartheid system. The focus
here is to: (a) identify the problem in South Africa, (b)
examine Nigeria and the United States positions on the South
African problem, and (c) evaluate both countries' efforts
to bring about political change in South Africa, with some
insights on the motivations behind both countries' involve
ment in South Africa.
Some highlights of the historical background of
South Africa's apartheid system may be useful. The process
of white dominance over the indigenous peoples of South
Africa was set in motion in 1652 when the Dutch East India
Company established the first permanent European settlement
at the Cape of Good Hope. *° This settlement facilitated
the subsequent conquering of the territory. White domina
tion over the African indigenous people was accomplished in
three phases. First, whites occupied the arable land with
in 100 miles of Cape Town. By the 1800 they also controlled
the fertile land throughout the whole of western half of
the region. And by the end of the nineteenth century whites
198
Cornelius W. DeKiewiet, A History of South Africa
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took complete control of the whole territory.199
By 1657 the settlement had grown into a colony, with
the company releasing a number of its servants to become
free settlers in the Cape in order to cultivate land and
herd cattle. The Dutch settlers in the Cape quickly came to
consider manual labour below their dignity, therefore, the
Company had to import slaves. The first shipload of slaves
arrived in 1658.200 Furthermore, the Dutch raided the local
inhabitants for slaves, and with the increase in the number
of Dutch settlers, came a sharp increase in the settlers'
demand for cattle and land. African resistance to Dutch ex
pansion was met with brute force, and by 1785 three addi
tional settlements had been established by the Dutch-
Stellenbosch settlement in 1685, Swellendam in 1747, and
Graaff-Reinet in 1785.201
By the 18th century there were about 15,000 white
settlers in the territory. Tension between the different
groups of settlers existed, but their common Calvinist
199Tom Hopkinson, South Africa (New York: Time, Inc.,
1964), p. 25.
200
Van den Berghe, South Africa: A Study in Conflict
Los Angeles: UCLA Press, 1965), p. 14.
201.
Leo Marquard, A Short History of South Africa
(New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 15.
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religion molded the white settlers into a relatively homo
geneous group that became known as the Afrikaners. How
ever, in about a generation, color had become "the primary
202
index of status." w* Fundamentalists Afrikaners have
sought Biblical justification for racial segregation and
white supremacy by arguing that, as Berghe puts it: "Afri
cans, . . .are the descendants of Ham, who was cursed by
Noah, and are destined by God to be servants of servants,
203
hewers of wood and drawers of water."
British conquering of the territory in 1806 further
complicated the South African situation. British-Afrikaner
struggle for supremacy had sometimes overshadowed the tradi
tional black-white power struggle. The result was what has
become known as the Great Trek, in which Afrikaners, dis
satisfied with British rule and its reforms which put the
Africans on the same footing as the Afrikaners, traveled
far into the interior, eventually establishing settlements
204
in upper Natal.
Intra-white conflict notwithstanding, by the time
South Africa became independent in 1910 whites were clearly
202Berghe, South Africa, p. 14.
203Ibid., p. 15. 204Ibid., p. 29.
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in control. However, Africans had not been silent while
whites took over control and designed the structure of South
Africa's political system. According to Gwendolen Carter,
African opposition was strong and organized. On the eve of
South Africa's independence, "the National Native Convention
protested the exclusion of Africans" from political partic-
205
lpation. That was the beginning of a movement that
eventually gave rise to the formation of the African Na
tional Congress (ANC) in 1912. And until it was banned in
1960 following the Sharpeville massacre, "the ANC remained
the chief standard-bearer" and a major force in the libera
tion struggle in South Africa.206
The Problem
The uniqueness of South Africa's apartheid system,
in the words of a United States Senator, is that "its
policies are based on race, made legal through legislation,
and justified in the name of defending the West from Com
munism."207 The racially dominated state is controlled by
205
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Senator Dick Clark (D., Iowa), Chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on African Affairs
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and exists for the purpose of upholding the privileges of
a white minority. According to Bernard Magubane, these
privileges include, among other things: (a) the consumption
of 60 percent of the nation's income, (b) ownership of
87 percent of the land, and (c) control of "most of the
skilled and semi-skilled occupations."208
Apartheid provided the guiding principle for govern
ment action and legislation. What followed particularly
from 1948 was a systematic barrage of laws and regulations
which imposed requirements for separate facilities, separate
group areas, and racial classifications; prohibited sexual
relations between different races and practically prohibited
any form of meaningful interaction between the races in all
aspects of life. To implement and enforce such a vast
apparatus of laws and regulations, the South African regime
has had to create a substantial bureaucracy. A person's
fundamental rights hinge on the color of his or her skin.
Thus, the South African regime has divided the population
(1978) quoted in The Report of the Study Commission on U.S.
Policy Toward Southern Africa (Los Angeles: UCLA Press,
1981), p. XVII.
208B. Magubane, The Political Economy of Race and Class
in South Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), p. 2.
209T. Beard, "General Introduction," in African Per
spectives on South Africa, Hendrik van der Merwe, ed.
(London: Rex Collings, 1978), p. 8.
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into four groups: Africans, Asians, Coloreds and whites.
The legal basis of this division stemmed from the Population
Registration Act of 1950.u Under this law, sometimes
described as the cornerstone of apartheid, the government
can further reclassify people. The implication here is
that in South Africa one can be classified as a member of
more than one racial group at different times. According
to a United States Commission report:
In 1978 ten whites were reclassified as coloureds
and 150 coloureds were reclassified as white. Such
shifts can cause upheavals in families. Families are
torn apart when husbands and wives, parents and chil
dren, brothers and sisters are differently classified,
with all the ensuing consequences to their personal,
economic and political lives.211
To guard against racial crossings the South African
regime enacted legal prohibitions against mixed marriages
and interracial dating, in 195 9 the Prohibition of Mixed
Marriages Act was passed. It forbids marriages between
"a European and a non-European."212 Other laws in the same
general category include the Immorality Acts of 1957 and
1950 which outlawed sexual relations or "any immoral or
210Hopkinson, South Africa, p. 91.
211
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212
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indecent act" between blacks and whites.213 About six
hundred people were convicted in 1960; and 355 people were
charged under the Immorality Acts in 1980 alone.214
The homelands policy, developed in the 1950s,
reached its climax in 1976 with the granting of indepen
dence to Transkei. One of the basis of this policy was the
Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 which im
plied that Africans would never be permitted effective
participation in South Africa except in their designated
tribal homelands. In other words, this policy was designed
to ensure that whites retained control of 87 percent of the
territory while the African majority were restricted to
these tribal states. Thus, whites would not have to share
political and economic power with Africans, but would re
tain African labor. The Report of the Study Commission
summed up the ultimate goal of this policy as follows:
All homelands would become independent states: the
entire African population of the Republic would be
granted political rights and citizenship in these
states; consequently, there would ultimately be no
African citizen of the Republic of South Africa re
quiring accommodation in the political order of
213Ibid.
214
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ern Africa, p. 49.
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South Africa itself.215
Some of the most detested aspects of apartheid are the pass
laws. The Black Urban Areas Consolidation Act of 1945 and
the Black Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents
Act of 1952 are the main statutes restricting the entry of
Africans into white areas.216 The pass laws in effect re
quires that:
Africans must carry at all times a reference book
containing his employment history, as well as a number
of documents; such as tax receipts. . . . Africans may
not reside anywhere without permission, may not move
outside his allotted place of residence without ap
proval of the authorities, is subject to curfew at
night, may not live in any 'white' area without being
gainfully employed, may not own land in freehold, and
may be expelled from his residence and deported to
any place, when the administration deems his presence
to be 'undesirable.'217
Compounding these discriminatory laws was the total exclu
sion of blacks from effective political participation.
Furthermore, blacks were struggling not only against,
as Magubane puts it, "the all-embracing" exploitations they
had been subjected to in the apartheid system. They were
challenging, Magubane added, "a history of violation that
215Ibid., p. 50.
216
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goes far beyond the judicial, into that which is economic
and social as well."218
There were serious inequalities in the education of
blacks as compared to that of whites in South Africa. These
inequalities ranged from physical facilities to textbooks.
In 1979 the teacher-pupil ratio was: (a) 1 to 48 for blacks,
and 1 to 30 for Coloureds, compared with 1 to 20 for whites.219
Dropout rates in black schools were very high. In 1967 the
attrition rate was about 80 percent. In 1970 there were
only 1,400 blacks with university education, while there
were 104,500 whites with university education.220
The gross injustice of apartheid as it relates to
education can be best gleaned from government expenditures
on white and black education. In the fiscal year 1978-1979,
the apartheid regime spent $90 on each black child, $290 on
each Coloured child, and $940 on each white child.221 Thus,
in 1981 40 percent of the urban black workforce were classi
fied as functionally illiterate, in the rural areas, the
Magubane, The Political Economy of Race and Class,
p. XII.
219
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figure was 65 percent.
There was a wide gap between white and black wages
for equal work. Specifically, it was 5 to 1 in 1981. In
the same year it was estimated that African per capital in
come was $280, compared to white per capital income of
$3,500. " It may be useful to point out that 85 percent
of blacks work for the minimum wage, compared with 0.24 per
cent of whites.224 Correcting these inequalities and other
aspects of apartheid has been, to some extent, the focus of
the struggle.
The struggle in South Africa involved a dangerous
confrontation between a minority white population, pursuing
discriminatory policies designed to keep them in control of
the state they captured over a half century ago, and the
majority of oppressed, exploited and dispossessed Africans
determined to wrest political power from the apartheid
regime and institute in its place a system based on majority
rule, one man one vote.
The struggle to wrest political power from the
"South Africa: Can Race War be Avoided?" Great
Decisions 1981, p. 35.
223
The Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward South
ern Africa, p. 133.
224
Great Decisions 1981, p. 35.
183
existing regime gave rise to a number of liberation move
ments in South Africa. The major one was the African Na
tional Congress (ANC). Others included the Black Conscious
ness Movement (BCM) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC),
(a splinter group from the ANC). At its peak the ANC
claimed a membership of approximately 100,000, committed to
the liberation of South Africa.225 Before the ANC was
driven underground in 1960 under the terms of the Suppres
sion of Communism Act, it led the fight inside South Africa
against the Native Land Act of 1913.226 Under this law the
white minority took 87 percent of the land, and left 13 per
cent for the African majority. The ANC supported the
bloodily repressed Sharpeville protest of 1960 and the stu
dents uprising of 1976227 in Soweto, both viewed as turning
points in black militancy. The ANC was reported to be a
viable organization with a well-established network of
internal and external supporters and sources of money.
Studies show that the ANC enjoyed widespread support "among
225
Africa, No. 55, March 1976, p. 83. Africa, July
1980 reported at least 10,000 young blacks have gone under
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South African blacks."228 About 55 percent of the people
polled in Soweto in 1978 expressed support for ANC, and the
number jumped to 69 per cent in 1980.229 Cuba, Nigeria,
the front line states and the Soviet Union are some of the
major backers of the ANC. The ANC also received financial
and moral support from the British Labor Party and the World
230
Council of Churches.
Nigeria and United States Positions
Opposition to the apartheid system not only came
from internal groups but also from external forces. The
fundamental and continuing opposition of Nigeria and the
United States to the apartheid system was reiterated by both
countries on several occasions.
Nigeria.—Radical Pan-Africanists have long stressed
that the survival of the apartheid system rests on the fact
that African countries capable of meeting South Africa's
humiliating challenge have not stepped sufficiently forward
to do so. That assessment may be debatable. However,
228"Support for ANC Grows," Africa. April 1981, p. 15
229
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beginning with the Muhammed-Obasanjo regime, Nigeria
stepped forward to make its contribution toward meeting the
humiliating challenge. Almost immediately after his ascen
dancy to power in 1975 Muhammed tried to provide leadership,
particularly in matters concerning political change in
South Africa. In a policy statement on September 1, 1975,
the Federal Military Government strongly condemned the
apartheid system in which, inter alia:
. . .15 million non-whites of South Africa are con
demned to live in the most barren reserves covering
13 percent of their home-land while the racist
minority group of under four million whites plunder
87 percent of the land.231
The Muhammed regime not only condemned the apartheid system,
but sought to ostracize South Africa from the international
community through a number of measures which included:
. . .(1) the further tightening of U.N. arms embargo
on South Africa; (2) discouraging any form of coopera
tion in the field of nuclear energy with the apartheid
regime; (3) a call on member states of the U.N. to
avoid economic relations with South Africa; (4) an oil
embargo on South Africa to be observed by all oil pro
ducing countries; (5) a rejection of the policy of
Bantustan; and (6) the calling on member states not to
deal with or recognize any so-called independent home
land.232
Nigeria: Bulletin on Foreign Affairs (August-
December 1975): 2.
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After less than a year in office, Muhammed was assas
sinated. His Successor 0. Obasanjo took over in February
1976. Essentially, no reversal of policy was undertaken
during his administration. Instead, Obasanjo seemed to
favor a tough stance on apartheid by developing a compre
hensive policy that placed equal weight on armed liberation
and diplomatic initiatives. While collaborating with the
United States in the continuing effort to find a peaceful
solution to the issue of political change in South Africa,
the Obasanjo regime also demonstrated its interest in armed
struggle through its extensive support for liberation move
ments in South Africa. In an effort to prepare the general
public for possible Nigerian military involvement in South
Africa and raise national consciousness about the struggle
in South Africa, the Federal Military Government undertook
a massive publicity campaign to educate the people of
Nigeria about the situation in South Africa. The Southern
Africa Relief Fund was established in late 1976, and by mid
1977 more than $10 million was collected. The first of a
number of airlifts of relief supplies that included shoes
and blankets sent by the Fund to the liberation movements
233
left Lagos on September 7, 1977. Countries which had
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suffered from the effects of the liberation war were also
earmarked for special assistance to help offset economic
losses caused by the war. In April 1976 Nigeria gave
Mozambique a grant for $1.5 million, and in July another
check for $250,000 for the support of Zimbabwe freedom
fighters was handed to Joaquim Chissano, Mozambique's
Minister of Foreign Affairs. In January 1977 another air
lift of relief supplies left Lagos for Botswana for an
estimated 2,000 South African refugees there. And in
January 1977 alone 200 Soweto refugee students were admitted
to schools and universities in Nigeria.^4
It was against this background that the announcement
in June 1977 by the Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. T. Y. Danjuma
that Nigeria was ready to send troops to assist the libera
tion movements particularly in South Africa was received
favorably throughout the country. However a report in the
London Daily Telegraph indicating that Nigeria actually
offered troops was strongly denied by the Federal Military
Government
234
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Nigeria's efforts at peaceful change were also
demonstrated through unilateral actions, diplomatic pres
sures exerted through international forums and joint diplo
matic initiatives with the United States. In his position
as Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee Against
Apartheid, Leslie Harriman, Nigeria's Ambassador to the
United Nations consistently worked to put the issue of
political change in South Africa on the front political
burner. One of such efforts was the World Conference for
Action Against Apartheid held in Lagos from August 22-26,
236
1977. The conference was organized by the Federal Govern
ment of Nigeria, in cooperation with the OAU, the U.N., and
in consultation with the South African liberation movements,
the ANC and the PAC. Participants were 112 Governments,
including the frontline states, the United States and
Britain, 12 inter-governmental organizations, five libera
tion movements and five non-governmental organizations.
The purpose of the conference was to intensify the
international campaign against apartheid and map out, as
Kurt Waldheim puts it, "a program of effective action
Report of the World Conference for Action Against
Apartheid, vol. 1 (New York: United Nations, 1977).
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commanding the widest possible support from the interna-
237
tional community." Leslie Harriman said at the confer
ence that: "The time has come for the international
community to pledge to stamp out apartheid, a refined form
of slavery, as it abolished slavery a century ago."238
Speaking before the conference, the United States Ambassa
dor to the United Nations, Andrew Young, credited the
Nigerian government with bringing about a "new sensitivity
of the West" to apartheid. He saw apartheid as "a policy
of discrimination and racism that most Americans had known
at home in not so distant a past." He likened the apart
heid system to cancer, but one that can be cured without
necessarily killing the patient.239 Furthermore, he reit
erated the United States commitment to bring about change
in South Africa, leading to majority rule and an end to
apartheid.
Also speaking before the conference Obasanjo stated
that Nigeria was willing to move from rhetoric to concrete
237Ibid., p. 5.
238
West Africa, 29 August 1977, p. 1791
239
Report of the World Conference for Action Against
Apartheid, vol. 11 (New York: United Nations, 1977), p. 13.
190
action. The conference adopted a 30-point Declaration that
came to be known as the Lagos Declaration.240
Throughout 1977 the Obasanjo administration dis
cussed ways of forcing western firms doing business in
South Africa to choose between their interests in South
Africa and in black Africa. By the end of 1977 Nigeria had
established an Economic Intelligence Unit to prevent firms
that had dealings with South Africa from operating in
Nigeria. The first of a number of retaliatory measures was
announced on March 21, 1978. Nigeria ordered the withdrawal
of all government deposits from Barclays Bank.241 This
move almost caused the bank to fail. In December 1977, the
United Nations General Assembly overwhelmingly endorsed a
proposal for a mandatory oil embargo against South Africa,




For details see Report of the Conference, vol. 1,
p. 31. Delegates from the West expressed reservations on
some of the points and attempted to prevent total approval
of the Lagos Declaration, which was eventually approved by
acclamation.
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"A Precise Move Against Barclays," West Africa.
3 April 1978, p. 636.
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United Nations Chronicle, vol. XV, n. 9 (October
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191
Obasanjo left office in 1979, and his successor,
President Shehu Shagari repeatedly reaffirmed Nigeria's
commitment to the freedom of Namibia and to the end of
apartheid. He indicated a willingness to continue the
policy of taking a tough stance against "western business
interests that continue to collaborate with South Africa."
Furthermore, he warned that Nigeria would use "all means
at our disposal, including oil if necessary," to bring
about political change in South Africa.243
United States.—On South Africa, the United States,
especially during the Carter administration, seemed to
favor a tough stance on apartheid. This tough stance was
manifested in three forms of pressure: military, economic
and diplomatic.244 Military—Historically, curbs on
military cooperation with South Africa appear to have been
the most important on the list of United States action
taken against apartheid. In 1963 the United States embar
goed arms sales to South Africa, and in 1967 the United
States Navy was ordered to stop calling at South African
243
New York Times, 4 October 1980, p. A. 4.
244
Desaik Myers, III and David Liff, "South Africa
Under Botha: The Press of Business," Foreign Policy
(Spring 1980): 149-150.
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ports. The United States voted for United Nations Security
Council Resolution 418 which imposed a mandatory arms em
bargo against South Africa in 1977. The embargo was
adopted unanimously by the 15 members of the Security
Council in a vote the Secretary General Kurt Waldheim
called "a momentous step." The resolution said, in part,
thats
The existing arms embargo must be strengthened and
universally applied, without any reservation or
qualifications whatsoever in order to prevent a
further aggravation of the grave situation in South
Africa.245
Andrew Young later said that the arms embargo was not aimed
at destroying the apartheid regime but was an attempt to
encourage moderation in it.246 In 1978 a ban was placed
on export of items used by the South African military and
police, deemed to be the chief enforcers of apartheid.247
Economic—Although Andrew Young had argued that
economic sanctions, whether partial or total, were never
effective, limited economic pressure was applied on South
245
"Council Imposes Mandatory Arms Embargo Against
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Africa by the United States. In 1979 Congressional commit
tee investigations revealed that Olin Corporation was in
volved in the illegal shipment of arms to South Africa. A
total of 3,200 guns were reported illegally shipped between
1971 and 1975, for which the company was fined $510,000.248
Also, voters in Berkeley, California, voted overwhelmingly
to withdraw city funds from United States banks that had
extended loans to South Africa.249 Furthermore, the Export
and Import Bank was forbidden to: (a) make loans for United
States sales to South Africa; and (b) extend guarantees or
credit insurance to United States businesses operating in
South Africa unless they could show evidence of progress
being made in eliminating apartheid.250 Also, the United
States has endorsed the Sullivan Principles, as have
about 140 United States firms doing business in South
Africa.
248Ibid. 249Ibid., p. 144.
250
This was contained in an Amendment to the Bill of
Authorization introduced by Representative Paul Tsongas
(D., Massachusetts) in 1978. It had the support of national
labor organizations, church groups and main-stream-to-
liberal political forces.
251
The Rev. Leon H. Sullivan is the author of six
principles promulgated in 1977 that form a code of conduct
for American companies doing business in South Africa.
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Diplomacy.—Quiet diplomatic talks with South
Africa on apartheid produced no tangible results. One such
occasion was in 1977 when Vice President Mondale, at a
meeting in Vienna, bluntly told B. J. Vorster that relations
between the United States and South Africa would depend on
progress toward the elimination of apartheid.252 In a
policy statement on June 20, 1978 Secretary of State, Cyrus
Vance reiterated the Administration's tough stance when he
said:
We have made it clear to the South African govern
ment that a failure to begin to make genuine progress
toward an end to racial discrimination and full poli
tical participation for all. . .citizens can only have
an increasingly adverse impact on our relations.253
By 1980 the Carter administration left no doubts in
the minds of observers and the South African regime that a
definite departure from the Nixon-Ford administration policy
had been established. The State Department group during
the Carter administration that was partly responsible for
this departure was the Africanists, made up of Secretary of
252
"Vice President Mondale Visits Europe and Meets
with South African Prime Minister Vorster," Department of
State Bulletin, 20 June 1977, pp. 659-666.
253
Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, U.S. Relations
with Africa, Address before the 58th annual meeting of the
U.S. Jaycees in Atlantic City, 20 June 1978, p. 5.
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State Cyrus Vance, U.S. Ambassadors to the United Nations,
Andrew Young and Don McHenry. The administration's policy
closely followed the thinking of this group who, according
to Great Decisions 1981. believed: "That African problems
should be dealt with as much as possible on their own
merits, and that apartheid is not only morally wrong but
historically doomed."254
The Reagan administration did not deal with African
problems on their own merits. Rather, it dealt with African
problems within the context of the East-West confrontation.
President Reagan tended to be supportive of the South
African regime. According to Henry Jackson, President
Reagan defended United States support on "both moral and
255
strategic grounds." In 1981 President Reagan said:
As long as there is a sincere and honest effort
being made (by the apartheid regime), based on our
own experience in our land, it would seem to me that
we should be trying to be helpful. . . . Can we
abandon a country. . .that strategically is essential
to the Free World in its production of minerals we
all must have and so forth.256
254
"South Africa: Can Race War be Avoided?" Great
Decisions 1981, p. 40.
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Henry Jackson, "Reagan's Policy Rupture," Africa
Report (September-October 1981): 11.
256Quoted in Ibid.
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It was in this context that five South African military
officers visited the United States in 1981. They were
received by Jeane Kirkpatrick, United States Ambassador to
the United Nations. Observers pointed out that the South
Africans' visits and consultations with United States
officials "violated a long standing policy outlawing
official business visits to this country by members of
South Africa's armed forces."
The shift in United States policy under the Reagan
administration underminded what little progress had been
made by the Africanist Group in the Carter administration
to bring about change in the apartheid system.
Evaluation.—The effect of these combined pres
sures from Nigeria and the United States with collaboration
from the United Nations, coupled with the escalation of
guerrilla activities inside South Africa produced two
responses from South Africa: (1) minimizing its dependence
on foreign arms and oil; and (2) initiating some cosmetic
changes in South Africa.
The South African regime attempted to counter the
arms embargo by: (a) stepping up the production of arms.
257Ibid.
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In 1979 it was estimated that South Africa had built the
world's tenth largest arms industry, possibly including a
nuclear weapons capability; and (b) once heavily dependent
on foreign oil, South Africa minimized that dependence to
22 percent of its oil needs in 1980. South Africa is said
to have developed the largest and technologically the most
advanced "oil-from-coal industry." It is estimated that
South Africa will be self-sufficient in energy in two
decades.258
The cosmetic changes initiated by the South African
regime included the relaxation of what observers call "petty
apartheid"—that is discrimination in cinemas, parks,
sports and beaches. These changes were contained in three
new laws announced by the South African regime towards the
end of 1980. The new laws are aimed at eliminating hurtful
discrimination. Perhaps the most important aspect of these
laws, according to Hennie Serfontein, concerned the attempt
to deal "with the presence of Africans in the so-called
white areas outside the homelands." These laws repealled
the present Urban Areas Act and "change the pass law system
and influx control regulation which restricts the flow of
p. 143.
258
Myers and Liff, "South Africa under Botha,"
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blacks to the cities."259
Supporters hailed these changes as "revolutionary
breakthrough in race relations," and predicted the end to
the pass law system. Critics rejected it as being too little
too late because "it did not involve fundamental changes in
the apartheid structure, and was merely an adjustment within
the framework."260 On the other hand, domestic violence is
on the increase inside South Africa. The ANC has stepped
up guerrilla attacks inside South Africa. Two crucial Sasol
oil-for-coal plants were set ablaze in 1980.
Students, trade unions and several organizations
were also involved in activism inside South Africa. Stu
dents protests against being taught in Afrikaans led to the
Soweto uprising of June 1976. Within a few weeks the up
rising escalated into a large resistance movement. It
triggered simultaneous uprisings by colored and Indian stu
dents, some sectors of black workers, and some white stu-
261
dents marched in solidarity with Soweto. The Soweto
9Hennie Serfontein, "Too Little Changes Too Late,"
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uprising, in Magubane's assessment, "became a political act
and a general declaration of war on the white rule."262 In
1980 colored students in the Cape area went on a prolonged
strike causing a violent confrontation with the South Afri
can police.
The formation of black and multi-racial trade
unions was sanctioned in South Africa in 1979. According to
Africa Confidential, "it could be argued that it is the only
substantial reform to have come out of the Prime Ministry of
P. W. Botha."264
In theory, trade unions were forbidden to engage in
political activities, but 1979 witnessed the fastest growth
ever in militancy of the trade union movement. Although the
unions claimed they were not political, that their focus was
solely on pay and conditions, observers pointed out that
"the possibility of organized labor acting as a potent
vehicle for political change" was obvious.
The Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU)
262Ibid.
263Africa, n. 107, July 1980, p. 23.
264Africa Confidential. 7 July 1982, p. 1
265Africa Confidential, 11 March 1981, p. 2.
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followed a carefully planned strategy of fighting those
battles which they had some chance of winning. Its general
secretary Alec Erwin said the unions made some gains in re
laxation of petty apartheid in workplaces, but he also
pointed out that once outside the workplace, workers were
still confronted with apartheid.
There are those who believed the United States,
particularly the Reagan administration, did not do enough to
promote the cause of African emancipation. They would like
to have seen the United States take stronger actions, includ
ing a trade boycott, disinvestment and a mandatory applica
tion of the Sullivan Principles against the South African
266
government. oo Randall Robinson, lamented the lack of
serious commitment to change on the part of the United States,
pointing out that:
. . .the difficulty is that Americans often do not
identify with the struggle for change in South Africa.
We lack a serious commitment to change, because as a
nation we tend to identify with the plight of white
South Africans.267
266
Advocates of these actions include university stu
dents, liberal churches and black organizations across the
United States.
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Randall Robinson, "South Africa Under Botha: Invest
ments in Tokenism," Foreign Policy (Spring 1980): 167.
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A case against disinvestment268 as effective action against
the apartheid regime was made by those who contended that
disinvestment would hurt blacks. Robinson supported disin
vestment.
269
Some influential Americans were of the opinion
that: (a) the United States should apply stronger pressure
on South Africa to bring about change of the Apartheid sys
tem; and (b) the United States lacked the domestic political
will to do so. A study done for the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace by James Baker, John de st. Jorre, and
J. Daniel 01Flaherty concluded that:
. . .there is a clear consensus in the foreign policy
community that the United States should exert stronger
pressure on the South African regime to change its
domestic racial policies.270
Such a consensus, according to this study:
. . .coexists with a feeling that, in the wake of Viet
nam, the United States possesses neither the domestic
political will nor the practical ability to determine
events in other countries271
268
°°For an overview of the pros and cons of this argu
ment, see Myers and Liff, "South Africa Under Botha," p. 147.
269
They include top-level government officials; con
gressmen, public interest activists; blacks, church and
labor leaders; academics; lawyers and businessmen.
270James E. Baker et al., "The American Consensus on
South Africa," World View (October 1979): 12.
271Ibid.
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The study added that beneath the consensus that fundamental
change in South Africa was inevitable, and that the United
States should apply pressure on South Africa, "lie a host of
contradictions, inconsistencies and disagreements."272 of
critical significance was the disagreement about the degree
of change that had taken place in South Africa and how it
had come about.
Admittedly, these changes were not fundamental, but
some observers contended that they were important first
steps toward real change. Robert Rotberg asserted that:
South Africa is being compelled to change its
intense system of racial domination because of the per
sistent threat of domestic violence and the suspicion
and pressure of a skeptical West.273
It is doubtful that South Africa would voluntarily dismantle
the apartheid system without the combined effect of domes
tic violence and international pressure. (More will be said
about the relative impact of domestic violence and inter
national pressure in the next section.) Thus, there was
some validity in the assertion by Rotberg that:
Western pressure has stimulated a process of change in
South Africa. The rethinking that has been reflected
272Ibid.
273
-"Robert I. Rotberg, "South Africa Under Botha: How
Deep A Change? Foreign Policy (Spring 1980): 126.
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in Prime Minister P. W. Botha's new rhetoric, in the
actions of his government, and in the ferment of late
1979 and early 1980 would have been impossible with
out a cooling of American friendship.274
Fundamental change in the apartheid system, involving a
major restructuring of government and society, is what is
needed. The cosmetic changes that have taken place, in
Bishop Desmond Tutu's assessment, were no more than im
provements. South Africa and its backers. Tutu contended,
"are making apartheid more comfortable rather than disman
tling it. We do not want our chains made comfortable. We
275
want them removed." International pressure on the South
African regime would have to be maintained to compel it to
start moving decisively to end the apartheid system.
What were the factors behind U.S. policy in South
Africa? Diplomatic rhetoric aside, was the U.S. really
committed to fundamental change in South Africa? Why did
the U.S. dragg its feet in applying stronger pressure on
South Africa? Were Nigeria and the U.S. both motivated by
the same interests in South Africa?
Motivations.—There was evidence to suggest that
, p. 127.
275
Bishop Desmond Tutu, "The Future of South Africa,"
Africa Report (September-October 1981): 4.
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both countries were not motivated by the same interests.
While Nigeria may have been motivated by its sincere commit
ment to political change, the United States sought to pro
tect its varied economic and strategic interests in South
Africa.
Nigeria.—The need to complete the unfinished task
of the total decolonization of Southern Africa was a strong
motivating factor for Nigeria's involvement in South Africa.
Furthermore, Nigeria saw this task as a moral obligation on
its part to assist fellow Africans in the liberation of
what remains of the white redoubt. The liberation of South
Africa would have been a fulfilling achievement for Nigeria
which had consistently stressed the point that until all of
Africa was free, Nigeria remains unfree.
United States.—Beyond the level of diplomatic
rhetoric, the United States was not interested in fundamen
tal change in South Africa, particularly in the Reagan
administration. The motivating factors behind U.S. policy
in South Africa were essentially strategic and economic.
Strategic interests.—These included: (a) U.S.
access to South Africa's mineral resources, (b) the secu
rity of Western oil flows around the Cape Sea route, and
(c) containing Soviet and Cuban influence and activities
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in South Africa. Platinum, a major element in anti-polution
technology, was one of the many minerals imported by the
United States from South Africa. Others included, antimony,
(44%), manganese (9%), Cobalt (7%), and industrial diamonds
(81%). (See Table 1, page 76.) It is estimated that South
Africa has about half of the world's gold resources, and
produces about 60 percent of the total world's production.
The Cape Sea route, connecting the South Atlantic and the
Indian Oceans, serves as a passageway for 90 percent of
Western Europe's oil supplies, 70 percent of its strategic
minerals, and about 20 percent of U.S. oil imports. ° The
U.S. also had an interest in maintaining its naval base in
Simonstown, South Africa, in order to continue its space
tracking stations' activities and intelligence operations
in the region and much of black Africa.
A prolonged cut-off of these supplies by the Soviet
Union could cripple Western economies. Therefore, Soviet
Union's access to basing rights in South Africa would be
considered by the U.S. as giving the Soviet Union the
military means to do so.
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Economic interests.—The U.S. corporate stake in
South Africa included about 350 American companies, with a
total investment of about $2 billion in 1980. See Table 2,
page 77. Rhetorical condemnation of apartheid notwith
standing, the U.S. government actually facilitated U.S.
investments in South Africa. According to a study for the
U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Embassy staff in South
Africa "consider the rendering of assistance to present and
potential U.S. investors to be a vital part of its task in
the country," and indeed, this commanded a considerable
portion of the embassy's attention."277 Furthermore, the
U.S. had lucrative trade relations with South Africa,
totaling $3.4 billion in 1980.278
Nation states formulate their foreign policies to
promote and defend their most vital interests. Thus, it
can safely be assumed that, for as long as the U.S. con
siders its strategic and economic interests in South Africa
as vital national interests, the U.S. is not likely to
pursue a foreign policy that would undermine these inter
ests in South Africa.
277
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207
In the concluding chapter, an attempt will be made to:
(a) sum up the impact of Nigeria-United States roles on
these cases; (b) generalize about relations between Nigeria
and the United States with respect to political change in
Africa; and (c) evaluate the prospects of Nigeria-United
States relations for the future.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
In the course of pursuing its stated foreign policy
objectives, Nigeria realized that there were other important
actors in the international environment to contend with.
One such actor was the United States. Nigeria's commitment
to the cause of African emancipation seems to have been in
harmony with United States global policy as outlined in
National Security Council Memorandum No. D. 18, which sought/
inter alia, to: (a) foster closer cooperation with Nigeria,
now regarded as one of the influential states, likely to
sway the fate of the rest of Africa; and (b) enhance the
United States' cooperative effort with "moderate states of
Africa in the cause of African emancipation."
This convergence of interests formed the basis of
Nigeria-United States relations during the period covered
by this study. During this period both countries publicly
National Security Council Memorandum No. D.18,p. 15.
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took similar positions on the issue of political change in
Africa. However, the United States has some ulterior
motives in taking these positions. These motives, which
include its profitable economic interests and strategic in
terests in the region, it has managed to cloak in political
and human rights terms. On occasions, both countries have
made joint efforts to find peaceful solutions to the prob
lem of political change in Africa.
How did these shared perspectives and the coopera
tive efforts between both countries impact on the situation
in Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa? In this con
cluding chapter, an attempt will be made to: (a) summarize
the impacts in the cases cited; (b) generalize about the
relations between both countries with regard to political
change in Africa; and (c) critically evaluate the prospects
for Nigeria-United States relations in the future.
Impacts
Angola
If there is any validity in Ivo D. Duchacek's asser
tion that "very rarely, if ever, is there either a total
2
harmony or total conflict of national interests" between
Ivo Duchacek, Nations and Men (Hindsdale, 111.:
Dryden Press, 1975), p. 532.
210
nations, the Angolan crisis is a good testimony. Nigeria
and the United States initially backed the same faction
(UNITA-FNLA), but for different reasons.
Nigeria.—Two factors can be identified: moral
obligation and commitment to black solidarity.
United States.—Soviet and Cuban involvement, and a
feverish attempt to deny anti-western powers a strong foot
hold in Southern Africa; and varied economic and strategic
interests in the region. However, South Africa's interven
tion in the Angolan crisis changed all that. Nigeria and
the United States found themselves on the opposite sides of
the conflict, with Nigeria backing the MPLA while the United
States backed the UNITA-FNLA faction.
Perhaps more important was the fact that the Angolan
crisis marked the beginning of a shift in United States'
perspective on political change in Africa. Contrary to the
Nixon administration's policy as outlined in NSSm 39 which
predicted, inter alia, continued Portuguese domination, and
ruled out black victory, the United States not only wit
nessed the dismantling of Portuguese domination and the
celebration of black victory, but it actively supported one
of the factions vying for political power rather than at
tempting to prevent political change. Caught unaware by
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events in Angola, the United States sought to install in
Angola a neo-colonial government by covertly funding and
arming FNLA-UNITA, the faction considered by the United
States as a "moderate and pro-western in orientation." This
led to a serious disagreement between Nigeria and the United
States. This disagreement was important in that it clearly
demonstrated that Nigeria was truly committed to real inde
pendence in Angola while the United States was prepared to
settle for a neo-colonial pattern of political change.
There was a perception in the United States that an
MPLA government in Angola would be inimical to United States'
interests, but history proved that wrong. Thus, by backing
the FNLA-UNITA the United States sought to prevent the MPLA
from coming to power or as John Stockwell, the former chief
of the C.I.A.'s Angola Task Force, puts it, "to prevent the
quick and cheap installation in Angola of what Mobutu would
regard as a pawn of Moscow." African interests and con
cerns were not the factors behind U.S. involvement in
Angola.
U.S. anti-MPLA posture notwithstanding, the most
important thing to the Angolan people and Pan-Africanists
Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, p. 54.
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was true independence; how it occurred was of secondary
significance. Historically, Pan-Africanists seemed to favor
this stand, and Angola was not an exception. In Julius K.
Nyerere's own words, "anything else, at this stage, is ir
relevant to us." The concern now, Nyerere asserts, is
political change, not how it is won, for "that will be
dealt with after it has been won, not before." After all,
Nyerere added, "in the war against Nazism the United States
and the Soviet Union were allies."
Events since Angola's independence in 1975 have been
fairly consistent with this thinking, as has been the case
with most African states which won the fight for political
change through the assistance of the Soviet Union and Cuba.
They invariably turn once again to the West for their tech
nology, trading opportunities and economic assistance.
Revolutionary rhetoric is toned down for political and eco
nomic reality because, in essence, "Africa is part of the
non-communist world economic system." According to United
Julius K. Nyerere, "American and Southern Africa,"
Foreign Affairs (July 1977: 35.
Implications of Soviet and Cuban Activities in
Africa for United States Policy, A study for the Department
of Defense by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Washington, D.C., 1979, p. 25.
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States Under Secretary for Political Affairs in the Carter
administration, David D. Newsom:
A few African governments describe their policies
or ruling parties as Marxist-Leninist or scientific
socialist, but their policies are mixed and do not
follow any rigid Saviet model.6
These countries include Mozambique, Ethiopia and Angola.
In these countries there is evidence "of a resistance on
the part of the leadership to the total adoption of the
Marxist-Leninist pattern of internal policies and organiza-
7
tion." Andrew Young has long urged United States policy
makers not to consider the socialist rhetoric of some
African leaders in isolation, but rather to compare it with
their actual policies. Angola's President, Agostinho Neto,
defended Angola's independence and sovereignty when he
pointed out that:
We are free and independent. ... We are not
satellites because the Soviet Union provides us with
arms. We have never asked Moscow how we should organize
our state. It is our movement, our government and our
people who will take decisions on the many major prob
lems which our country faces.^
David D. Newsom, Testimony before the Subcommittee
on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on
October 18, 1979, p. 5.
7Ibid.
"Angola Interview," Africa Report (January-February
1976) : 3.
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Angolan overtures for direct discussions with the United
States were conveyed through congressional aides and
journalists touring Luanda. According to Marcum, soon
after its independence in 1975 Angola expressed its: (a)
readiness to welcome the Gulf Oil Corporation back to the
Cabindan oil fields that it had left under United States
government pressure; (b) recognition of the importance of
Western markets for its oil, iron, coffee, diamond and other
exports; and (c) willingness to make a constitutional under
taking not to allow any "foreign power to establish bases"
on Angolan territory. Gulf Oil Corporation came back to
Angola and was pumping 160,000 barrels a day by 1981.
Texaco and Boeing Aircraft also returned to do business in
Angola.10 Although these business interests do not speak
for the United States, Gulf Oil Corporation's position on
United States policy of nonrecognition was made known in
1978 when an official declared in congressional testimony
that: "It would be in the mutual interest of the United
States and Angola for the United States to establish formal
John Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," Foreign Affairs
(April 1976): 420.
10New York Times, 8 February 1981, p. Y. 25.
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relations with the People's Republic of Angola."^
However, while United States concern over Soviet and
Cuban involvement in Africa was understandable, this con
cern, as the study for the Defense Department by the Center
for Strategic and International Studies pointed out, "should
not be the only thrust of African policy. Furthermore, the
study added, "not all activities of Moscow and Havana" in
12
Africa "are counter to United States interests." The
crucial question was why had the United States not shown so
much intensity and concern over the cause of Soviet and
Cuban involvement in Africa? It was clear that the exis
tence of colonial and neo-colonial governments, occupation
forces, settler regimes, and minority regimes presented the
biggest opportunities for Soviet and Cuban involvement in
Africa. Emphasizing this point further, a study for the
Defense Department declared that "the existence of white,
minority-ruled governments is the cause of Soviet and Cuban
involvement, and as long as such governments exist and
follow discriminatory policies" Africa will seek help from
.S. Congress, House Committee on International
Relations, U.S.-Angolan Relations, Hearings before the Sub-
Committee on Africa, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, May 25,
1978, p. 39.
^Implications of Soviet and Cuban Activities, p. 25.
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the Soviets and Cubans for their liberation.13 In a be
lated attempt to remove the cause of Soviet and Cuban in
volvement in Africa the United States steadily increased
its role in finding a peaceful solution to African problems
after the Angolan crisis.
On the whole, Nigeria-United States role in Angola
had different impacts on the resolution of the conflict.
U.S. continued support for FNLA-UNITA, long after the MPLA
had won the war and this had the negative impact of prolong
ing the war and destablizing the MPLA government. Nigeria's
strong position in favor of the winning faction, (MPLA)
whose objectives were true independence and self-determina
tion had the positive impact of helping fellow Africans to
liberate themselves from colonialism and oppression.
However, in the case of Zimbabwe, Nigeria-United
States differences were not as sharp as they were in Angola.
Thus, both countries made joint efforts to find a peaceful
solution to the crisis.
Zimbabwe
When President Carter came into office in 1977 he
explained to an understandably skeptical Africa that the
13Ibid.
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motivating force in United States policy in Africa was not
opposition to communism per se, but concern for the aspira
tions of the continent. Andrew Young's appointment and his
subsequent diplomacy were instrumental in lending credi
bility to this new United States line. And when the situa
tion in Zimbabwe became critical in 1977, Nigeria and the
United States had no major difficulty in making a joint
effort to find a peaceful solution to the problem.
First, there was the basic agreement between both
countries that: (a) political change in Zimbabwe was in
evitable; and (b) such change should be fundamental.
Second, both countries were also agreed that the solution
that would bring about such a change should be one which
was acceptable to all parties to the conflict, and to de
vise such a peace plan, all the parties to the conflict
would be brought to the conference table.
It was under this basic understanding and commit
ment to meaningful change by both countries that their col
laborative efforts to find a peaceful solution to the
Zimbabwean problem, as demonstrated by the many diplomatic
initiatives including the Anglo-American Proposals and the
Lancaster House Agreement, were successful. The outcome in
Zimbabwe, for which Nigeria and the United States are given
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a substantial part of the credit, was a desirable one.
First, it settled once and for all, the issue of political
change in Zimbabwe, thereby meeting the aspirations of the
Zimbabwean people, the foreign policy objective of Nigeria
and at the same time enhanced the credibility of United
States global policy in the region. Second, in the words
of Andrew Young, it "was the premier achievement in the
long struggle for majority rule in Southern Africa, and
United States role in that process contributed to the sue-
14
cess" in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the success of United
States diplomatic initiative in Zimbabwe, according to Xan
Smiley, entailed considerable political benefits for the
West, in that:
Mugabe has, in fact, been cold toward the U.S.S.R.
since independence. His refusal to invite delegations
from the Soviet Union's closest Eastern bloc allies to
independence celebrations was widely seen as a snub.15
The thinking in the State Department was that:
. . .our security has been enhanced by the success of
peacemaking in Zimbabwe. That effort deprived our
adversaries of a conflict to exploit. . .we must not
14
Andrew Young, "The U.S. and Africa: Victory for
Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs (Winter 1981): 665.
Xan Smiley, "Zimbabwe, Southern Africa and the
Rise of R. Mugabe," Foreign Affairs (Summer 1980): 1083.
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retreat from those efforts.16
As in Angola, events since independence in Zimbabwe
have shown that revolutionary rhetoric during the struggle
for political change does not necessarily translate into
Marxist-Leninist policies patterned after the Soviet model.
Rather, President Mugabe "has spoken of his high esteem for
the United States and his desire to form genuine bonds of
friendship with America." Furthermore, he made known "his
intention to work within the free enterprise system." The
United States responded with a total of $20 million in
18
assistance in 1979 and $30 million in 1980. Nigeria also
gave assistance to Zimbabwe, including a $5 million grant
"to enable the government to buy out the South African stake
19
in Zimbabwe's newspapers" in 1980.
It was unlikely that the outcome in Zimbabwe would
have been the same without the efforts of the Patriotic
Front, the Front Line States, Nigeria and the United States.
Secretary of State, Ed. Muskie, "U.S. Security
Programs," Address Before the World Affairs Council,
Pittsburgh, 18 September 1980, p. 4.
Department of State Bulletin, June 1980, p. 19.
18Ibid.
19
Shehu Shagari, My Vision of Nigeria, p. 65.
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Independence in Zimbabwe, as Andrew Young puts it, was a
victory for diplomacy, but it was also a victory for armed
struggle, in that:
. . .it was achieved through the skilled and tough
diplomacy of the British government. . .the patient
statesmanship of the Front Line states and Nigeria;
the courage and unshakable commitment to liberation
shown by Rovert Mugabe (PF). . .and the firm, con
sistent support of the United States government.20
With the exception of South Africa, where the mood was
decidedly one of sombre caution, reactions elsewhere in
21
Africa were very enthusiastic. The Organization of Afri
can Unity saw the outcome in Zimbabwe as a vindication of
its position that the Patriotic Front was the "sole and
22
legitimate representative of the Zimbabwean people." In
his congratulatory message, Lesotho's Chief Leabua Jonathan
saw the outcome in Zimbabwe as "a victory for all black
people in Southern Africa and definite defeat for the
forces of racism."23 President Sadat of Egypt called the
outcome in Zimbabwe "the culmination of an honest struggle
20Andrew Young, "U.S. and Africa," p. 650.
21The O.A.U. and several African countries including
Nigeria, Angola, and the Front Line states all sent
messages of congratulations to Mugabe.
The Daily News (Tanzania), 4 March 1980, p. 3.
23The Guardian (London), 5 March 1980, p. 5.
221
by the people of Zimbabwe under the leadership of the
24
Patriotic Front." Colin Legum, who had concluded in the
previous year (1979) that "the chances of a negotiated
settlement in Rhodesia" would take a miracle, called the
outcome in Zimbabwe an "astonishing achievement" and gave
credit to Britain, the Commonwealth, the Front Line states,
Nigeria, the United States and the Patriotic Front.
Specifically, Legum pointed out two critical factors:
. . .the confluence of interests which in the past had
been strongly divergent; and the co-incidence of a
number of leaders holding their particular positions
at the point where the armed struggle of the Patriotic
Front (PF) had succeeded in weakening the capacity of
the defending Rhodesian forces to hold out much
longer.25
The impact of the collaborative efforts of Nigeria and the
United States on the Zimbabwean situation can be said to
have been constructive and instrumental. These efforts,
26
according to 0. Aluko, "were among the decisive ones."
Because of these efforts, echoed the New York Times,
"Rhodesia has been reborn as Zimbabwe. Most important, it
24A1 Ahram (Cairo, 4 March 1980, p. 2.
Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Records: 1979-
1980 (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1980), p. A3.
0. Aluko, "Britain, Nigeria and Zimbabwe," African
Affairs, 1980, pp. 91-102.
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has been born free."27
Furthermore, the outcome in Zimbabwe was very-
gratifying to nationalists and prominent blacks in the
region who considered it as a giant psychological boost for
black aspirations in Namibia and South Africa itself, and
hoped that the South African government would draw the ap
propriate lesson from it.28 Dr. N. Motlana of Soweto said
"I am as happy as anybody could ever be—as happy as when
Frelimo won in Mozambique." An important lesson South
Africa should have learned from the outcome in Zimbabwe,
according to Motlana, "is that the black puppets whom whites
imposed on blacks as their leaders could not work." He
also expressed the hope that the outcome in Zimbabwe would
make "South African blacks realize that they would also be
29
victorious one day." The Star perhaps summed up the pre
vailing feelings among black people in South Africa when it
editorialized that:
27
New York Times. 5 March 1980, p. 5Y.
28
Others able to express their views included Bishop
Desmond Tutu, Gen. Secretary of the South African Council
of Churches, who called on the South African government to
welcome the new government in Zimbabwe with open and friend
ly arms.
29
The Guardian. 5 March 1980, p. 5.
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The first lesson from this is that South African
government must negotiate directly and immediately
with the real black leaders in this country, not just
those traditional leaders and obvious moderates
through whom the National Party hopes to achieve some
vaguely defined ethnic 'constellation' of states.30
It is unlikely that South Africa will, of its own volition,
negotiate "directly and immediately with the real black
leaders" of South Africa. There has to be an escalation
of domestic violence and an increase in external pressure
on the South African regime to bring this about.
Namibia
In Namibia considerable progress toward a settlement
was made. The United States was an active member of the
Contact Group; and a major force in the drafting of the
Group's proposal for a Namibian settlement. Donald McHenry's
role in this group was instrumental to the success of
United States diplomatic initiative. He was credited with:
(a) convincing South Africa and SWAPO to agree to the
Group's peace proposal; (b) persuading South Africa "that
a United Nations-approved and supervised" peace plan would
be in the best interest of South Africa; and (c) bringing
the two parties to the conflict "within sight of the peace
30The Star, 5 March 1980, p. 2.
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table, and kept them there through two and one half years
of complex and bitter negotiations."31 Nigeria-United
States collaborative efforts, with cooperation from the
United Nations produced some degree of success. First,
South Africa was moved grudgingly from outright intransig
ence to doubtful cooperation, and participated in an all-
party conference in 1981. Second, South Africa was no
longer under any illusion that Namibia would be free; the
only issue was when this would occur.
This is a far cry from South Africa's uncompromis
ing position in the past. Rather than strengthening
apartheid as had been the usual response in the past. South
Africa started to dismantle petty apartheid in Namibia, and
by 1981, parties favoring an Internal settlement were being
encouraged by the South African regime to broaden their
support base at home and abroad. None of these would have
been thinkable without U.S. pressure and the international
community's diplomatic efforts in which Nigeria and the
United States were a major force. But these effects seemed
to have dissipated with Reagan in the White House. He made
Namibian independence a non-priority issue and relaxed
Richard Deutsch, "High Stakes in Namibia," Africa
Report (November-December 1979): 55.
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pressure on the South African government. In effect,
Reagan rolled back what little progress had been made to
wards Namibia's independence during the previous administra
tion. Perhaps the point where Nigeria-United States shared
perspective and cooperative efforts needed to make a
stronger impact than it actually did, was South Africa it
self.
South Africa
The manifestations of this impact can be gleaned
from Prime Minister P. W. Botha's now famous "adapt or die"
speech, in which he indicated that he clearly understood
the need for far-reaching changes in the apartheid system.
By early 1980 South Africa's political fortunes appeared to
be on the decline, with aspects of apartheid undergoing
some changes. Piet Koornhof, South African minister for
Cooperation and Development "declared war" on the pass
system and petty apartheid. At the same time South Africa
attempted to head off the increasingly militant and violent
challenge of the ANC and its supporters. Observers likened
the situation South Africa was confronted with in 1980 to
that which de Tocqueville had described over a century ago
when he wrote:
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Experience teaches us that, generally-speaking the
most perilous moment for bad government is one when it
seeks to mend its ways. Only consumate statecraft can
enable a king to save his throne when, after a long
spell of oppressive rule, he sets out to improve the
lot of his subjects. Patiently endured so long as it
seemed beyond redress, a grievance comes to appear
intolerable once the possibility of removing it crosses
men's minds. ^2
Perhaps the most striking indication that South Africa was
entering this new era was found in its changed political
perspective. Colin Legum summed up this change as follows:
. . .whereas before there was a confident, even ar
rogant, assumption about the durability of white
supremacy; now the dominant white group found itself
on the defensive—no longer even sure of its own
future.33
The success of liberation struggle in Southern
Africa also had its impact, particularly on the perceptions
of South African blacks. T. Beard explained this changed
perceptions accurately when he wrote:
For the first time for well over a decade, blacks
have begun to question the immutability of white
domination and to anticipate processes of change in
which their roles will not be those of mere subordi
nates dictated to by a 'white1 government.-*4
32
Quoted in Economist, 21 June 1980, p. 3.
Colin Legum, "The Crisis of Afrikaner Survival,"
Africa Contemporary Records 1979-1980, p. B. 763.
^4Beard, "General Introduction," p. 2.
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Consequently, there was a growing acceptance of revolu
tionary violence among blacks. They believed that funda
mental change would be brought about through revolutionary
means. The Report of the Study Commission on United States
Policy toward Southern Africa explained that:
. . .among young urban blacks, the watchword that has
been gaining currency is 'which side of the gun are
you on?' Africans began leaving South Africa for
military training abroad about 1973. . . .during the
two years after Soweto, . . .some 4,000 Africans left
the Witwatersrand for such training.3^
This changed perceptions, coupled with the rise in expecta
tions among blacks in South Africa, which found expression
through hightened violence, was not likely to be easily
"broken by government counter-measures" as had been the
case in the past. It was true in 1949 when Kwame Nkrumah
made the point as it was in 1981:
When a people who have smarted under a foreign
rule suddenly wake up to the indignities of such a
rule and begin to assert their national and inherent
right to be free then they have reached that stage of
their political development when no amount of oppres
sive laws and intimidation can keep them down. . . .
When the spirit of the oppressed people revolts
against its oppressors that revolt continues until
The Report of the Study Commission on U.S. Policy
Toward Southern Africa (Los Angeles: UCLA Press, 1981),
p. 199.
Beard, "General Introduction," p. 2.
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freedom is achieved. It carries in its wake a force
too dangerous to suppress.37
"The white regime," said the Report of the Study Commission,
"will prove incapable of crushing all resistance permanently
and that black opposition will grow after any crackdown."38
Furthermore, blacks had begun to demonstrate greater con
fidence in their ability to strike targets inside South
Africa. The pace of activism quickened. According to the
Report of the Study Commission;
. . .whereas Sharpeville was followed by a lull in
black activism, the post-Soweto years have been marked
by the resurgence of the underground ANC and by grow
ing radicalism, evident in renewed political activity
and in waves of strikes and boycotts that have become
endemic. °
The Report added that "militancy is growing among all black
South Africans: Africans, Coloureds, and Indians." There
were "militant ten-year olds and militant grandmothers
supporting the same cause."40 The ANC confounded its
critics by demonstrating its ability to mobilize and con
tinue the struggle. It attracted "the best of those new
recruits who have had to leave the country," and inside
37
Kwame Nkrumah, Revolutionary Path (New York: Inter
national Publishers, 1973), p. 78.
38
U.S. Study Commission, p. 199.
39 40
Ibid., p. 188. Ibid., p. 200.
229
South Africa its activities have forced the South African
head of Security Police to publicly admit that "South Africa
is in a state of war."41 Africa Confidential declared in
1980 that:
. . .the ability of the ANC to carry out sophisticated
acts of sabotage like the operation against the Sasol
refinery will. . .become increasingly evident. . .as
the paramount exile movement, the ANC is gaining
ground. The probability is that one day Botha or his
successor will have to talk to it.4^
According to John S. Saul and Stephen Gelb, the ANC had
become a critical factor in the South African revolution
because of:
. . .its military capacity, which is now increasingly
relevant, and seen to be so by those gravitating to
ward it. The ANC has prepared for this necessary
level of struggle and is also equipped for it. ...
Engagements with the South African Defense Force have
become much more commonplace.4^
Also there were the increasing "reports of whites abandon
ing farms all along the Transvaal's northern borders be-
44
cause of guerrilla presence." with external pressures
mounting and internal violence escalating, "white
41
Saul and Gelb, The Crisis in South Africa, p. 138.
42Africa Confidential, 1 October 1980, p. 3.
43
Saul and Gelb, The Crisis in South Africa, p. 138.
44Ibid.
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domination is becoming increasingly beleaguered"; and de
lay in the achievement of political change is to be "re
garded as no more than temporary."^5
Perhaps the most critical manifestation was the fact
that there appeared to be a change of heart among some seg
ments of the white population of South Africa. The pro-
government South African newspaper, Rapport, conducted a
survey in which three out of four white South Africans
"agree that legislation which discriminates purely on
grounds of race should be scrapped." Rapport gave editor
ial support for black political participation when it said:
We have learned enough to know that. . .after all
there is only one basis on which communities can as
sociate with one another and develop, and that is
government by consent. And this can be achieved only
by a system that is not designed by one element and
forced on all the others, but one that is created in
consultation with others. 6
Willem de Klerk, editor of Die Transvaler, also summed up
the mood of some white South Africans in an editorial when
he wrote:
Hard, cold, equal negotiations are now on the agenda
. . . . The whites in this country are increasingly
sincerely predisposed to establish a new dispensation.
Beard, "General Introduction," p. 3.
46Quoted in the Financial Mail, 17 August 1979, p. 2.
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A dispensation of human dignity for all. Removal of
discrimination. Equal opportunities. . . . The whites
want to give their share of a meaningful compromise
for a political settlement. . .47
The pace of this change of heart was probably quickened by
events in Southern Africa, particularly Zimbabwe. The
Rand Daily Mail's response to the outcome in Zimbabwe in
1980 was a clear indication that the South African regime
not only drew the proper lesson from, but it also showed
that the people are worried that stalling for time might not
be in their best interest. The paper appealed to white
South Africans to:
. . .look at (Rhodesia) now to see the consequences
of delay; of missing chances to do favorable deals
while there is still time; of destroying the moderate
black leaders by giving them nothing to show for their
moderation except the deadly image of collaborators;
and of polarizing the races and radicalizing the minds
of the blacks until in the end there is a great nation
alist upsurge for the man with the most extreme image.48
This change of heart was further demonstrated in 1980 when
69 Johanesburgh restaurants were given official permission
to provide equal eating facilities to all races. And Piet
Koornhof took a group of white guests to a dinner party
47
Quoted by Saul and Gelb in The Crisis in South
Africa, p. 60.
48
'The Rand Daily Mail, 16 May 1980, p. 2
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hosted by blacks in Soweto.49
Although none of these changes were fundamental,
they are important first steps that "would have been im
possible" without the combined effect of domestic violence
and international pressure.50
A Generalization
On balance, Nigeria-United States relations with
respect to political change in Africa, were marked by dis
agreements and cooperation. Specifically, relations were
decidedly cool at times, as during the Nixon-Ford era;
cordial at other times, as they were during the Carter
administration, and conflictual during the Reagan adminis
tration .
For different reasons, the two nations shared, as
President Carter puts it: "(a) a commitment to majority rule
and individual human rights. . .; (b) a commitment to an
Africa that is at peace, free from colonialism, and free
from racism."51 These commitments underlined their shared
49
International Herald Tribune (Paris), 3 October
1980, p. 4.
Rotberg, "South Africa Under Botha," p. 126.
President Jimmy Carter, "U.S. Commitments to
Nigeria and Africa," Public Papers of the Presidents (Wash
ington, D.C.: The White House, 1980), p. 25.
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perspectives on political change in Africa. During the
period under study both countries essentially worked closely
together to achieve these goals in some of the cases
studied and in other African troubled spots. They took
similar positions on most of the cases, although there was
a serious question mark over United States' motives? had
serious disagreement over Angola, with the United States
backing the faction with a neo-colonial orientation; fully
collaborated in working out the peace plan in Zimbabwe and
made some progress in Namibia and South Africa. In the
latter two cases efforts to find an acceptable peace plan
have continued, as President Carter pointed out, "We in the
United States remain committed, as do the people of Nigeria
to the path of genuine progress and fairness."52 By 1981
President Carter's belief that Namibian and South African
societies "should and can be transformed progressively and
peacefully, with assured respect for the rights of all,"
had not yet been realized. This was partly due to the fact
that the Reagan administration did not continue the Carter
policy. Consequently, no meaningful progress was made




The chances of the close relations between Nigeria
and the United States continuing in the future will largely
depend on: (a) progress made in Namibia and South Africa
on the issue of political change; (b) whether both countries
can continue their collaborative efforts on Southern Africa;
and (c) to some extent, who is in the White House.
Progress.—Fast and concrete progress in resolving
the Namibian dispute, coupled with a decisive move toward
dismantling of apartheid system in South Africa will be
needed for the cordial relations between Nigeria and the
United States to continue. Unfortunately, since the end of
the Carter administration no tangible results have emerged
from Reagan's so-called "constructive engagement" policy.
Nigeria has voiced its dissatisfaction with the Reagan
administration's policy on many occasions. In a policy
statement at the Commonwealth Conference in Melbourne,
Australia, Shagari expressed his disagreement with aspects
of the Reagan policy- Specifically, he rejected the
"linkage theory," and added that "linking the so-called
issue of Cuban troops with the question of independence is
incomprehensible." In a major news conference in
54President Shehu Shagari, "Policy Toward Southern
Africa," p. 5.
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October 1983 Shagari complained that:
No progress is being made toward what we hold so
dear—-the decolonization of Africa. We believe these
excuses the Reagan administration raises about Cuban
troops in Angola are just excuses to delay indepen
dence for the people of Namibia, excuses to assist
racism in Southern Africa.55
Furthermore, President Shagari pointed out that the long-
term interests of the United States rest with "cooperation
with the rest of Africa rather than identifying with a
small racist clique."*6
Continuing collaboration.—For concrete progress to
be made in the two remaining colonies, Nigeria-United
States collaborative efforts will have to be intensified,
and the United States in particular will have to take a
tough stance and increase international pressure on South
Africa. Most important, political change for Namibia and
South Africa should not be contingent upon the withdrawal
of Soviet and Cuban forces in the region because: (a) the
supposition that political change brought about with aid
from the Soviet Union and Cuba will as a matter of course
make the emergent regime a Soviet satellite, is hopelessly




flawed; (b) the governments and policies of Angola and
Zimbabwe are neither Soviet satellites created by Moscow
nor do they follow any rigid Soviet model; and (c) the
governments of these countries have publicly stated their
intentions to protect their sovereignty and remain in the
capitalist world system. Zimbabwe would not even establish
diplomatic relations with Moscow until about a year after
independence.
It is my contention that the available empirical
evidence is far more consistent with the view that polit
ical change in Angola and Zimbabwe has brought into exis
tence governments with a strong nationalist orientation
concerned with protecting their sovereignty than it is with
the view that these governments and their policies are pro
ducts of Soviet machinations which, once in power, will be
communist satellites. To miss this nationalist dynamic in
these countries and interpret events as a by product of a
global East-West conflict amounts to a distortion of
reality.
White House orientation.—The prospects of (a) and
(b) above coming about will depend, to some extent, on the
policy orientation of whoever is in the White House.
Therefore, it is essential to have in the White House an
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administration that is both sensitive in its policy and
committed to the completion of what Nigeria "holds so dear"
—the dismantling of the last vestiges of white minority
rule; first, in Namibia and then, most importantly, in South
Africa. Such sensitivity and commitment must be reflected
in a policy that is actively opposed to apartheid in con
crete terms. It will not do to engage in rhetorical ab-
horence of apartheid. Such public condemnations must be
backed by concrete actions that will leave the South African
regime in no doubt that nomalization of United States-South
Africa relations will depend on progress toward the dis
mantling of the apartheid system. If these conditions pre
vail, the high point reached in Nigeria-United States
relations in 1980 will undoubtedly continue, and both
countries stand to gain from it.
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